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The Communication on "The demographic future of Europe – from challenge to opportunity" 
(COM (2006) 571final) approved by the European Commission on October 2006, describes 
the state of demographic change in the European Union. Notable findings are that the 
average number of children per woman is low, well below the replacement rate of 2,1 
required to maintain population size in the absence of immigration. The communication also 
points to the effectiveness of family and other policies in creating conditions supportive of 
those who wish to have children.  
The importance of creating conditions favourable to having children is also illustrated by the 
2006 Euro barometer on Fertility and Aging, which showed that in general, Europeans (both 
women and men) declare a wish to have more children than they effectively do have. 
Following the communication, the European Council announced in March 2007 the creation 
of a European Alliance for Families which will be a platform for exchanging experience and 
good practice between Member States. In the recent Communication ―Promoting solidarity 
between the generations‖ (COM (2007)244 final) adopted on 10 May 2007, the Commission 
set out how it intends to support this Alliance. The Council presented its views on the 
Alliance in conclusions adopted at its meeting on 30-31 May 2007. One major purpose of the 
Alliance is to help Member States in modernizing their policies aimed at supporting 
parenthood.  
Three main forms of support for families were identified in the Commission Communication 
of May 2007: 
 compensation for the direct and indirect costs associated with the family (benefits or 
tax relief for those responsible for children or other dependent persons),  
 services to parents in the form of education and care for young children, care and 
supervision for older children and, increasingly, services for dependent people in an 
ageing society,  
 Organization of working and employment conditions (appropriate work schedules and 
leave) and access to services at local level. 
Both the Communication on intergenerational solidarity and the Council conclusions of May 
2007 insist strongly on the importance of measures aimed at supporting families in order to 
enhance the reconciliation of work, private and family life. Indeed, allowing more mothers to 
remain in employment while raising children could have a major impact on families‘ income, 
thus reducing significantly the indirect costs of parenthood. 
The modernization of policies supporting families is likely to be crucial, not only to allow 
Europeans to have the number of children they wish to have, hence contributing to  
European demographic renewal, but also to reduce child poverty, which is a priority item on 
the agenda of the Open Method of Coordination applied to social protection and social 
inclusion, and to promote equal opportunities for women and men, for parents and for 
children from various backgrounds. The modernization of family policies is also crucial for the 
success of the Lisbon Employment Strategy, which will depend to a large extent on a higher 
level of participation of women in the labour force. 
 
The purpose of this report is to produce an overview of available knowledge about the 
following issues: 
 the costs (to parents) of parenthood and of raising children in European Countries; 
 the effectiveness, in the short and long term, of various policy measures in avoiding 
or compensating for those costs; 
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 the impact of different policy instruments aimed at supporting families according to 
various policy objectives, e.g. achieving family projects, reconciling family and 
working life, reducing child poverty, raising the levels of education and well being of 
children, and increasing equal opportunities. 
 the wider economic and social costs and benefits of policy interventions in support of 
families. 
 
The current state of knowledge on the following issues is presented as follows in this review 
report:  
 The costs of children and the challenges for public policies supporting parenthood 
(chapter 1); author: O. Thévenon 
 The policy instruments used in the EU to support families and reduce the costs of 
parenthood (Chapter 2); authors: A. Math and O. Thévenon 
  The impacts of these policies on families:  
o On fertility and the decision to have children (chapter 3); authors M-Th. 
Letablier and O. Thévenon 
o On parents‘ participation in the labour market, gender equality and work-life 
balance (chapter 4); authors: M-Th. Letablier, A. Luci, O. Thévenon 
o On children‘s well-being (chapter 5): M-Th. Letablier and O. Thévenon 
 
 The wider economic and social costs and benefits of such policies (Chapter 6); 
author: A. Luci. 
 
The review of literature presented in this report attempts to make the tools, goals and 
impacts of family policies more clear and comparable across countries, in order to facilitate 
the circulation of knowledge between Member States, notably in the context of the European 
Alliance for Families and the newly established High Level Experts Group on Demography 
Issues. The report provides a review of recent literature and available data material on the 
direct and indirect costs of raising children in the European Union (using international as well 
as particularly important national studies). Ground breaking studies from countries outside 
the EU, of particular interest from a methodological point of view, are also included in the 
review. 
Focus is on the following kinds of costs of having and raising children over the long and short 
term:  
- Direct financial costs, e.g. for housing, health care, education, child care,  
- Indirect financial costs, e.g. for lost income, lost pension rights, lost career prospects 
etc. , also taking into account the impact on gender roles and gender equality. The 
costs of raising children are examined at the different phases of their development, 
from birth through to the age at which they become autonomous.  
The overview also summarizes knowledge on the main determinants of costs, including, the 
effects of the number of children, the socio-economic status of parents, and the family 
structure. Significant differences in cost levels and structures across Member States are 
identified. The overview also identifies gaps in the available knowledge, and highlights some 
issues for future research that have the potential to contribute to a better understanding of 
the policy impact and to better comparability across the European Union. 
The report has benefited from encouragements and valuable comments from Linda Hantrais, 
Maryse Huet, Ralph Jacob and Julius Op de Beke who are gratefully acknowledged. We are 
also indebted to Catriona Dutreuilh and Abigail Gregory for the edition of English in several 




Overview of the main results 
 
 
Olivier Thévenon, Marie-Thérèse Letablier, Antoine Math, Angela Luci 
The literature reviewed in this report starts with the evidence that the ―cost of children‖, 
measured as the loss of standard of living due to the presence of children in the household, 
is relatively high: children account for between 20 and 30% of the budget of the households, 
but this cost depends on several factors such as family income, age of children, education, 
and the bargaining process within the household. Although quite large already, this standard 
estimation underestimates the actual cost of raising children, since it does not consider the 
indirect costs associated with time allocation to children, labour market interruption and 
potential other consequences of children for parental career prospects. Since only children 
up to the age of 14 are taken into account, such an estimation also understates the cost in 
education, or housing, etc. associated with the presence of an adolescent or the transition to 
adulthood (see details in Chapter 1).  
The overall cost of children thus includes many dimensions that have to be clearly identified 
in order to assess the impact of policies designed to help parents bear that cost. Such an 
assessment requires entering into the black-box of the household in order to understand how 
policies impact on parental decisions relating to children and to their own well-being. The 
objectives fulfilled by policies are also of crucial importance to assess their impact.  
Six broad categories of objectives are generally assigned to family support policies, with 
variable emphasis from one country to another: 
- Compensation for the cost of children, in order to limit the gap in standard of living 
between households with and without children 
- Reduction of poverty faced by families and children 
- Promotion of  children‘s well-being, and of their cognitive and social development 
- Support to fertility, by helping adults to have the number of children they want. 
- Increase in female employment rates and reconciliation between work and family 
life. In that case, support to families is not only supposed to ―compensate‖ for the 
cost of children, but to ―enable‖ parents to combine work and care. 
- Promotion of gender equity, especially concerning childcare and labour market 
outcomes 
These objectives are not independent but can be conflicting, and since their importance can 
vary from country to country, any assessment of policy impact will depend on the levels of 
priority given to these objectives and how they are packaged together. This means that, 
irrespective of their cost, policies cannot be considered as efficient if they fail to achieve a 
satisfactory balance between the outcomes associated with the different goals assigned to 
policies supporting families. Hence, policy ―costs‖ have to be considered with regard to their 
long run returns. Policies that aim at reconciling work and family life are expected to generate 
such long run rewards, the important required initial investments none withstanding.  
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One important issue in making such an assessment is to define accurately the scope and 
boundaries of family policy (chapter 2). Three broad sets of measures are generally regarded 
as the ‗core‘ of family policies:  
- cash support to families (through benefits and/or tax relief);  
- support in kind or services in the form of education, care and supervision for young 
and older children;  
- family-related leave and child rearing payments provided to parents who care for 
their children (maternity leave, paternity leave, parental leave, leave to care for a 
sick or handicapped child).  
Figure 1 gives a comparison of how the instruments of the ―core‖ of family policies are 
combined in OECD countries:  
- Nordic countries are found to provide the most comprehensive support for working 
parents with children under age 3, and continuous support combining well paid 
maternity/parental leave and relatively high provision of childcare services from 
age 1. Rates of both female employment and fertility are among the highest, while 
poverty (including child poverty) rates are comparatively low (before and after 
transfers). 
- Compared to this situation, the Anglo-Saxon countries are characterised by short 
and low paid leave, while financial support is highly targeted to low-income 
families. Here, fertility rates are quite high, as are female employment rates, but 
women with children under age 6 work frequently in part-time employment. 
Poverty rates are also quite high. 
- By contrast, Southern European countries are characterised by a long period of 
unpaid leave, low cash benefits and less developed provision of childcare services 
for children under age 3. Here, comparatively low scores are observed for both 
fertility and female employment rates, while poverty rates are quite high. 
- Continental Eastern European countries are roughly situated between the above 
groups, although their situations are quite diverse. 
 
Figure 1: Contrasted patterns of support to families in OECD countries 
 
Source: Thévenon (2008), Population and Societies, 448 
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A larger range of other policy instruments can also be included in the perimeter of ‗family 
policies‘: social welfare provisions other than ―family/children‖ ones, i.e. not exclusively 
focusing on families with children, but having a clear effect on them. Such provisions include: 
- child supplements in housing benefits and social assistance benefits,  
- health insurance coverage for children,  
- supplements for pensions;  
- tax relief not exclusively focusing on families with children, such as joint taxation of 
married couples;  
- education expenditure that may be also important;  
- working and employment conditions other than leave, whether they are determined 
by legislation or by collective bargaining are also to be considered. 
The data on social welfare expenditure provided by Eurostat (ESSPROS) and the OECD 
(SOCX) can be used to compare the three core measures of family policies (cash support, 
replacement income during maternity and parental leave for mother of small children and in-
kind benefits).  With regard to ―family/children‖ benefits, there are large differences between 
European countries. The dispersion of levels of commitment, measured by the level of 
expenditure, is higher than for any other social protection function, ranging from 0.8 % of 
GDP in Poland up to 3.8% in Denmark in 2005. Furthermore, there are strong differences in 
the relative weight given to the different kind of support (benefits in kind, benefits in cash, 
and payments during leave). Family policies comprise a mix of policies that complement and 
interact with each other. This argues for analyses taking into account the whole package of 
measures together. 
 
The various databases have strengths and weaknesses, however. The ESSPROS data 
present strong advantages (good comparability, regular production over several decades, 
large geographical scope) to analyse and compare family policies, but also serious limits. 
The ESSPROSS methodology could, however, be improved to capture more accurately the 
support available for families, within or beyond the scope of social protection. Data could be 
made more reliable (especially those concerning payments for paid maternity and parental 
leave); to some extent the differences in support which are not in the ―core‖ of policy could 
also be documented through: 
- ad hoc evaluations of the family/children components or supplements that are 
classified in other social protection functions (sickness/health care, unemployment, 
housing, old age, social exclusion);  
- a broader evaluation of this support would include spending on education and the 
support received through tax relief, as considered by the OECD;   
- the inclusion of employer‘s support to the family of their employees. 
One of the limits also stressed in the report is the impossibility of connecting the information 
on spending with the outcomes for family standards of living. The model family method has 
proved particularly well-suited to analyse the impact of social policies on family income, but 
an interesting topic would be to determine the correlation between the amount spent, and the 
extent to which the economic situations of families are improved. 
Although such a connection is lacking, cross-country comparison shows that good 
performance in the different areas (labour market outcomes, poverty, fertility and child 
development) taken as a whole can be achieved simultaneously. Thus, higher rates of fertility 
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and of female labour market participation, and lower rates of poverty, are found in countries 
where policy support to families is comparatively comprehensive, quite continuous over 
childhood and based on a diversified range of support measures (chapter 3 and 4). Better 
achievements in all these domains appear to depend on how leave entitlements after the 
birth of children, with cash support for needy families, the provision of both high quality 
childcare and after-school care services and flexible arrangements at the workplace for 
working parents are combined over the family life-cycle. However, the balance between 
these different types of policy support still varies quite widely, in line with variations in policy 
orientations and frames.  
The definition of an appropriate balance between the different types of support remains a 
controversial issue, and many questions still remain unanswered. One can, however, try to 
elaborate general conclusions about policy impact (chapter 1). Two dimensions are in fact at 
stake when assessing this impact. The first is the issue of policy effectiveness, which 
considers the extent to which policy has an impact because individuals make use of their 
entitlements and rights, whatever the result achieved.  Assessing the latter raises rather the 
issue of policy efficiency, which considers whether the support produces the expected 
outcome. The issue of efficiency cannot be considered without reference to policy choices. 
A first manifestation of such choices lies in the balance achieved between three objectives 
fulfilled by income support to families: the compensation for the cost of children, income 
redistribution, and poverty reduction among families. The first objective encourages the 
provision of income support that increases with household income, with possible anti-
redistributive consequences. By contrast, the aim of reducing inequalities and poverty tends 
rather to limit the extent to which the compensation increases proportionally with the effective 
cost. 
Given the objective of reducing poverty of families (or reducing inequalities), universal benefit 
programmes have often proved to be more efficient than targeted support to low-income 
families. One reason is that universal programmes receive support from a larger range of 
contributors and the amount of support is consequently larger. Universal programmes are 
also likely to better resist budgetary cuts imposed during periods of crisis or austerity. 
Another reason is that targeted programmes can fail to reach families with the largest needs 
because of multiple transaction costs and because imperfect information hampers efficient  
target design. In addition, policies that encourage parents, living either in partnership or 
alone, to enter the labour force are found to be efficient means of reducing the risk of 
poverty. 
This raises the issue of policy ―effectiveness‖, since individuals can be entitled to rights and 
benefits without actually taking them up. The available evidence shows that take-up rates 
can be very low, especially for parental leave entitlement. The increase in the take-up rates 
of the various benefits and rights supporting families may be one concern for both policy 
making and future investigation. Further knowledge of the determinants of these rates would 
however be needed to design more effective policies. Nevertheless, the available evidence 
suggests that specific programmes which aim at fitting the specific needs of families more 
closely would positively affect take-up rates. They could include programmes that simplify the 
application process for obtaining benefits or services, or that propose tailored services to 
accompany families according to their needs. 
The ―optimal‖ balance between the support provided through the entitlement to a post-birth 
period of leave for working parents, and the support received in cash or in-kind with the 
provision of childcare services is not straightforward either. Here again, the evaluation of 
policy impact will depend on the balance achieved between conflicting outcomes. 
Nevertheless, very broad conclusions can be drawn about the impact of policies on the 
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different types of outcomes. Particular attention should be focused on how potential conflicts 
between these outcomes can be reduced. 
The guarantee for parents of a period of paid parental leave after the birth of children has 
been found to have a positive impact on children‘s outcome, including the reduction of health 
problems and improved cognitive development (chapter 5). By contrast, research on 
maternal employment often finds that labour force participation during the child‘s infancy has 
a negative impact on cognitive development. However, these results depend on the quality of 
the time invested by parents to care for their child, and on the quality of services that can be 
substituted for parental time. Moreover, the employment of parents, notably of mothers, is 
found to have a positive effect on children living in an ―adverse‖ context, such as those living 
in a single-parent household. The ―adversity‖ of the context relates also to different 
characteristics of the family members, their life-style or their environment, with variations 
from one study to another. It can refer, for example, to the socio-economic background of 
parents, household composition, home environment, ethnic origin, or to the lack of high 
quality service of care.  
Several considerations lead, however, to limiting the period of parental leave. First, one 
should not to over-generalise the above results, which are based on US and UK data. The 
reason why such caution is recommended is that results are only valid in a given context. We 
do not know, for example, if the outcomes relating to specific family characteristics would be 
similar in another context. The case of children living in a single-parent household can serve 
as an illustration. While mother's employment is found to impact negatively on children‘s 
outcomes in the US, a positive relation is, in contrast, found in certain European countries. 
This suggests that the effect of family characteristics is strongly conditioned by the 
environment: in this case for example, widened access to high-quality childcare services. 
Keeping in mind such dependence between household characteristics, life-style and the 
environment is important in order to avoid any inaccurate stigmatization. 
The benefit for children of early enrolment in collective care outside the home is also an 
argument balancing the emphasis put on parental time in the development of their children. 
For example, there is also evidence that high-quality formal day care in the year prior to 
kindergarten increases school readiness and non-cognitive development. This observation 
leads some authors like Heckman and Masterov to emphasize the ―productivity‖ of the 
investment in early childhood, especially in the direction of disadvantaged children. As stated 
by the two authors, ―investing in disadvantaged young children is a rare public policy with no 
equity-efficiency trade-off. It reduces the inequality associated with the “accident” of birth and 
at the same time raises the productivity of society at large‖. The authors also underline the 
self-productivity of early investment. Thus they consider that this investment may be the most 
effective policy for improving the human and social capital of a society: ―at lower cost to 
society, bolstered families will produce better educated students, more trained workers and 
better citizens‖.  
Furthermore, although early enrolment of children, i.e. within the two first years of life, in a 
childcare centre or preschool is not proven to be beneficial for the child in all cases, several 
studies suggest that child development (measured either by performance at school or by 
non-cognitive development) is at least not worse in this case than when they are cared for by 
their parents for the first three years, provided they have access to a high standard of 
childcare. This statement is especially true for ―disadvantaged‖ families, such as those 
headed by a single parent, for whom early enrolment of children in childcare services is also 
found to increase the opportunity of labour market participation, and thus to prevent the risk 
of poverty (which is detrimental for the well-being of all the family members including 
children). In any case, access to a high standard of childcare service is crucial to achieving a 
situation that combines positive impact on both sides of labour market position of parents 
and children outcomes.  
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In order to promote access to high quality services, many countries have implemented 
programmes to support both the development of services and the solvency of households. 
Some authors have even reported a shift in cash payment to parents to support such 
broadening of access to childcare in several European countries. One debate is, however, 
whether the support to families should be provided in cash or in kind.  
Support in cash is often argued to provide the main advantage by giving parents the 
opportunity of a ―free choice‖ of the care solution and by encouraging childcare providers to 
meet the needs of parents.  
However, an emphasis on in-kind support can be defended for three main reasons: 
 First, the provision of in-kind programmes can guarantee that the support is actually 
used by parents to obtain quality childcare services.  It can also guarantee that the 
level of service provided is quite homogeneous whatever the socio-economic status 
and the place of residence of the family. This argument is based on the traditional 
paternalistic view of social welfare.  
 Second, in-kind programmes are useful to overcome the risk of inefficiency 
associated with the provision of cash benefits, especially when those benefits are 
targeted.  
 Finally, the development of cash payments often includes subsidies for parents who 
care for their children themselves during their first years. The existence of such a 
diversified set of subsidies creates inequalities however: women who are 
disadvantaged because of their labour market position or the lack of affordable high-
quality childcare services are often encouraged to receive parental care allowance, 
while those with a higher socio-economic position are more tempted to take up 
benefits supporting the use of formal childcare.  
Thus, although cash payments make it easier for governments to respond to the choice 
agenda, they also imply a diversity of support that has an ambiguous impact on labour 
market performance, and creates (or reinforces) inequalities.  
This observation serves as a transition to a further argument in favour of limiting the period of 
parental leave: the incidence of parental leave on labour market outcomes of parents 
(chapter 4). There is now a large body of research showing that career interruption due to 
children and/or a long period of leave has a substantial negative impact on wage progression 
and career prospects. Moreover, parental leave is not gender-neutral since women are the 
main users of parental leave rights. So the objective of gender equity rather supports the 
idea that the period of parental leave should be kept relatively short. While there is no 
agreement on what ―short‖ means, some research has found that a period of leave which 
exceeds one year has a negative impact on the wage level and its future progression. 
Moreover, attention to gender equity is also a motivation to increase leave take-up by fathers 
and to encourage equal sharing of parental care between parents. The evidence on how to 
increase take-up rates is very scarce, however. Nevertheless, three parameters appear to be 
important: a replacement income proportional to the individual wage; the existence of a non 
transferable period of leave; and the possibility of dividing the leave into several periods.  
Finally, the cost of policies supporting families are often advanced as an argument to limit 
spending on childcare provision, especially in periods of budgetary restriction and economic 
austerity. Such a one-sided view, however, remains blind to the potential returns. For that 
reason, it is certainly preferable to speak with authors like Esping-Andersen or Heckman 
about ―investment‖ in order to stress two characteristics: first the fact that the amount 
invested can be expected to generate higher returns in the future; second that children can 
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be considered as a capital, i.e. an ―object‖ whose value decreases if not cared for, but which 
generates self-productivity when we invest in it. 
The existence of such returns on investments is documented by the literature, but the 
evidence remains relatively scarce given the difficulty of properly evaluating these returns 
over the long-run. Results are also rather sensitive to the assumptions underlying such 
calculations. This being said, examples of such estimations can be given. Cleveland and 
Krashinsky (1998 and 2003) found that public childcare investment  in Canada in 1998 for all 
children between ages 2 and 5 cost an estimated 5.3 billion of Canadian $ but generated 
estimated returns of 6 billion of Canadian $ through increased female employment (leading 
to increased productivity, and economic growth, tax revenue, etc.). For the United Kingdom, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2003) report a 9% growth in female employment, and ensuing 
GDP growth, at an initial cost of GBP 3 billion. A recent evaluation concerning Zürich in 
Switzerland concludes that each franc invested in a childcare centre generates a return of 3 
francs through the tax collected after the increase in labour supply. In the same perspective, 
for the Danish case, Esping-Andersen (2008) considers that there are important rewards for 
public investments in childcare to prevent over-long career interruptions after childbirth. 
Returns on investment can be roughly estimated at 43% of initial spending in childcare. 
These cost/benefit evaluations can appear as a trivial exercise given that a wider range of 
outcomes is in fact concerned, and that such evaluations should be made over the longer 
term. Their interest is however to show explicitly the collective returns generated by such 
investments. The fact that most of the returns (such as the additional productivity and tax 
revenues) are received at the collective level may stand as a strong motivation to mutualize 
the cost of children and to develop public policies supporting families.  
Although empirical evidence on the exact effect of policies is lacking, the relationships 
between the increase in female labour force participation, fertility and economic growth 
suggest that investments in work and family life reconciliation policies generate profitable 
dynamics (Chapter 6). There exists a series of theoretical arguments suggesting that gender-
specific differences in education reduce a country‘s growth. Other theoretical studies 
investigate the question of how employment and earned income of women promotes growth 
over generations. A series of empirical investigations have also been conducted on the 
impact of women‘s education, employment and income on macroeconomic growth. Recent 
theoretical and empirical studies agree that gender-related differences in education, 
employment and income hinder economic growth. Therefore the indirect costs of children are 
not only to the disadvantage of mothers and of children‘s welfare, but beyond this, the 
indirect costs are to the disadvantage of the society as a whole. Policies fostering the 
reconciliation between human capital accumulation and family life can thus be expected to 
impact positively on growth dynamics in the long run. Moreover, policies that promote a more 
equal division of professional, household and child care responsibilities between mothers 
and fathers are, we suggest, a step towards macroeconomic sustainability.   
To sum up, the overview presented in this volume tends to conclude that helping parents to 
bear the cost of children can be positive for all the outcomes considered, provided that 
policies are designed to reconcile the different aspects of parents‘ and children‘s lives. We 
found first evidence that diversified support in paid leave entitlements, in cash benefits and in 
service provision is certainly a first requirement to achieve such outcomes. A period of 
parental leave that provides time for parents to care for their children is certainly beneficial 
for children and for parents who thereby avoid the stressful problem of reconciling work and 
family life during this period. However, policies that support a rapid return to work have a 
positive influence in reducing poverty and can have positive impacts on children, provided 
that high quality and affordable childcare solutions are available. This support is especially 
important for low-income families, or single parents, for whom the positive impact of early 
child enrolment in childcare centres or in preschool on both female labour market status and 
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children‘s outcomes is clearly acknowledged. The continuity and complementarity of the 
support, without gaps during the childhood period, are also important dimensions for 
achieving a combination of positive outcomes: for example, taking a parental leave will not 
have a detrimental impact on the labour market position of the leave-taker if (i) both parents 
are encouraged to share the leave, (ii) childcare services are available and affordable at the 
end of the leave (iii) work schedules are adjusted to family life. The better outcomes 
observed in countries where support is more comprehensive is also certainly not 
independent of the capacity of institutions to act as ―complementary goods‖, i.e. the effect of 
each of them strictly depends on the presence of a consistent set. The challenge is thus to 
design this set in a way that produces positive outcomes on all aspects simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, the provision of such comprehensive support is certainly costly, since the total 
amount spent for families is already estimated to reach about 4% of GDP in countries where 
provision is the highest. In this context, most of the European countries may be not able or 
willing to spend higher amounts to support families. Any kind of programme which promises 
―universal‖ access to all the benefits and services has a very low chance of receiving political 
support. Nor are tax payers likely to give their support to such programmes. This does not 
mean, however, that all sets of ―universal‖ programmes should be forgone and replaced by 
―targeted‖ support. Targeted support is indeed found to be less effective for eradicating 
poverty, and fails to reach the neediest part of the population. A more realistic and efficient 
support system would comprise two pillars:  
- One first pillar providing ―universal‖ cash and in-kind support to cover basic needs. On 
one hand, a universal cash benefit would aim to limit the risk of poverty; on the other 
hand, the provision of a universally-based minimum of childcare services goes some 
way towards guaranteeing more egalitarian conditions of care and more egalitarian 
preparation for schooling among young children. 
- A second pillar, proposing ―targeted‖ benefits and/or services to meet specific needs 
and to supplement support in the direction of the population with the highest needs.  
Several advantages of a two pillar policy support are proposed in the literature: 
 By maintaining a range of universal support measures and covering all 
categories of families, such a combination is likely to receive more widespread 
support, even during periods of economic austerity.  
 Maintaining a set of universal support measures limits the stigmatisation of 
families receiving support.  
 The combination of the two pillars is likely to create confidence about the 
sustainability and durability of the system. This confidence is certainly needed to 
ensure that people use the existing support, and that policy delivery is effective. 
Confidence also partially explains the success of policies supporting families in 
countries like the Nordic states or France with a long tradition of government 
intervention.  
One should nevertheless not conclude without pointing up the limits of policies, which should 
also be kept in mind. It is important to note that public policies cannot do everything.  Other 
actors such as employers are also important pieces in the puzzle to assemble an efficient set 
of institutions. It is important to consider how workplace practices contribute to balancing 
work, personal and family life, especially when children grow up (i.e. when public support to 
families is generally withdrawn). Moreover, rather than focusing solely on policies directly 
supporting families, one should also consider policies encouraging employers to provide 
family-friendly workplaces. This is especially important given that some support given to 
employees can have counter-productive effects if employers have to bear its cost. Such 











This chapter provides a review of recent literature on the measurement of the cost of 
raising children. Methodological issues, and results related to the estimation of both the 
direct and indirect costs, are presented in the first section. This overview stresses the main 
determinants of the costs and their relationship with family size, parents‘ socio-economic 
status, and other characteristics of household composition (e.g. single parenthood, or 
support from grandparents). The available empirical estimations of these costs in the 
European Union are then reviewed in order to illustrate the importance of policy dealing with 
the different components of the costs of having children, and their evolution over the family 
life-cycle. While costs of children at younger ages are fairly well documented, the costs 
associated with the transition period into adulthood are far less so, except in certain 
countries. The second part of the chapter presents the challenges for public policies which 
aim to deal with these costs.  
The measurement of the cost of children: methodological issues 
Most analyses of the economic cost of children and its impact on work and family behaviour 
have their root in the fertility decision model pioneered by Becker (1960), where demand for 
children is a function of their costs and of individuals‘ (or couples‘) preferences, for a given 
level of income. Underlying this model is the idea that children are a special type of good, i.e. 
a long-lived asset that produces a flow of welfare that enters into the utility function of 
parents. Within this framework, cash benefits and tax credits to families with children can 
reduce the ―private‖ cost of children. This reduction is expected to have a positive impact on 
fertility (see chapter 3). Policies reducing more specifically the cost of childcare and/or 
facilitating the work and family-life balance are expected to impact positively on the 
development of female employment (chapter 4 and 5). 
Direct and indirect costs, individual vs. collective costs 
Costs of children and their measurement are of crucial importance in determining the state‘s 
contribution to the reduction of these costs to parents. Identifying what parents pay directly 
for raising their child is however not sufficient. It is also necessary to include implicit child-
related costs (higher cost housing, consumption) which have to be taken into account to 
achieve an estimate of the full cost of children. Basically, these costs may be divided into 
three groups. Both of the first two groups can be evaluated at the individual level: 
 Direct costs which are the additional costs incurred by households with dependent 
children (i.e. for food, clothing, child care, education housing, etc.).  
 Indirect costs that refer to the loss of income incurred by parents as a consequence of 
the presence of children. They include opportunity costs when the mother drops out 
of employment or reduces working hours to care for children, or when career 
prospects decline following birth (family-wage gap). Long terms costs can also be 
included, such as the costs related to the loss of derived pension rights. These costs 
are not gender neutral, and therefore accounting for them is also important in order to 
eradicate gender inequity. 
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 A second category of indirect costs refers to those implied, at the collective level, by 
the effect that insufficient investments in childcare or children‘s education have 
indirectly on human capital and economic growth. Thus, a deficiency of childcare 
structures can have a negative impact on labour supply through its constraint on 
relatively highly skilled women, and can consequently hamper economic growth. 
Such a deficit can also have an impact on fertility decisions with comparable, if not 
necessarily negative, effects on economic growth (see chapter 5). A deficit in 
children‘s health or education can be damaging for future human capital, but also for 
the transmission of the cultural values and rules of behaviour on which the whole 
society is grounded. In this context, one motive of public investment in early 
childhood education and care is to provide services to foster the social and cognitive 
development of children and to prepare for their future integration into the education 
system (OECD, 2001; Kamerman et al., 2003; Esping-Andersen, 2008). Positive 
―externalities‖ from such investment can be expected for society as a whole, and can 
lead one to consider children as ―public goods‖.  
Measuring the cost of children: a “convention-based” estimation 
Measurement of the direct costs of children raises several methodological issues. Estimates 
of the direct cost of children rely on three main approaches: 
 Estimates of the ―objective‖ cost are basically derived from two approaches: 
o a budget analysis that calculates the cost of a standard ―basket‖ of goods and 
services that a child of a given age is deemed to need. 
o An expenditure-survey approach, which compares the household 
expenditures of couples with and without children but who have the same 
standard of living. 
 Opinion surveys can also be used to measure a ―subjective‖ cost associated with 
children. Estimates are derived from a representative sample of families through 
answers to questions about how much children cost. 
Expenditure-survey estimates are among the most common and reliable methods. 
Basically, cost is measured by the loss of a consumption standard due to the presence of 
children. However, evaluating the direct cost of children is complex, since part of these costs 
is related to the consumption of collective goods by children, which is not directly observable. 
The estimation of this full cost also implies that collective consumption is taken into account, 
according to various hypotheses which can be tested. One challenge in particular is to 
account for the possible economies of scale involved in consumption when family size  
increases.  
To illustrate this point, one can consider the case of a couple for whom the birth of a 
child will create new spending to meet the child‘s needs, but which will be compensated, if 
household income remains constant, by a decrease in the amount spent to satisfy parental 
needs. While the costs of children can be approximated to the extra income needed to bring 
adults back to their previous level of welfare, results differ according to the techniques used 
to evaluate adults‘ welfare. The difficulties are basically two-fold:  
 the first obstacle relates to the comparison of welfare between households of different 
compositions;  
 the second difficulty relates to the assumptions concerning consumption behaviour that 
are needed to identify the cost associated with children. The increase in family 
expenditure is in fact the outcome of decision-making through which families adjust their 
expenditure  following the birth of a child according to a more or less collective process. 
Individual welfare outcomes depend on this process.  
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To sum up, the attempt to estimate the direct budgetary cost of children faces 
obstacles due to the impact of children on consumption patterns: some expenditure 
components will rise, others will fall, and others yet will be incurred for the first time. 
Furthermore, the direct costs of children vary with parental income and preferences, with the 
age and number of children, and with life-style standards. In this context, simple comparison 
between spending by a couple with and that of a couple without children is misleading for 
several reasons. One of these reasons is that having a child induces changes in 
consumption patterns and probably in parental preferences; these changes are also 
frequently related to changes in labour market status and in the income of parents which 
have to be controlled for. Moreover, estimating the cost of children raises the problem of 
determining what proportion of ―indivisible goods‖ (e.g. housing, cars, etc.) should be 
attributed to a child; a related issue is that an increase in family size is subject to 
mutualisation of resources that generates ―economies of scale‖ in consumption.  
Defining an equivalence scale: a central issue for the estimation of costs of children 
Statisticians formalise this idea with the concept of ―consumption unit‖ (CU). 
Considering a household with several members pooling their resources, each of them 
reaches a given level of standard of living. If they were living separately, a higher level of 
individual resources would be necessary to reach the same standard. Thus one can consider 
that, to reach an equivalent level of welfare, couple families should have the same level of 
expenditure for the first partner, while the second should spend a lower level of resources, 
let‘s say 75% of the previous case. In such circumstances, one may deem that the first 
partner counts for one ―consumption unit‖ while the second counts for 0.75 CU.  
However, the ―equivalence scales‖ that allow one to determine the number of CU in 
the household (and thus its welfare) vary with the type of good, and with household 
composition and the related scale returns. Thus, an equivalence scale is a set of coefficients 
associated with the different types of households. They are used to deflate income or 
consumption so as to measure them in adult-equivalents. In practice, variations in 
equivalence scales are estimated according to family size, age of members, and the 
distinction between adults and children. More detailed scales can be also estimated for 
specific sub-categories of population (low income families, lone parents, etc.). An 
equivalence scale is also a measure of the ―costs of households‘ characteristics‖ obtained by 
comparing the budget allocation made by households with different characteristics to reach 
the same standard of living. In particular, equivalence scales provide estimates of the 
economic cost of children, defined as the supplementary income needed by parents to keep 
the same standard of living as those without children.  
The assumptions required to empirically estimate such equivalence scales are 
consequently of crucial importance in understanding variations in the estimations of the cost 
directly incurred by the presence of children. However, the estimation of such scales raises 
several methodological issues. Different approaches have been considered, with numerous 
surveys highlighting the underlying advantages, weaknesses and main critical debating 
issues (Blackorby and Donaldson, 1991; Browning, 1992; Lechêne, 1993; Gauthier, 1994; 
Ekert-Jaffé, 1994, 1998). As a consequence, the estimation and comparison of the cost of 
children is based on conventionally accepted scales. 
The Engel approach is one of the most common methods used to evaluate such an 
―equivalence scale‖ and related cost of a child. A unique coefficient is estimated based on 
the share of expenditure that a family devotes either to food or for clothes. Here the function 
of food demand is estimated from an econometric equation linking the share of food 
expenditures in household budget with households‘ characteristics (number of children, type 
of dwelling, etc.). The unknown variable here is the level of income of households, while the 
budget share devoted to food is considered as fixed for households with children and the 
reference Household to solve the equation. The advantage of this method is simplicity, 
considering that food expenditure responds to basic needs: its share decreases with income, 
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and increases with household size; and this increase represents exactly the loss of ―welfare‖ 
incurred by the increase in family size. One can of course switch the share of food 
expenditure for the corresponding expenditure in housing, clothing and/or a combination of 
them. The weakness is that different scales are obtained for each case. The hypothesis that 
the expenditure share is similar for households with or without children is however 
controversial (Browning, 1992). As an illustration of this limit, it is sufficient to observe that, 
for example in France, food expenditures are more than three times higher than average for 
one-earner-families with three children and for childless couples at age 35 and over (Ekert-
Jaffé and Trognon, 1994). Thus, expenditure shares do not only reflect differences in 
income, but also qualitative differences in consumption, standards of living and possible 
economies of scale. 
Other methods, such as those derived from the Barten, Prais and Houthakker or 
Rothbarth approaches, aim to better account for household behaviour: 
 Barten (1964) includes the consumption unit directly in the utility functions of 
the household. The consequence of his model is that any change in household composition 
is equivalent to a change in the prices of all goods. 
  The Prais and Houthakker (1955) and Rothbarth (1943) analyses aim to take 
into account the entire range of consumption, topic by topic, and rely on implicit assumptions 
about the identity of family members consuming a given share of each type of good. The 
impact of children on the expenditure devoted to food, clothing, transport, leisure, etc. is thus 
estimated and from this a synthetic indicator is calculated as a weighted sum of the partial 
estimators. This needs a reference scale for a given good, from which other partial scales 
can be adjusted. One considers in principle as a reference a consumption good which is not 
impacted by the presence of children. Spending on clothes for adults is generally considered 
as such, but more adult-specific goods can be selected such as tobacco or alcohol. One may 
however consider that consumption on these goods responds to basic needs and that the 
presence of children does not induce any substitution. The evaluation of the cost of children 
however varies with the basket of goods that are considered as adult-specific. 
Another important restriction is, however, that parents‘ and children‘s welfare remains 
non-distinguished in all these models: thus what is good for children is what parents consider 
as good for their children, according to their own preference (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; 
Nelson, 1993; Browning, 1992). Moreover, children-specific consumption is generally not 
included in the Engel model, and has been introduced as a fixed cost by Gorman in a second 
generation of research. 
 
Empirical evidence on the direct costs of children 
An easy and popular estimation of the costs associated with children is, at first 
glance, provided by the comparison of expenditures by households with children with those 
by childless households. A recent example of such estimation is given by Bauer and Rettig 
(2002), with a detailed breakdown by type of consumption, economic situation of parents and 
age of children, for American people living in urban areas. They compare, for two parent and 
single parent families, the cost in terms of housing, transportation, clothing, health care and 
childcare and education. They find that the cost of food is the largest component of the cost 
of children at whatever age. Childcare and education are the second largest component up 
to the age of 6 years (whatever the household income) and thereafter transportation costs 
become predominant. Estimations based on consumption patterns in France also confirm 
that childcare and education costs as well as some clothing costs decrease with the age of 
the child (Bellamy, 2007). 
However, as previously stated, such a simple expenditure-based approach is 
misleading because the impact of ‗economies of scale‘ on household welfare is neglected. 
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Estimations of the cost weighted by adult-equivalent scales are thus needed. Such 
estimations of these costs exist in several countries (table 1). Although they are based on 
different methods and values, some general conclusions can be drawn on the variation of 
costs with households‘ characteristics. 
The cost of children: one quarter of the budget of a childless couple  
The first basic result is that the relative cost of a child represents an average of 20 to 30% of 
the budget of a childless couple, depending on the household characteristics and also on the 
estimation method (table 1). In France, where the cost of a child has been estimated at 
different periods, the relative cost of children appeared to be relatively stable over the 1980s 
and the 1990s. 
Moreover, the marginal cost of a child is estimated to decrease with birth parity, due to the 
economies of scale in consumption consequent on an increase in the size of the household. 
These ―economies of scale‖ occur especially after the birth of a third child and are mainly due 
to economies in housing expenditure. In France, the relative cost of a third child seems to 
have slightly decreased over the 1990s because of increased economies of scale. 
Consequently, a third child costs relatively less than a first in 1989 and 1995, while the 
opposite was observed in the late 1970s (Glaude and Moutardier, 1991; Hourriez and Olier, 
1997).  
Cost increases with the age of children… especially during the transition to adulthood 
Another empirical finding is that costs increase with the age of children. The main reason is a 
change in the composition of household expenditures as the children grow up. Note, 
however, that the literature has mainly focused on the costs of children before the transition 
to adulthood, which is also associated with specific needs in leisure or housing expenditure 
that compete with parents‘ personal consumption (Ekert, d‘Arbonville and Wittwer, 1995). For 
children before adulthood, the evidence on the relationships between cost and the age of 
children is relatively mixed: while some evaluation based on subjective scales suggests a 
rather stable cost from early childhood to the beginning of adolescence, for example in 
France (Hourriez and Olier, 1997), other estimations using ‗objective‘ scales report an 
increase with age – but results can be unstable (Glaude and Moutardier, 1991; Van Imhoff 
and Odink, 1994). By contrast, the increase in cost associated with the transition to 
adulthood is more clearly identified: a child before the age of 14 costs between 0.10 and 
0.20% of household‘s budget, while older children up to 25 years account for one third of 
households‘ budget on average (and as much as 41% when the child is from 20 to 24 years 
old, e.g. almost equivalent to an additional adult) (Hourriez and Olier, 1997). Changes in 
consumption patterns are mainly responsible for this increase: the main budget items for 
young adults concern transport, holidays and education, while spending on food and housing 
is dominant when the child is younger (Ekert, 1998). 
Changes in consumption patterns according to the age of children also raise methodological 
issues for the estimation of children‘s costs. For example, since the share of expenditure on 
food decreases with the rising age of children, Engel‘s model in which food is considered as 
a basic need in evaluating the cost of children provides an artificially low estimation of this 
cost for children over 16 years of age. For this reason, many authors are inclined to estimate 
the incidence of age on cost from surveys on subjective well-being. Here the end of 
adolescence emerges as a crucial stage.  
A U-Shaped cost? 
The sensitivity of equivalence scales to household income is also an issue assessed using  
empirical evidence. Results are however relatively mixed because (i) they depend on the 
field of expenditure under consideration, (ii) they are sensitive to the estimation method (i.e. 
based either on objective or subjective cost), and (iii) they show a rather non linear relation 
(Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Ekert and Trognon (1990); Glaude and Moutardier (1991); 
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Wittwer, 1993; Hourriez and Olier, 1997; Ekert, 1998). Here again, results for France can 
serve as an illustration.  
Results are affected in the first place by the type of expenditure being studied, as illustrated 
by Ekert and Trognon (1994) and by Glaude and Moutardier (1991). In both studies, a 
negative or null correlation between the scale coefficient and household standard of living is 
found when food expenditures are considered. By contrast, a positive correlation appears 
when authors consider expenditure on clothes. Wittwer (1993) also emphasizes such a 
differentiation of results: the food-related scale coefficient does not seem to vary with 
income, while the impact of children on the relative share of housing expenditure increases 
strongly with income: higher income households thus appear to increase their housing 
expenditures more systematically when household size increases. Wittwer also found that 
the total cost of children increases, ceteris paribus, with households‘ income: the share of 
expenditure allocated to children increases with household budget. This result argues for the 
existence of a strong ―quality effect‖ implying that richer households can more easily afford to 
―invest‖ in children‘s welfare, as is depicted by Becker‘s economic theory.  
However, this result has several limitations:  
 First, childcare and education spending are generally not considered in these studies, 
although they are the most relevant expenditures for assessing the effective investments of 
parents in children‘s ―quality‖.  
 Second, the above identified relationship can bear different interpretations. In 
particular, the increase in the share of expenditure allocated to children with increasing 
household income can be related to changes in households‘ preferences or lifestyle rather 
than to an increase in the objective cost of children (Blundell and Lewbel, 1991; Lechêne, 
1993). Policy implications may be radically different, since only the first interpretation would 
support an argument for compensation.    
 Third, the sensitivity of the cost of children to household income varies within the 
scale of earnings. Ekert and Trognon (1994) or Ekert (1998) find, for example, that the cost 
of children varies especially at the extremes of income distribution. With regard to food 
expenditures, one child can be more costly than one additional adult for the poorest families, 
while the cost is decreased by one third for the 30% richest families. The sensitivity to 
income varies, however, with the field of expenditure. 
 Fourth, some estimates based on subjective cost produce a rather different picture. 
Ekert (1998) finds that a slight increase in cost with household income cannot be rejected. 
However, this global feature hides important variation within income distribution. By contrast, 
Hourriez and Olier (1997) obtain a relative subjective cost which decreases with household 
income. Whether this relation is due to effective cost or to varying perceptions is, however, 
not known. 
 Finally, the ‗‗costs of children‘‘ are perceived here essentially as market consumption 
costs. This ignores the fact that an important, possibly preponderant element of child costs 
takes the form of parental time, which must be diverted from alternative uses such as market 
work, other household production activities, and leisure, to care for children. Including the 
―time costs‖ of children can double the estimation of the overall cost of children, which may 
vary according to the distribution rule within households (Apps and Rees, 2002).  
The limits of cross-country comparisons 
Finally, it is not easy to compare the cost of children from one country to another, since 
equivalence scales allow comparison of the relative differences in standard of life within one 
country, i.e. given some cultural characteristics and habits that shape common patterns of 
consumption. The impact of children on consumption patterns may thus vary according to 
cultural norms, but also according to differences in the accessibility and affordability of 
resources for children. Comparison based on purchasing power parity definitions of prices 
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and standardised equivalence scales, such as the Oxford or the OECD revised scales, can 
only give a proxy of cross-country differences. These scales are ―normative‖ and are not 
based on the estimations of households‘ needs. The OECD revised scale counts the first 
adult in the household as 1 consumption unit, a supplementary adult as 0.5 and children  
under 14 years old as 0.3 CU5. Compared to the previous scales, the weighting of children 
was minimised in the evaluation of household welfare (i.e. the returns to scale should be 
larger)6. In spite of this revision, one extreme is to consider all children as equal in the 
household budget, without any differentiation by birth parity and age of children7. However, 
one can see from the table below that the scale may still overweight the incidence of a first 
child, and may underestimate the economies of scale related to the extension of the family 
(that appear especially in France from the 3rd child onwards). Furthermore, the scale 
underestimates the needs of households with children of 14 or more years old. The 
comparison of household welfare, and especially of poverty rates, can be impacted by such 
bias: the understatement of economies of scale tend to underestimate the poverty threshold 
and the associated rates (Burkhauser et al., 1996; Accardo, 2007). 
An increasing cost due to demographic changes? 
Some general conclusions on the macro-impact of children on consumption patterns can be 
derived from the above-mentioned micro-based results when cross-country differences in 
family structures are taken into account. Thus, one result is that some expenditures are 
highly elastic to family size, such as those related to food, clothes, leisure, or services; by 
contrast, the relative share of the budget that concerns housing, cars or domestic cleaning 
are only slightly sensitive to family size. A consequence is that, for a given level of income 
per inhabitant, countries with a larger number of large families will spend relatively more on 
clothes, and less on housing. The share of expenditure on housing is consequently higher in 
countries such as the Northern European countries and Germany where households are 
smaller on average (and where housing is also relatively expensive), while in Mediterranean 
countries where households are often larger, the share of expenditure on clothes is larger. 
The decrease in household size over recent decades due to the combination of an ageing 
population, decreasing fertility rates and rising divorce rates tends however to increase the 
need for housing which is already, and is expected to continue to be, a growing share of 
households‘ expenditure. 
                                                 
5
 The Oxford equivalence scale counts each supplementary adult as 0.7 CU and each supplementary child as 0.5 CU. 
6
 The main reason for this change is that the Oxford and old OECD scale were elaborated in a period with different consumption 
patterns. In particular, expenditures for food and clothes were the most important, while housing-related expenditures 
represented a lower share of household budget. The share of this latter component in household budgets has now increased 
but is subject to return to scale.  
7
 Here again, the estimations for France can be quoted as an illustration. When a linear scale is considered, results confirm the 
relevance of the OECD revised scale (Hourriez and Olier, 1997). However, compared to the ―best‖ (non linear) scale (i.e. the 
scale that best fit data), the OECD scale slightly overweights the needs of two or three member households, and underweights 
those of larger households. A better solution would consist in considering the second adult as 0.4 CU, children under 14 years 
old as 0.3 CU and other adults, including children of 14 years and over, as 0.6 CU. 
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Table 1: Equivalence scale for children (compared to a childless couple) 
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Spain 1981 Rothbarth  0.11   0.11-0.12 for children 
between 5 and 9 
years; 0.15-0.18 for 
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1989 older children 
Deiss 1994 Switzerland 
1975-1986 
  0.24 0.43 0.60  
Muellbauer 
1977 












 0.22    
Ray 1986 UK General Cost 
Scaling 
 0.12    
Boger 1977 Norway   0.51    
Reading: In France 1979, the first child is estimated to be equivalent to 0.19 adult; the child accounts for 19% of 
the consumption of a childless couple. 
As already stated, such an economic approach to the cost of children is useful in 
comparing how the presence of children affects the expenditures of households with similar 
incomes. However some limits to this approach should be considered which are due to the 
implicit hypotheses on which these estimations are based. 
A first limit lies in the constraints surrounding the definition of welfare, which faces 
several limitations. First, preferences are stated as similar for households without or with 
children; thus any change in preferences due to the birth of a child is ignored.  This may be a 
serious limitation since the presence of children adds a child-specific component in parental 
welfare function whose impact depends on the ―altruism‖ of parents (Browning, 1992; 
Browning and Lechêne, 2001). Moreover, the presence of children is itself a source of 
welfare, counter-balancing the direct cost of raising children. In extreme cases, a ―welfare‖ 
cost could be reversed from a positive to a negative value. Thus, a more complete approach 
should include this impact of children on a household‘s welfare. Controlling for endogenous 
fertility decisions would lead to a more accurate estimation of the cost associated with 
children (Ekert-Jaffé et al., 2000; Browning and Lechêne, 2003). 
Another way of putting it is that equivalence scales provide estimations of the cost of 
children based on conditional preferences (e.g. conditional on the presence of children) but 
do not allow us to compare unconditional welfare (Blundell and Lewbel, 1991; Lechêne, 
1993). In this case, the ―normative‖ content of these estimations is limited since it does not 
provide any measurement of the needs associated with households‘ characteristics. 
Alternative approaches based on a ―basket of goods‖ may be considered more accurate in 
estimating such needs. 
Another hypothesis is that the level of consumption of adult-specific goods relates to 
the standard of living, which implicitly requires that there is no substitution between goods 
because of the presence of children. In this case, household welfare can be written as the 
addition of separable functions of parental consumption, children-specific consumption and 
the socio-demographic characteristics of households (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980). There 
are, however, situations where such a property of ―separability‖ is not verified. On the one 
hand, the presence of children transforms some consumption, such as food consumption, 
from individual to collective, the relative price of it rising in comparison to adult-specific 
goods. One can expect in that case the existence of some substitution of collective 
consumption by adult-specific goods to balance the income effect due to the presence of 
children. By contrast on the other hand, economies of scale decrease the relative price of 
collective goods (such as housing) and thus can entail a substitution detrimental to adult-
specific goods (Nelson, 1992). 
An additional limit is that the above estimation considers the household as a unitary decision 
entity, and consequently ignore the question of the differential incidence of child costs on 
adult members of the household. However, consumption decisions result more surely from a 
collective rational decision-making process. In this case, the allocation of budget to children 
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and their related cost depends on the sharing rule of income, depending on the bargaining 
power of household members (Lechêne, 1993; Apps and Rees, 2002; Browning et al., 2004). 
Literature on intra-family allocation shows that expenditures on children-specific goods are 
higher when the control of the household by the female partner is higher (Thomas, 1990; 
Hoddinot and al., 1994; Lundberg, Pollack and Wales, 1997). Recent developments in 
welfare comparison of households have been extended to account for equivalence scale 
within the collective approach to household decision-making (Browning et al., 2006). 
Conditions for a proper identification of the child related equivalence scale are however not 
yet derived in this framework, given the complexity of deriving testable restrictions. 
Finally, this approach to child-related costs is also limited because it only includes 
direct (consumption) costs; indirect (or opportunity) costs also have to be considered 
because they can be even higher than those directly identifiable.  
The Indirect costs of raising children 
If direct costs may be shared among parents, indirect costs due to the loss of individual 
income following career interruption fall almost exclusively on mothers. The main aspects of 
these costs are the foregone earnings due to the interruption in labour market participation, 
or lower career prospects associated with the raising of children. Because they have to 
allocate time in work or in care, women often interrupt their labour market participation after 
the birth of a child, and consequently stop their accumulation of human capital which can 
even be eroded during the period of interruption (Mincer and Polachek, 1974) and only 
partially restored after returning to work (Mincer and Ofek, 1982). Moreover, anticipating 
such an interruption, women may be inclined to ―self-select‖ into jobs where the loss of 
human capital in case of career interruption is limited (Polachek, 1981). The expectation of 
discrimination in the labour market can also be an important factor reinforcing such a self-
selection process.  
The literature provides some estimations of these costs and investigates the determinants of 
the ―family earnings gap‖, e.g. of the foregone earnings which can be attributed to the 
incidence of children. These investigations are useful in order to explain differences in 
earnings between mothers and childless women, and between men and women (see chapter 
4). Comparative analyses of the difference across European/OECD countries are also 
available (Davies and Joshi, 1994; OECD, 2001; Harkness and Waldfogel, 2003; Davies et 
Pierre, 2005; Sigle-Rushtown and Waldfogel, 2007). 
All these studies agree in the assessment that, among European countries, the UK and 
(West) Germany are similar to each other, with higher costs than for example France or 
Sweden. Davies and Pierre (2005) present estimates of the pay penalty associated with 
motherhood for 11 European countries using the European Community Household Panel 
Survey (ECHP). They found that significant penalties in pay also exist in Denmark, Ireland, 
Spain and Portugal.  
Why does the family pay gap vary so much across countries? Differences in wage structure 
and in job characteristics are of prime importance, compared to differential selection into 
employment (Harkness and Waldfogel, 2003). Differences in the impact of motherhood on 
career development are nevertheless important. For example, the family pay gap is larger in 
the U.K. than in other countries because of the higher propensity of U.K. mothers to work in 
low-paid part-time jobs and also because, even among full-timers, women with children are 
lower paid relatively to mothers in other countries (Harkness and Waldfogel, 2003; Sigle-
Rushtown and Waldfogel, 2007). Davies and Pierre‘s findings for Germany (using the 
German Socio-Economic Panel) and the UK (using the British Household Panel Survey) also 
reveal that career breaks contribute to lower earnings growth. While periods of family 
formation are associated with lower earnings growth in Germany, in the UK completed spells 
of family formation are associated with a recovery in earnings growth.  
By contrast, the child-specific component of the earning gap is much lower in France for 
example than in the previous set of countries. The main reason is that children particularly 
27 
 
affect labour market participation, and consequently labour market experience, but have little 
or no significant impact on the rewards of job experience and on job selection. In this context, 
the wage gap between women and men is mostly explained by differences in labour market 
experience (due to the presence of children) and not to differences in the returns on this 
experience or to a selection effect (which may be partly due to discrimination) (Meurs et al., 
2007). 
As will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4, differences in work and family-life balance 
policies are part of the story explaining cross-country differences in the earnings cost of 
motherhood. On the one hand, these policies can facilitate the combination between work 
and care by providing parents with benefits, services or time. Thus, balancing policies can 
limit the impact of children on women‘s labour market interruption. On the other hand, these 
policies can also limit the impact of children on self-selection mechanisms and on  
productivity at work. By doing so, they may help to limit discriminatory practices among 
employers that affect women‘s career development.  
The other macro-level indirect costs can be less easily estimated, being not directly 
quantified by the literature. As already mentioned, they concern the impact of children on 
economic growth through their impact on the development of female employment and fertility 
decisions. Thus, if the literature investigates the relations between fertility dynamics, female 
employment and economic growth, no simple quantification of a cost for the society can be 
derived from these analyses. Chapter 6 will review this literature, arguing that collective 
returns in ―growth‖ can be expected from investments in childcare and child ―human capital‖. 
This economic cost-benefit approach should not minimise the other aspects of well-being 
that are also at stake. The well-being of children, the satisfaction of parents with their work-
life balance, equity across individuals, and more generally the development of ―happiness‖ 
within the society are also related challenges raised by the evaluation of the costs, benefits 
and impacts children have for society. All these economic and social aspects have to be 
considered when assessing the role of policies supporting parents and children. 
Why and how policies should deal with the cost of children? 
The evidence presented in the first part has shown that standard estimation of the ―cost of 
children‖, measured as the loss of standard of living due to the presence of children in the 
household, is relatively high: children account for roughly between 20 and 30% of the budget 
of the household, but this cost depends on a number of factors such as family income, age of 
children, education, and bargaining process within the household. Although quite large 
already, this standard estimation underestimates the actual cost of raising children since it 
does not consider the indirect costs which are associated with time allocation to children, 
labour market interruption and potential other consequences of children on parental career 
prospects. Since only children up to the age of 14 are taken into account, such an estimation 
also minimises the cost in education, housing, etc. associated with the presence of an 
adolescent or due to the transition to adulthood.  
The overall cost of children thus includes many dimensions that have to be clearly identified 
in order to assess the impact of policies helping parents to bear that cost. Such an 
assessment requires entering into the black-box of the household in order to understand how 
policies impact parental decisions relating to children and to their own well-being. The 
objectives fulfilled by policies are also of crucial importance to assess their impact.  
One can identify 6 broad categories of objectives for policies supporting families: 
- Compensation for the cost of children, in order to limit the gap in standard of living 
between households with and without children 
- The reduction of poverty faced by families and children. 
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- The promotion of  children‘s well-being, cognitive and social development 
- The support to fertility, by helping adults to achieve the number of children they 
want. 
- Increase in female employment rates and creating a balance between work and 
family life. In that case, support to families is not only supposed to ―compensate‖ 
for the cost of children, but to ―enable‖ parents to combine work and care. 
- The promotion of gender equity, especially concerning childcare and labour market 
outcomes 
These objectives are not independent but can be conflicting, and since their importance can 
vary from one country to another, any assessment of policy impact will depend on the priority 
given to some of these objectives and on how they are packaged together. The overall 
assessment of policies relates to the balance achieved between the different areas of 
outcomes.  
Cross-country comparison shows that good performances in the different areas of outcomes 
can be achieved simultaneously. Thus, higher rates of fertility, female labour market 
participation, and lower poverty rates are found in countries where support to families is 
comparatively comprehensive, provided quite continuously over childhood, and based on a 
wide range of support. Better achievements in all these areas appear to depend on how 
leave entitlements after the birth of children, support in cash for needy families, the provision 
of both high quality childcare and after-school care services and flexible arrangements at the 
workplace for working parents are combined over the family life-cycle. However, the balance 
between these different types of policy support still varies quite widely, in accordance with 
the variations in policy orientations and frameworks.  
Several socio-economic arguments are emphasized in the literature as legitimising policies 
supporting parenthood. The existence of positive externalities benefiting parents as well as  
childless individuals is a first argument for ―mutualising‖ the cost of raising and educating 
children. These externalities can be due either to the presence of children or to higher 
children‘s social capital. First, the presence of children generates such externalities through 
intergenerational transfers from children to the elderly, such as those involved in pensions 
systems. Positive externalities on childless individuals‘ well-being derived from raising 
children‘s human and social capital can also be expected through their impact on economic 
growth or on social behaviour. Thus, benefits can easily be perceived as collective, but there 
is no guarantee that everybody will share the same willingness to pay for children. In this 
case, children can be considered as a public good for which state intervention can guarantee 
that the cost is collectively shared.  
However, policy intervention faces several challenges. A first challenge is to define the right 
balance between the different types of support; this remains a widely debated issue, with 
many questions still unanswered. Two dimensions are in fact at stake when assessing such 
impacts:  
- The issue of policy effectiveness, which refers to the propensity/ability of eligible 
beneficiaries of policies to take up their entitlements to rights or benefits. We thus 
consider here  the extent to which policy has an impact because individuals make 
use of their entitlements and rights, whatever the result is;  
- Considering the results themselves raises the issue of policy efficiency, which 
involves considering whether the support produces the expected outcome. The 
issue of efficiency cannot considered without reference to policy choices. 
Achieving an efficient combination of policy instruments also raises other issues. 
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Balancing compensation for the cost of children with income redistribution 
One first issue lies in the balance achieved between three objectives fulfilled by income-
support to families: compensation for the cost of children, income redistribution, and 
reduction of family poverty. The first objective tends to encourage the provision of income 
support that increases with household income, with possible anti-redistributive 
consequences; by contrast, the aim of reducing inequalities and poverty tends to limit the 
extent to which compensation increases proportionally with the effective cost. 
How progressive should the compensation provided by the State be in relation to the cost of 
raising children? The answer would be clearer if the only objective were the full 
compensation of the economic cost of children, in order to guarantee that the standard of 
living is not reduced after the birth of children: since, as stated above, this cost increases 
with household income, the compensation provided by public transfers should increase with 
household income, proportionally to the increase of the estimated ―cost‖. This argument lies, 
for example, at the basis of the French system of ―quotient familial‖ that guarantees tax 
breaks for families with children that increase with household income. This mechanism is set 
to guarantee ―horizontal equity‖ in the tax system, i.e. households with and without children 
pay taxes according to their capacity to contribute to the overall payroll. The limits which 
should circumscribe these tax breaks and the extent to which they should or not focus on 
larger families is however a debated issue (Glaude, 1991; Sterdyniak, 1992). Giving priority 
to cost compensation would support an increase in household income, whether full 
compensation was the objective or not.  
Other concerns however,enter into consideration when dealing with the design of support to 
families with children. Such a design involves more normative arguments and depends on 
how the issue of cost compensation is combined with other objectives.  
One such other consideration is the extent to which the principle of ―horizontal equity‖ is 
combined with the objective of vertical redistribution in the overall policy of cash transfers. 
The balance between horizontal and vertical redistribution will depend on the extent to which 
family policy is considered as part of the redistribution process. In this context,  
compensation for the cost of children can be balanced with other aspects of redistribution 
that limit the extent to which policy aims at compensating for this cost. However, these limits 
involve some ―normative‖ criteria that delimit the ―cost‖ which can be taken as a reference to 
define an acceptable level of compensation. Several definitions of such costs can be agreed 
within a society. In this perspective, Albouy and Roth (2003) and Le Minez and Roth (2007) 
considered the cost of children under ―average social conditions‖, defined as the average for 
different family compositions of the cost of an additional child for families earning 
approximately the median income. They show, for example, for the French case that this 
―normalised‖ cost is more frequently fully compensated by the overall set of tax breaks and 
cash benefits available to the upper quartile of families. 
A related issue is also how this compensation is combined with the objective of poverty 
reduction, and especially the reduction of children‘s poverty. Cross-country evidence shows 
that transfers contribute importantly to reducing child poverty: in OECD countries these 
average 16.3% before transfers to 9.2% after transfers (Whiteford and Adema, 2007). 
Moreover, the fact that all countries with very low child poverty rates (less than 5%) combine 
low levels of family joblessness and effective redistribution policies supports the view that 
successful anti-poverty strategies should seek a balanced approach combining improved 
benefits where necessary with improved incentives to work. There is, however, a large 
variety of ways in which support to families with children is related to anti-poverty policies. 
Three dimensions are of importance in mapping the different combinations of state policies to 
support families: the extent to which family benefits are combined with (or even integrated 
into) in-work benefits; the extent to which the support is or is not targeted at specific 
populations or specific needs; the balance achieved between cash benefits and the provision 
of services.  
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Combining universal and targeted support 
So what is the most appropriate means to reduce income inequality and reduce poverty? The 
advantages and disadvantages of targeted versus universal support to families is another 
issue discussed in the literature. Basically, at least two arguments are advocated to promote 
targeted programmes of support. The argument of fairness comes first, to defend 
programmes that prioritise benefit to the population in need rather than universal 
programmes that may benefit the whole population equally. On the other hand universal 
support can particularly benefit those who really need support, while the section of the 
population with specific needs can be deterred from claiming their entitlements. Budgetary 
restrictions are also one of the main concerns in deciding whether entitlements or benefits 
should or should not be, exclusively or mainly, reserved for a specific population. Given such 
restrictions, the aim of universal programmes is to maintain a minimum level of income for all 
individuals, at a reasonable cost to government; targeted programmes, on the other hand, 
are aimed at providing more extensive support to a more limited section of population. The 
increased pressure on budgets is certainly one reason for the increase, observed in OECD 
countries, in the share of targeted support within programmes of support. By contrast, 
means-tested benefits are found to be the first to be cut during a period of recession or 
economic austerity (Nelson, 2007).  
There are, however, several arguments to dispute the efficacy of such targeting. Smolensky 
and al. (1995) outline several costs that may offset the potential budgetary benefits. One 
limitation to the adoption of targeted programmes is that they may in fact be administratively 
expensive, although costs can be reduced by screening out certain categories of recipients 
and providing benefits in such a way that only the targeted group select into the programme 
while others select out (Mitchell, 1997). 
Another limitation is that targeting may be socially divisive to the extent that it divides society 
into those who give and those who receive. Conversely, programmes that offer universal 
benefits may enjoy greater political support. Increasing the scope of means-tested benefits 
can create a ‗dualisation‖ of social protection and reinforce the divide between those who 
receive benefits and those who pay for them. This sort of divide creates the conditions for a 
self-reinforcing process of disintegration of social protection (Damon, 2008). 
A third limitation is that targeting is subject to imperfection (Currie, 2004). Some of those who 
take up benefits will not deserve them, and some of those who are eligible for benefits will 
not take them up. A basic reason is that individuals eligible for means-tested programmes 
face costs which can be sufficient to deter some individuals from using them. People will not 
take up benefits if these costs outweigh the expected benefits. One illustration of this type of 
cost is the ―stigmatization‖ of the population receiving social assistance or targeted support. 
This ―stigma‖ can involve a psychological cost that may deter rational actors from taking up 
their rights to benefit or specific support (Moffitt, 1985). Paradoxically, targeted policies can 
produce negative and counterproductive signals about precisely the specificities of the 
population that these policies are supposed to eradicate. Transaction costs incurred in 
checking that individuals fulfill the requirement to receive benefit can also deter people from 
claiming for it. This cost can be highest for precisely those individuals in greatest need and in 
cases where the beneficiary (the child or young adolescent) is not the person who bears the 
cost. In the face of this agency problem, it could be rational to provide benefits in kind rather 
than in cash (Currie and Gahvari (2008). Furthermore, the management costs involved in 
making the information available to the needy person and in reaching the individuals with the 
greatest needs may also be very high. 
Last but not least, the efficiency of a targeted policy as compared to a universal benefit 
programme for poverty reduction has been disputed (Goodin, 1987; Palme and Korpi, 1998; 
Gilbert, 2001; Math, 2003). Better outcomes are found to be achieved where where benefits 
are distributed on a universal basis. 
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Enabling parents to work and care with a balanced support in child-related leave, cash 
benefits and childcare services 
The ―optimal‖ balance between the support provided through the entitlement to a post-birth 
period of leave for working parents, the support received in cash or in-kind and the provision 
of childcare services is also not straightforward.  
Here again, the ―optimal‖ policy package will depend first and foremost on the balance 
achieved between the different objectives of policy intervention. One important aspect is thus 
the articulation and emphasis given to either the education of young children or to work-life 
balance, together with the consideration of equity.  
Second, the guarantee for parents of a period of paid parental leave after the birth of children 
has, been found to have a positive impact on children‘s outcomes; including the reduction of 
health problems and an improvement in cognitive development (see details in chapter 5). By 
contrast, research on maternal employment often finds that paid employment during the 
child‘s infancy has a deleterious impact on cognitive development. However, these results 
depend on the quality of the time invested by parents in caring for their child, and on the 
quality of services that can be substituted for parental time. Moreover, the employment of 
parents, notably of mothers, is found to have a positive effect on children living in 
―disadvantaged‖ conditions, such as living in lone-parent households. The ―degree of 
disadvantage‖ of the context also refers to different characteristics of the family members, 
their life-style or their environment, with variations from one study to another. It can refer, for 
example, to the socio-economic background of parents, household composition, home 
environment, ethnic origin, or to the lack of high quality care services.  
Several considerations tend, however, to counter-balance the above statement and to 
support a limit to the length of parental leave. The benefit for children of early collective 
centre-based childcare stands as an argument against the role of parental time in the 
development of their children. Thus, there is also evidence that high quality formal day care 
in the year prior to kindergarten increases school readiness, and also non-cognitive 
development. This statement leads some authors like Heckman and Masterov (2007) to 
emphasize the ―productivity grounds‖ of the investment in early childhood, especially in the 
direction of disadvantaged children. As stated by the two authors, ―investing in 
disadvantaged young children is a rare public policy with no equity-efficiency trade-off. It 
reduces the inequality associated with the “accident” of birth and at the same time raises the 
productivity of society at large‖. The authors also underline the productivity of early 
investment. Thus, they consider that this investment may be the most effective policy for 
improving a society‘s human and social capital: ―at lower cost to society, supported families 
will produce better educated students, more trained workers and better citizens‖.  
Furthermore, although early enrolment, i.e. within the first two years of life, in a childcare 
centre or preschool is not proved to be good for the child in all cases, several studies 
suggest that child development (measured either by performance at school or by non-
cognitive development) is at least no worse than when a child is cared by its parents for three 
years, provided there is access to a high standard quality of childcare. This statement is 
especially true for ―disadvantaged‖ families, such as those headed by a single parent, for 
whom an early enrolment of children in childcare services is also found to increase the 
opportunity of participation in the labour market, and thus to lower the risk of poverty (which 
is detrimental to the well-being of all the family members including children). In any case, 
access to high quality childcare services is crucial in order to ensure positive labour market 
outcomes for both parents and children.  
A further argument for limiting the period of parental leave is the impact of parental leave on 
the labour market outcomes of parents (see details in chapter 4). Thus, there is now a large 
body of research showing that career interruption due to children and/or a long period of 
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leave has a substantial negative impact on wage progression and career prospects. The 
incidence of parental leave is, in addition, not gender-neutral since women are the main 
users of parental leave. An interest in gender equity therefore tends to support the idea that 
the period of parental leave should be relatively short. While there is no agreement on what 
―short‖ means, some research has found that a period of leave which exceeds one year has 
a negative impact on wage levels and their future growth. Moreover, the attention to gender 
equity is also a motivation to increase fathers‘ take-up of parental leave and to encourage 
equal sharing of parental care between parents. Evidence on how to increase take-up rates 
is however very scarce. Nevertheless, three parameters appear to be important: a 
replacement income proportional to the individual wage; the existence of a non- transferable 
period of leave; and the possibility of spreading the leave over several periods.  
Combining support in cash and in kind 
Another important issue in achieving an efficient policy mix is the extent to which support 
should be provided in-cash or in-kind. In many countries, the extension of support has been 
mainly driven by an increase in cash benefit. One reason may be the relative reluctance of 
policy analysts to recommend transfers in-kind, as stated by Currie and Gahvari (2008) who 
observe that  ―Economists have traditionally been sceptical about in-kind transfers, viewing 
cash as superior in terms of recipients’ utility‖. However, many possible justifications for in-
kind programmes have been put forward in the literature.  
In order to promote access to high quality childcare services, many countries have 
implemented programmes to support both the development of services and the affordability 
of services. Some authors have even reported a shift in cash payment to parents to support 
increased access to childcare in several European countries (Lewis et al., 2008). Support in 
cash is often argued to provide the main advantage of giving parents the freedom to chosse 
their care solution, and of encouraging childcare providers to meet the needs of parents. 
However, an emphasis on in-kind support can be defended for three main reasons.  
First, the provision of in-kind programmes can guarantee that the support is actually used by 
parents to obtain childcare services with a minimum standard of quality.  It can also 
guarantee that the service provided is quite homogeneous whatever the socio-economic 
status and the localition of the family. This argument refers to the traditional ―paternalistic‖ 
view of social welfare: if members of a society care about the situation of the poorest, then 
the unconstrained choices of the poorest may at times imply negative externalities for those 
who care for them (Currie and Gahvari, 2008). Transfers in-kind introduce some kind of 
social control in order to reach Pareto-efficient outcomes. Note that the paternalistic 
argument assumes particular force when the intended recipient of a transfer programme is a 
child but the transfer goes to parents. Parents may not take full account of the utility of their 
children when making decisions, or they may neglect to factor in externalities. For example, 
suboptimal spending on children‘s education may lead not only to poorer individual 
prospects, but also to slower economic growth. 
Second, programmes in-kind serve to overcome the problem raised by the existence of 
imperfect information (this is the main point raised by Currie and Ghavari, 2008). In this 
situation, the provision of cash benefits, especially when they are targeted8, is likely to be 
inefficient. By contrast, transfers in kind are likely to stimulate ―self-targeting‖ and so to 
discriminate between needy and non-needy persons9.   
                                                 
8
 Universal programmes will evidently cover all needy persons, but at a cost of covering those who are not needy as well. By 
contrast, targeted programmes may well miss some needy individuals. One challenge is therefore to identify accurately those 
who are needy,  although there is no guarantee that governments can so identify them. If cash is offered, all individuals have an 
incentive to claim they are poorenough to receive it, making cash subsidies an inefficient tool.  
9
 To achieve self-targeting, one must offer the public a good that appeals only to the intended recipients. In some instances, the 
nature of the good may suffice to ensure this. In many other cases, everyone may want to consume the good subject to 
transfers and one cannot rely on the nature of the good to separate those who should receive it from those who should not. The 
―trick‖ to achieving self-targeting in these cases is to ―package‖ the good in such a way as to impose costs on the recipients 
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Finally, the development of cash payments often includes subsidies for parents who provide 
early years‘ care for their children. However the incidence of such a wide range of subsidies 
creates inequalities: women who are disadvantaged because of their labour market position 
or the lack of affordable high quality childcare services are often encouraged to receive cash 
payments, while those with higher socio-economic positions can use childcare subsidies. 
Thus, although cash payments make it easier for governments to respond to the choice 
agenda, they also lead to a range of support that has an ambiguous impact on labour market 
outcomes, and creates (or reinforces) inequalities (see further details in chapter 4).  
Designing family policies like “investments” 
Finally, the costs of policies to support families are often considered as arguments for limiting 
the spending on childcare provision, especially in periods of budgetary restraint and 
economic austerity. Such a one-sided view however is blind to the returns that can be 
expected. For this reason, it is certainly preferable to speak about ―investment‖, as is the 
case with authors like Esping-Andersen (2002) or Heckman, in order to stress two 
characteristics: first the fact that the amount invested can be expected to generate higher 
returns in the future; second that children can be considered as capital, i.e. as an ―object‖ 
whose value decreases if not cared for, but which generates ―self-productivity‖ when invested 
in. 
The existence of such returns on investment is documented by the literature, but the 
evidence remains relatively scarce given the difficulty of properly evaluating them in the long-
run. Results are also rather sensitive to the assumptions underlying such calculations. 
Examples of such estimations may be provided to illustrate this. Cleveland and Krashinsky 
(1998 and 2003) found that public childcare investment  in Canada in 1998 for all children 
between 2 and 5 would have cost 5.3 billion, but would have generated 6 billion returns by 
means of an increase in female employment (leading to increased productivity, and 
economic growth, tax revenue, etc.). For the United Kingdom, PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
(2003) reports a 9% increase in female employment, and ensuing GDP growth, at an initial 
cost of GBP 3 billion. A recent evaluation from Zürich in Switzerland concludes that each 
franc invested in a childcare centre generates a return of 3 francs through the tax collected 
as a result of increased labour supply. In the same vein, in the Danish case, Esping-
Andersen (2008) considers that there are important benefits from public investments in 
childcare aimed at preventing over-long career interruptions after childbirth. The return on  
investment can be roughly estimated as 43% of the initial spending on childcare10.  
These costs/benefit evaluations can appear as a trivial exercise given that a wider range of 
outcomes is in fact concerned, and that such evaluation should be made over the longer 
term. Their interest is however to show explicitly the collective returns generated by such 
investments. The fact that most of the returns (such as the boost to productivity, or to tax 
revenues) are realised at the collective level may stand as a strong motivation to mutualize 
the cost of children and to develop public policies supporting families. Moreover, long-term 
returns on these investments in human capital in the form of children and women can be 
expected from the inter-relationship between the increase of female employment, fertility 
stabilisation and economic growth (see chapter 6). 
                                                                                                                                                        
(actual and potential). As long as the costs are calibrated to fall more heavily on the non-targeted group, if they choose to 
participate, only the targeted group will be prepared to endure them and take up the good. Note also that the costs may be in 
terms of restriction on quantity, or on quality, or on time. 
10
 In Denmark, the cost of two years of childcare added to three years of preschool for an household having two children can be 
evaluated at 72.850 Euros; if a woman earning the average wage keeps her job during this five year period, she will gain 
114300 Euros and possibly 200.100 if the whole life-cycle is considered.  This implies an additional amount of tax revenue of 
40.000 Euros for the 5 years of full-time employement, and of 110.000 Euros over the life cycle. The total returns for public 




The evidence presented in the first part of this chapter has shown that the standard 
estimation of the ―cost of children‖, measured as the loss of standard of living due to the 
presence of children in the household, is relatively high: children account for between 20 and 
30% of the household budget, but this cost depends on a number of factors such as family 
income, age of children, education, and the bargaining process within the household. 
Although already quite large, this standard estimation underestimates the actual cost of 
raising children since it does not consider the indirect costs associated with caring for 
children, labour market interruption and potential other consequences of children on parental 
career prospects. Also, since only children up to the age of 14 are taken into account in the 
estimations, it also minimises the cost of education, housing, etc. associated with the 
presence of an adolescent or due to the transition to adulthood.  
The overall cost of children thus includes many dimensions that have to be clearly identified 
in order to assess the impact of policies to help parents to bear that cost. Such an 
assessment requires entering into the black-box of the household in order to understand how 
policies impact on parental decisions relating to children and to their own well-being. The aim 
of policy objectives is also of crucial importance in assessing their impact. 
The chapter has argued that policy to support parenthood should be assessed with regard to 
the balance achieved between different outcomes relating to income distribution, children‘s 
well-being, parental labour market status and fertility decisions. We raised arguments 
supporting the idea that an efficient policy design should be made up of a mix of parental 
leave and support in cash and in kind. Universal programmes offering support in kind can be 
overcome the risk of inefficencies related to ‗targeted‘ programmes with benefits in cash. 
To sum up, this overview concludes that helping parents to bear the cost of children can be 
positive for all the outcomes considered, provided policies are designed to reconcile the 
different aspects of parents‘ and children‘s lives that are at stake. We found evidence that a 
range of support made up of paid leave entitlements, cash benefits and service provision is 
certainly a first requirement to achieve such outcomes. A period of parental leave that 
provides time for parents to care for their children is certainly beneficial for children and for 
parents, who avoid the stressful problem of trying to achieving work-family balance during 
this period. However, policies that support a rapid return to work have a positive influence in 
reducing poverty and can have positive impacts on children provided high quality and 
affordable childcare solutions are available. This support is especially important for low 
income families, or single parents, for whom the positive impact of an early formalised 
childcare (via childcare centres or preschool) on both female labour market status and 
children‘s outcomes is clearly recognised.  Continuity and complementarity of support, 
without gaps within the childhood period, also seem important dimensions in achieving a 
combination of positive outcomes: for example, taking parental leave will not have a 
detrimental impact on the labour market position of the leaver if (i) both parents are 
encouraged to share the leave, (ii) childcare services are available and affordable at the end 
of the leave (iii) working times are adjusted to family life. The better set of outcomes 
observed in countries where support is more comprehensive is also certainly not 
independent from institutions‘ ability  to tend to act as ―complementary goods‖, i.e. the effect 
of each of them strictly depends on the presence of a consistent set of others. The challenge 
is thus to design this set in a way that produces positive outcomes for all aspects 
simultaneously. 
Nevertheless, the provision of such comprehensive support is certainly costly, since the total 
amount spent to support families is already estimated to reach about 4% of GDP in countries 
where it is the highest. In this context, most of the European countries may be unable or un 
willing to spend higher amounts to support families. Any kind of programme which promises 
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―universal‖ access to all benefits and services has only a very low chance pf receiving 
political support. Tax payers are also unlikely to give their support to such programmes. This 
does not mean, however, that all sets of ―universal‖ programmes should be forgone and 
replaced by ―targeted‖ supports. Targeted support is in fact found to be less effective as a 
programme to eradicate poverty, and to fail to reach the neediest population. A more realistic 
and efficient support would be a system organised in two dimensions:  
- The first dimension providing ―universal‖ support in cash and in kind to cover basic 
needs. On the one hand, universal cash benefits would aim to limit the risk of poverty; 
on the other hand, the provision of a universally-based minimum of childcare services 
would guarantee equal conditions of care and equal preparation for school for all 
children.  
- A second dimension, offering ―targeted‖ benefits and/or services to meet specific 
needs and to enhance support in favour of the population with the greatest needs.  
Several advantages of a two-dimensional framework can be mentioned as a conclusion. 
First, by keeping a range of universal support, such a combination is likely to receive 
wider political and public support, even in a period of economic austerity. Maintaining a 
set of universal supports would also limit the stigmatisation of families receiving support. 
Moreover, the combination of two dimensions is likely to create confidence about the 
sustainability and durability of the system. This confidence is certainly needed to 
encourage people to use the existing support, and so to make the policy effective. It is 
also certainly partially explains the success of policies to support families in countries like 
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Family policy instruments helping to cope with the cost of children 
 
 
Antoine Math and Olivier Thévenon 
 
The Chapter presents an overview of the available knowledge on the relative importance of 
various forms of support for parenthood. This overview explores more particularly the data 
provided by the ESSPROS Eurostat database and discusses the validity of the database and 
methodological issues, suggesting improvements for the future. 
Policies helping families to cope with the cost of children take the form of different 
instruments.  
The generally accepted ‗core‘ of family policies includes three broad kinds of measures:  
 Cash support to families, through social benefits and/or tax relief that compensate for 
the costs associated with raising children. 
 Support in kind or services in the form of education, care and supervision for young 
and older children. Policy instruments may take the form of the direct provision of 
services and/or the subsidisation of services, but may also take the form of tax relief 
and cash benefits to help families to pay for services. 
 Family-related leaves and associated payments provided to parents who care for 
their children (maternity, paternity, parental leaves, leaves to care for a sick or 
handicapped child, etc.). 
However, there is some disagreement about the range of policy instruments that should also 
be included in the evaluation of family support. Other provisions are often mentioned in 
research because they may help households with children and may be included within the 
perimeter of ―family policies‖: 
 Social protection provisions other than ―family/children‖ benefits are excluded from 
this additional calculation because they do not exclusively focus on families with 
children, even if they have a clear effect on them: for example supplements for 
children in housing benefits and social assistance benefits, health insurance 
coverage for children, supplements for pensions, etc. 
 Tax relief not exclusively focusing on families with children, such as joint taxation of 
married couples. 
 Education expenditure is generally not included although it may be important,  in 
particular in countries where it may be a substitute for childcare arrangements for 
very young children under the age of compulsory school (‗play school‘). 
 Working and employment conditions other than leaves, whether they are determined 
by legislation or collective bargaining. 
 
There is also a debate about how private expenditure (e.g. by employers, childcare 
providers) should be included to measure the investment in families. 
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In the following, we focus on three ―core‖ kinds of measure to support parents in coping with 
the cost of children. For each broad set of measures, we will start by presenting the 
comparative information provided by the Eurostat social protection expenditure database and 
complement this with some other broad information on the three main sets of policy 
instruments. 
An overview of social spending for families and children in EU countries 
The Eurostat social protection expenditure database (ESSPROSS) provides a 
comprehensive and coherent description of social protection. It was developed in the late 
‗70s by Eurostat jointly with representatives of the Member States. The first methodology 
was published in 1981, revised in 1996 and small adjustments published in 2008.  
This database has several advantages:  
 good comparability due to a precise and tested methodology ;  
 regular production of data, useful in analysing trends over time  
 a large geographical scope with data now concerning 30 Member States, all 
EUMember States plus Norway, Iceland and Switzerland. 
 
The ESSPROS figures on expenditure are classified in to 8 functions:  
1. Sickness/Health care 
2. Disability 
3. Old age 
Family and 
maternity benefits 
Family supplements in « social 
assistance » and « housing policy » 
Childcare and preschool support 
Tax breaks for families 
Family supplement in pension regimes 








8. Social exclusion not elsewhere classified. 
 
The ―family/chidren‖ function is defined as ―support in cash or kind (except health care) in 
connection with the costs of pregnancy, childbirth and adoption, bringing up children and 
caring for other family members‖. It includes benefits that: 
 provide financial support to households for bringing up children; 
 provide financial assistance to people who support relatives other than children; 
 provide social services specifically designed to assist and protect the family, 
particularly children. 
 
The following table and graphs present the total ―family/function‖ social benefit expenditure 
that can be obtained from this database from the most recent available data (2005). 
As a whole, there are strong differences between countries as regards the « family/children » 
benefits: the amounts vary from 0.8 % of GDP in Poland up to 3.8% in Denmark in 2005. The 
EU average is 2.1 % of GDP. As a percentage of total social protection, total family/children 
benefits amount to 7.7 % in 2005 in the EU, ranging from a minimum of 4,2 % in Italy up to 


























Family/children social protection benefits (as % of GDP) - 2005 
 Total 










Benefits in cash 
during leaves (2) 
Other cash 
benefits 
eu27 2,1 7,7 1,5 0,6 0,6 0,3 1,2 
eu25 2,1 7,7 1,5 0,6 0,6 0,3 1,2 
eu15 2,2 7,7 1,6 0,6 0,6 0,3 1,2 
be 2,0 6,9 2,0 0,0 0,4 0,1 1,6 
bg 1,1 6,6 0,5 0,6 0,1 0,4 0,6 
cz 1,4 7,3 0,9 0,5 0,2 0,6 0,6 
dk 3,8 12,6 3,6 0,2 2,2 0,5 1,0 
de 3,2 10,8 2,2 1,0 0,8 0,2 2,2 
ee 1,5 12,0 1,5 0,0 0,1 0,7 0,7 
ie 2,5 13,6 1,6 0,8 0,3 0,1 2,1 
gr 1,5 6,3 1,1 0,5 0,5 0,3 0,7 
es 1,1 5,5 0,8 0,3 0,7 0,2 0,2 
fr 2,5 8,0 1,6 0,9 0,5 0,4 1,6 
it 1,1 4,2 0,7 0,4 0,5 0,2 0,4 
cy 2,1 11,6 2,1 0,0 0,2 0,1 1,8 
lv 1,3 10,6 1,3 0,0 0,2 0,6 0,5 
lt 1,2 9,0 1,1 0,1 0,4 0,3 0,5 
lu 3,6 16,5 3,6 0,0 0,5 0,4 2,7 
hu 2,5 11,5 2,3 0,3 0,6 0,6 1,3 
mt 0,9 4,7 0,1 0,7 0,1 0,0 0,8 
nl 1,3 4,6 1,2 0,1 0,7 0,0 0,6 
at 3,0 10,4 2,8 0,2 0,5 0,1 2,4 
pl 0,8 4,3 0,2 0,6 0,0 0,2 0,6 
pt (1) 1,2 5,0 0,2 1,0 0,5 0,2 0,5 
ro 1,4 10,0 1,2 0,2 0,2 0,6 0,7 
si 2,0 8,4 0,6 1,4 0,6 0,4 1,0 
sk 1,9 11,0 1,9 0,0 0,1 0,5 1,2 
fi 3,0 11,2 3,0 0,0 1,4 0,6 1,0 
se 3,0 9,5 3,0 0,0 1,5 0,7 0,9 
uk 1,7 6,2 1,3 0,4 0,4 0,1 1,1 
is 3,0 13,6 2,4 0,6 1,7 0,6 0,7 
no 2,8 11,9 2,7 0,2 1,3 0,7 0,9 
ch 1,3 4,4 1,3 0,0 0,2 0,1 1,0 
 
Sources : ESSPROS (Eurostat) –in March 2008, many of these 2005 data were still mentioned as provisional or estimated 
values 
(1) 2004 
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Social protection expenditure includes cash benefits and benefits in kind (public child care 
services and particular accommodation or home help services). ―Family/children‖ benefits are 
divided into 9 types of benefits that may be grouped in to three categories, and each of these 
groups may be used as proxy for analyzing what is widely recognized as the three core 
measures of family policies: cash support, allowances for raising children during maternity 







ESSPROS categories of benefits 
… that may be used as proxy for 
Benefits in kind 
1. Child day care 
2. Accommodation 
3. Home help 
4. Other benefits in kind 
Support in kind or services  
Cash benefits (1) 
5. Income maintenance benefit in 
the event of childbirth 
6. Birth grant 
7. Parental leave benefit 
Payments in the event of family-related leaves 
Cash benefits (2) 
8. Family or child allowance 
9. Other cash benefits 
Cash support to families (compensation for the costs associated 
with the charge of raising children) 
 
Social protection benefits in kind and provision of formal childcare services 
Social protection benefits in kind in the ―family/children‖ function include heterogeneous 
benefits such as child day care, accommodation, home help and other benefits in kind. 
These benefits are aimed at providing child day care to families as well as other services 
(accommodation, home help) for deprived families. 
These social benefits, as gathered in the ESSPROSS database, represent 0.6 % of GDP on 
average in the EU ranging from nearly 0 in certain countries up to 2.2 % in Denmark. Nordic 
countries are distinguished from others by spending much more on benefits in kind than 
others. However, the data cannot be properly used for evaluating the total invested in 
childcare services since some of the spending on childcare may be categorised under social 
assistance and because cash benefits aimed at covering childcare costs have to be added. 
Moreover, pre-school education programmes that are widespread in certain countries, and 
that may serve as an alternative to childcare arrangements, are not counted as social 
protection. Furthermore, as far as childcare is concerned, more quantitative and qualitative 
dimensions have to be taken into account. The following tables provide some examples of 
aspects of childcare provision such as the rate of coverage by age group, the duration of 
daily childcare,net costs for parents, etc. (see the limitations of ESSPROS data below). Data 
on expenditure as well as data on childcare coverage for pre-school age children show huge 
differences among European countries, especially for children under 3 years old. Behind the 
broad figures, there is furthermore a wide variety of childcare services, differing in quality (in 
terms of carers‘ numbers and qualifications), size, etc. Provision of childcare in European 
countries is currently estimated from surveys such as the EU-SILC survey. This data is not 
without drawbacks and limitations and it should be completed and compared with data on 
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Some characteristics of childcare provision in selected countries 

















































parent (b)  
DK 2.3 8009 4824 61.7 89.7 3.3 6.9 7.8 8.5 
SW 1.9 5530 4091 39.5 86.6 5.5 10.9 6.2 4.8 
FI 1.4 4186 4069 22.4 46.1 4 12.7 7.2 4.1 
NO 1.5 6085 3895 43.7 85.1 n.a. n.a. 7.7 -6 
IC 1.8 3408 6781 58.7 94.7 n.a. 7.3 14.9 13.5 
FR 1.6 4009 4744 28 100 5 18.8 11.3 8.8 
AU 0.6 3251 6205 6.6 74 8.7 14.7 14.9 9.3 
GE 0.77 3084 4865 9 80.3 7.5 10.5 8.4 6.8 
BE 0.9 1900 4663 33.6 99.6 7 15.6 4.2 3.5 
NL 0.9 2025 5497 29.5 70.2 5 20 11.5 3 
LU 0.9 3554 n.a. 14 72.3 5 14.3 5.7 4.8 
IE 0.3 1430 n.a. 15 68.2 3 10.3 29.2 51.7 
UK 0.8 1850 7153 25.8 80.5 3 17.4 32.7 14.4 
PT 0.9 1289 4489 23.5 77.9 11 16.5 4.2 2 
 
Source: authors‘ compilation from data provided by the OECD family database 
http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,2340,en_2649_34819_37836996_1_1_1_1,00.html, and OECD (2007), Babies and Bosses: 
Reconciling work and family life. A Synthesis of findings for OECD countries, Paris. 
a. Childcare costs are estimated for a dual earner family with two children and full-time earnings of 167% of the average wage in 
2004. The first earner is supposed to earn the average wage and the second two thirds of it. The two children are supposed to 
be below 3 years old and to be cared for full-time (40 hours per week) (OECD 2007; chart 6.5). 
b. Single parents are supposed with two children under age 3 and with  full-time earning at 67% of the average wage 
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Provision of childcare in European countries in 2005 
(Children cared for (by formal arrangements other than by the family) up to 30 hours / 30 hours or more per usual week as a 
proportion of all children of same age group) 
Country 0 – 2 years 3 years – mandatory  
school age 
Mandatory school age 





1 – 29h. 30h. or + 1 – 29h. 30h. or + 1 – 29h. 30h. or + (pre-primary 
included) 
EU Member States        
Belgium BE 23% 19% 49% 48% 43% 54% 6 
Bulgaria BG . . . . . . 7 
Czech Republic CZ 2% 0% 30% 40% 53% 45% 6 
Denmark DK 13% 60% 15% 79% 34% 65% 7 
Germany DE 8% 8% 61% 26% 69% 29% 6 
Estonia EE 3% 9% 9% 69% 57% 40% 7 
Ireland IE 14% 6% 64% 14% 64% 35% 6 
Greece EL 3% 4% 27% 34% 54% 45% 6 
Spain ES 25% 14% 54% 40% 53% 46% 6 
France FR 16% 16% 56% 39% 48% 52% 6 
Italy IT 9% 16% 21% 70% 13% 87% 6 
Cyprus CY 7% 12% 42% 43% 54% 46% 6 
Latvia LV 2% 16% 6% 60% 27% 69% 5 
Lithuania LT 2% 9% 11% 46% 66% 31% 7 
Luxembourg LU 14% 8% 51% 12% 74% 23% 4 
Hungary HU 2% 5% 30% 49% 30% 70% 5 
Malta MT 5% 0% 32% 23% 19% 79% 5 
Netherlands NL 36% 4% 82% 7% 89% 11% 5 
Austria AT 4% 0% 53% 16% 66% 32% 6 
Poland PL 0% 2% 8% 22% 58% 38% 6 
Portugal PT 3% 26% 9% 55% 30% 69% 6 
Romania RO . . . . . . 7 
Slovenia SI 2% 22% 10% 67% 41% 55% 6 
Slovakia SK 0% 3% 10% 57% 39% 44% 6 
Finland FI 8% 19% 25% 51% 82% 18% 7 
Sweden SE 22% 31% 35% 52% 1% 95% 7 
United Kingdom UK 24% 6% 72% 28% 10% 90% 5 
EFTA countries          
Iceland IS 7% 30% 21% 76% 22% 77% 6 
Norway NO 11% 22% 28% 52% 83% 17% 6 
 
Source: Eurostat, EU-SILC 2005 data. 
Notes: 
1) Formal arrangements refer to the EU-SILC survey reply categories 1-4 (pre-school or equivalent, compulsory education, 
centre-based services outside school hours, a collective crèche or another day-care centre, including family day-care 
organised/controlled by a public or private structure). 
2) Only care for more than 1 hour a week is considered. 
3) Some children do not use child care since parent is taking parental leave for a younger child. 
4) Child age is calculated at the interview date, except for IE and FI where age is calculated at 31/12/2004. 
5) Some countries, like BE, did not collect data for children 12 years old at the interview date. 
6) CY, LV, PT, SK: No information collected for children born between 31/12/2004 and the interview date. 
7) FR: Care performed by 'assistantes maternelles' directly paid by the parents, without an organised structure between them, is 
not included in the table. 
8) IE: For the age groups '0 - 2 years' and '3 years - mandatory school age', the care '1-29h.' is overestimated and the care '30h. 
or +' underestimated due to measurement error. 
9) SK: Measurement error for the age group 'mandatory school age school - 12 years' leading to high proportion of children 




Family-related leave  
The various forms of family-related leave are a central issue across Europe. Leave is a major 
part of 'work-life balance' or 'reconciliation of work and family life' measures. Leave schemes 
may be a way for parents - especially mothers - to cope with the indirect costs of children, i.e. 
avoiding the time devoted to the care and education of their children becoming an obstacle to 
their careers. Originally developed as support for parents to make it easier for them to 
continue working or to get back into employment after a break, parental leave can also be a 
means of fostering gender equality. However, leave may also worsen the difficulties faced by 
some parents, mainly mothers, in trying to keep a job or in returning to employment. Leave 
schemes may also accentuate 'career discontinuity', which is most prevalent among women. 
In such cases, parental leave might, ultimately, undermine rather than promote gender 
equality at work, at home and in the family by reinforcing the unequal division of parenting 
duties. 
ESSPROS data provides a proxy for measuring cash benefits provided during and for family 
related leaves, through three types of ―family/children‖ benefits: income maintenance benefit 
in the event of childbirth, parental leave benefits, birth grants. 
These benefits represent on average 0.3 % of GDP, ranging from 0 in certain countries up to 
0.7 % in Sweden and Estonia. Nordic countries, together with Estonia, Czech Rep, Latvia, 
Hungary and Romania, are the countries reporting the largest share of GDP devoted to these 
kinds of benefits. 
There may however be some reporting problems : for instance, the Netherlands indicates  no 
expenditure on this item even thoughthere is paid maternity leave, as well as a popular paid 
parental leave for public sector employees. 
 
"family/children" benefits in cash for leaves as a % of GDP - 2005 
0,3 0,3 0,3
0,7 0,7 0,7
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Expenditure on leaves is far too broad a category of information to permit evaluation and 
comparison of leave provisions. There is currently a large variety of types of leave open to 
parents: short and long, paid and unpaid. As far as paid leave is concerned, compensation 
may be calculated as all or part of the individual‘s normal pay or be paid at a flat rate. 
Compensation may be limited to a period shorter than the actual duration of leave. It may be 
48 
 
capped, means-tested or subject to other criteria (such as the number of children or previous 
employment/service). 
Some characteristics of family-related leaves in selected countries 
  Spending for maternity 
and parental leave per 
child (in % of GDP per 
capita) 
Total length maternity 
and parental leave (in 
weeks) 
Full-time eq period of 




Full-time eq period of 
paternity leave 
(in weeks) 
DK 49 50 46.8 2.0 
SW 64 66 52.8 9.2 
FI 57 200 42.9 3.0 
NO 63 51 49.2 3.2 
IC 50 26 20.8 10.4 
FR 28 172 56.2 2.0 
AU 32 120 37.8 0.4 
GE 22 170 25.4 0.0 
BE 17 27 13.9 2.0 
NL 17 40 16.0 0.4 
LU 46 78 32.1 0.4 
IE 5 46 14.4 0.6 
UK 7 52 12.0 0.5 
PT 15 41 17.0 1.0 
 
Source: Thévenon (2008a) - authors‘ calculation from data provided by the OECD family database 
http://www.oecd.org/document/4/0,2340,en_2649_34819_37836996_1_1_1_1,00.html, and OECD (2007), Babies and Bosses: 
Reconciling work and family life. A Synthesis of findings for OECD countries, Paris. 
a. full-time equivalent is the proportion of the duration of leave if it were paid at 100% of last earning: FTE = duration of leave in 
weeks*payment (as a percentage of average earnings) received by the claimant. Benefits and payment rates applicable as of 1 
January 2006. 
 
Family-related leave schemes are usually broken down into four categories: 
 maternity leave, with compensation generally covering part or all of the mother‘s 
regular wage, often for a period of approximately 15 weeks, some of which are taken 
prior to the birth of the child;  
 paternity leave, consisting generally of a few days off for fathers immediately following 
the birth of a child;  
 parental leave consisting of a block of several months to care for a young child, 
following on from maternity leave. Traditionally, this type of leave has either been 
unpaid or compensation has, as is the case in Austria and France, been a flat-rate 
benefit. In some northern European countries, it may be a contribution-based social 
insurance benefit calculated as all or part of the individual‘s normal pay; and  
 leave to care for older children in special circumstances- illness, disability, an 
emergency situation etc.  
Under this traditional four-category model, the various types of leave follow each other in 
chronological order based on the age of the child. This model is not always very conducive to 
analysis and comparison since actual provisions may tend to deviate from it. The boundaries 
between these different types of leave have tended to blur and various categories of leave 
may overlap or be, at least partially, interchangeable. Very long maternity leave, as in the UK 
(up to 52 weeks) functions de facto like parental leave in other countries. Alternatively, 
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parental leave may, as is the case in Finland, constitute an extension of maternity or 
paternity leave, with both being paid in the same way as wage compensation, or be quite 
separate when it is unpaid, as in Ireland. The distinction between maternity and paternity 
leave also tends to be blurred in some countries, especially in the case of post-natal leave. 
Parental leave also now tends to be applicable to infants. It may often be taken in an 
increasingly flexible and staggered fashion and long after maternity or paternity leave, when 
the child is older, or when adopting a child. It may also function as leave to care for a sick 
child. Lastly, there are also types of leave that do not fit into any of the four pre-determined 
traditional categories. For example, since 2000, grandparents in Portugal have been able to 
take advantage of 30 days of paid leave following the birth of a grandchild whose mother or 
father is under the age of 16 and living in the grandparent‘s home. 
In order fully to understand the complete picture of parental leave, it is important to keep in 
mind that the whole range of provisions in a particular country may be combined, shared 
between parents or follow on from one another chronologically. Several works have analysed 
and compared leave schemes and policies (for instance, Bruning and Plantenga, 1999, Math 
and Meilland, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c, Ray, Gornick & Schmitt, 2008). Among the numerous 
works, one has to mention particularly works undertaken by the OECD and by the Network of 
experts on leave policies & research (Moss and O‘Brien, 2006, Moss and Wall, 2007). The 
overview of this literature on the effects of leave policies on parent‘s employment, gender 
issues and child well being is carried out in chapter 4. In this chapter, by contrast, the focus 
remains on the policies. On this point, results of research on the comparison of leave 
instruments in the EU are convergent. We present a summary of this below, mainly based on 
Math and Meilland (2004b).  
 
Leave for urgent family reasons or for caring for a sick or disabled child. 
The EU Parental Leave Directive gives workers an entitlement to 'time off from work on 
grounds of ―force majeure‖ for urgent family reasons in cases of sickness or accident making 
their immediate presence indispensable', though Member States (and/or management and 
labour) may 'specify conditions of access and detailed rules and may limit this entitlement to 
a certain amount of time per year and/or per case'. This provision appears to have stimulated 
the development of specific leave for family reasons, particularly on the grounds of ―force 
majeure‖ or of a sick or disabled child. Leave to care for a child may be very short - a matter 
of just a few days - for emergencies or short illnesses. Alternatively, it may be relatively long - 
from several weeks to several years - for more serious illness or disability. 
A distinction between long- and short-term leave is relatively arbitrary because the various 
national leave schemes actually represent a continuum in terms of the duration of leave for 
family reasons. In addition, long-term leave may sometimes be broken into short periods - in 
Sweden, for example, a paid leave scheme providing for a maximum of 60 days per child, 
per year, per parent for children under the age of 12 (16 in some cases) is often in practice 
used in very small blocks. For the analysis of the leave package, leave for sick children 
should not be omitted, especially in countries like Sweden where this leave is particularly 
developed and widely taken up by parents. 
 
Maternity leave 
The 1992 EU Maternity Directive enhances the employment protection of pregnant women 
and women who have recently given birth or are breastfeeding and guarantees a minimum of 
14 weeks‘ maternity leave. Some of the main points of maternity leave statutory schemes are 








Length and payment of statutory maternity leave (based on legislation in 2004) 
Duration (1) 
Compensation 
Less than 80% 




14-15 weeks Belgium  Germany, Slovenia 
16-18 weeks Finland Denmark 
Austria, France, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Spain 
21 weeks  Italy . 








(1) For the first child - may be longer for the second and subsequent children (Poland) or the third child (France and Spain); (2) 
for 20 weeks after the first six weeks; (3) for the first six weeks out of a total 26 paid weeks; (4) no specific maternity leave - 
mother’s leave is included de facto in the parental leave scheme available to the two parents; (5) compensation as a percentage 
of income is very low for the vast majority of employees because of a very low ceiling on compensation. 
Source: Math et Meilland, 2004b, EIRO, 2004 
 
Duration 
The length of maternity leave varies greatly from one country to another, from the minimum 
14 weeks required under the 1992 Directive in Germany to approximately six months in 
Hungary, Ireland, Slovakia and the UK. In the UK, ordinary paid maternity leave of 26 weeks 
may be extended by additional unpaid maternity leave of 26 weeks. Total leave may thus be 
a whole year. In several countries, maternity leave is longer for a second or third child or for 
multiple births. Since the early 1990s, entitlement to leave and maternity benefits for multiple 
births has been increased in several countries and has often been widened to include 
adoption or fostering situations. 
Compensation 
In most cases, compensation is paid by sickness insurance or social security funds (or the 
general unemployment fund in the case of the Netherlands). However, in Ireland, Norway, 
Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden (parental leave) the compensation is paid by the 
state. In Denmark, employers cover the compensation. Legislation provides for employer top-
ups to compensation from sickness insurance funds in Greece, Poland and Germany. In the 
latter country, the sickness insurance funds make a wage-related payment of up to 13 euros 
per day, which employers top up to full pay compensation. In the UK, employers pay the 
statutory compensation, almost 100% of which is reimbursed through a reduction in 
subsequent employer social security contributions and other levies. 
At least part of maternity leave is generally financially compensated as a percentage of the 
mother's pay (or other employment income). For low wage earners, a minimum 
compensation level may exist, as in Finland, Ireland and Portugal. Maternity leave 
compensation is equivalent to 100% of normal pay in many countries. However, 
compensation may sometimes be capped (i.e. there is a maximum cash amount). In almost 
all countries, compensation covers the entire maternity leave period. However, in Ireland only 
the first 18 weeks of the maximum maternity leave period of 26 weeks are paid. In the UK, a 
maximum of 26 weeks are paid, of which six are paid at a rate of 90% of pay, with an 
additional period of 26 weeks unpaid. In Hungary, partial wage compensation is paid only 
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during the weeks of leave - of which there must be at least four - taken prior to the birth of the 
child. Women are entitled to a flat-rate benefit for the remaining weeks. 
In many countries, other types of benefits may either substitute for or top up maternity leave 
compensation. These benefits may be in the form of allowances paid at or around the birth of 
a child and during the first few months of the child‘s life, or they may take the form of one-off 
grants, notably a 'maternity premium'. Such benefits may be paid instead of maternity 
compensation, especially for women who are not entitled to normal paid maternity leave 
because they fail to meet all the eligibility criteria. There may also be top-up benefits 
designed to supplement maternity leave compensation.  
 
Paternity leave 
The March 1992 EU Council Recommendation on childcare stated that: 'As regards 
responsibilities arising from the care and upbringing of children, it is recommended that 
Member States should promote and encourage, with due respect for freedom of the 
individual, increased participation by men, in order to achieve a more equal sharing of 
parental responsibilities between men and women and to enable women to have a more 
effective role in the labour market.' Entitlement to family-related leave for fathers has been 
significantly enhanced in many countries since then. Post-natal leave, which was traditionally 
available only to women, now tends to be available to men as well, or to be open to sharing 
between the two parents. This change has been reflected in the creation or enhancement of 
specific leave, called paternity leave, available to fathers only on the birth of a child. 
Legislation on paternity leave available to fathers after the birth of a child or during the first 
few months of the child‘s life has been introduced or upgraded, in particular since the late 
1990s, in Belgium, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the UK. 
Increased leave entitlement for fathers has not only been achieved through specific paternity 
leave but also through parental leave designed to be shared more easily by both parents. 
The paternity leave entitlement must therefore be assessed in conjunction with the parental 
leave entitlement. Some of the main points of paternity leave schemes are outlined below - 
table below summarizes a number of key features. 
 
Statutory paternity leave schemes – 2004 
  
No statutory leave Austria, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Slovakia 
Very restricted leave Spain, Greece, Luxembourg, Netherlands 
    2 days Hungary, Portugal 
    5 days Belgium, Denmark, France, Slovenia (1), Sweden, UK 
    Around 2 weeks Finland, Norway (2), Slovenia (1) 
 
(1) 15 paid days and 75 further unpaid days; (2) no specific paternity leave - paternity leave included de facto in parental leave 
scheme. 
Source: Math et Meilland, 2004b, EIRO, 2004. 
 
Entitlement 
Self-employed men are entitled to paternity leave in only a very few countries and such leave 
is often available only to fathers in paid employment. However, employees do not have a 
statutory entitlement to paternity leave in all the EU countries studied though collective 
agreements may provide for leave. In countries where paternity leave does exist, fathers are 




Duration and compensation 
The duration of statutory paternity leave varies from one country to another, from a few days 
up to more than 3 weeks (see table). It should be stressed that, in the same way as for 
maternity leave, looking at the duration of paternity leave in isolation is problematic since 
paternity leave may be extended through parental leave. In countries with very short 
paternity leave, this may be offset by the existence of parental leave, thus ultimately 
providing fathers with significant leave in terms of both duration and compensation. Statutory 
paternity leave is generally paid and, in general, loss of pay is entirely or almost entirely 
covered. In those countries where paternity leave is limited to a few days, there is no loss of 
income and compensation is mainly covered by employers. Compensation paid by 
employers may be capped.  
 
Statutory parental leave 
The parental leave legislation of many EU Member States has been significantly amended 
since the early 1990s. The 1996 Directive on the issue often drove these amendments since 
it compelled some Member States to introduce this type of leave on top of maternity leave. In 
short, under the Directive, parental leave is required to be an individual entitlement lasting at 
least three months following the birth or adoption of a child (in addition to the minimum of 14 
weeks‘ maternity leave guaranteed by the Pregnant Workers Directive). Eligibility criteria 
relating to length of employment or length of service in a company may not exceed one year. 
Workers must be able to return to their jobs. The Directive also recommends, but does not 
make it compulsory, that leave should be flexible, available until the child turns eight, non-
transferable from one parent to the other and cover cases of adoption. Provision must also 
be made for giving workers time off on the grounds of force majeure for urgent family 
reasons. Some of the main points of statutory parental leave schemes are outlined below. 
 
Duration and compensation 
The length of statutory parental leave varies from country to country, ranging from a 
minimum of three months (13 weeks) in the UK and Belgium to three years in Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Spain - see table 4 below. The duration of 
parental leave has been extended over the past few years in Italy, Spain and Sweden, while 
Ireland and the UK introduced statutory leave as recently as the late 1990s. 
Statutory parental leave is unpaid in Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and 
the UK. However, in some of these countries, such as the Netherlands, collectively agreed 
provisions may offset this absence of statutory compensation. Leave attracts a flat-rate 
benefit in Austria, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Poland. In the remaining 
countries, compensation is proportional to loss of pay. Proportional compensation is very low 
in Italy. It stands at between 60% and 70% of pay in Hungary and Finland (where the rate 
varies according to the employee's wage level). Compensation is between around 80% and 





Maximum statutory parental leave - full-time leave after birth of first child (not disabled or adopted) taken 
after (or in lieu of) maternity or paternity leave – 2004 





























3 months (1) 
3 months 
6/11 months (7) 
32 weeks (2) 
260 days (11) 
43/48 (10) 
420 days (12) 
2 years (1) (2) (4) 
2 years (1) 
2 years (3) 
3 years (0) 
3 years 
3 years (1) 
3 years 








6/11 months (7) 
40 
260 days 
43/48 weeks (10) 















1 / 8 (9) 
3 / 8 (7) 












(1) benefit entitlement rules are separate from rules governing leave; benefit duration reduced to one year in 2007 (2) 11 months 
can be shared, with maximum of 6 months for the mother and 7 months for the father - compensation only if a child is under 
three (unconditional for first six months of leave and means-tested thereafter); (3) can be shared between the two parents; (4) 
for one parent only; (5) 52 weeks with compensation of 80% of income or 42 weeks with 100% compensation, to be shared by 
the two parents (nine weeks reserved for mother and four for father) - also acts de facto as maternity and paternity leave, which 
do not exist; (6) 480 days to be shared between the two parents, of which 60 days are non-transferable - also acts de facto as 
maternity and paternity leave, which do not exist; (7) benefit may be longer than leave, lasting up to 30 months (36 months 
when used by both parents); (8) 3 years if a small flat-rate benefit is included; (9) compensation lower after initial 26 weeks 
shared by the two parents; (10) employers and employees should agree arrangements for taking leave, but minimum 'fall-back' 
scheme allows up to four weeks’ leave per year; (11) after maternity leave for first parent and up to child’s fifth birthday for the 
other; (12) to be taken after maternity/paternity leave, but a block of 8 to 13 weeks may be postponed for the period until the 
child reaches nine years old; (13) to be taken up to age of two, but three months may be held back until the child reaches 
seven. 
Source : Math et Meilland, 2004, EIRO, 2004 
 
Age limit for children and adoption 
Traditionally, parental leave has been restricted to caring for young infants and as a result 
was designed to be taken after maternity leave. The 1996 Directive suggests that leave can 
be taken in the period up until the child concerned is eight years old. However, few countries 
allow parents to take parental leave beyond the child‘s third or fourth birthday. Parental leave 
schemes have increasingly been extended to cover adoption. 
Breaking up and spreading leave 
As encouraged by the 1996 EU Directive, statutory parental leave is tending to become more 
flexible and for example, may be broken up into a number of separate blocks. However, 
dividing or staggering leave in this way is not permitted in all countries. For instance, in 
Ireland, the unpaid leave of up to 14 weeks has to be taken all at once while at the opposite 








Compensation for statutory parental leave (full-time leave) – 2004 
Type of compensation Country 
None  Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, UK 
Flat-rate Means-tested Poland 
Lower for higher-income 
claimants 
Germany (2004) 
Not means-tested Austria, Belgium, France, Finland (1) Luxembourg, Slovakia 
Proportional to 
pay 
Below 80% of pay Finland (2), Hungary, Italy, Germany (since 2007) 
80%-90% of pay Denmark, Sweden 
100% of salary Norway, Slovenia 
 
(1) after initial 26 weeks; (2) initial 26 weeks. 
Source : Math et Meilland, 2004, EIRO, 2004 
 
 
Part-time work and flexibility 
The flexibility recommended by the EU Parental Leave Directive may be achieved by 
permitting those taking statutory leave to work part time. The same result can also be 
obtained, outside the parental leave scheme proper, by entitling parents to reduce working 
hours or adopt different working patterns. For instance, there exists some rights granted by 
law to parents that reduce or reorganise their working time in several countries like Finland, 
France, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia and Spain.  
One of the perceived advantages of both of these options over full-time leave is that they 
enable parents to remain connected to their jobs. There are various incentives for parents to 
take leave on a part-time basis: longer leave for those taking up leave on a part-time basis, a 
financial incentive for part-time parental leave, to ensure that the employee‘s income falls 
less than proportionally to the reduction in working time, encouraging both parents to work 
part time.  
 
Sharing leave between parents 
While enhanced entitlement to leave for fathers can be achieved through paternity leave, it 
may also be attained through parental leave that can be shared by the two parents. The 
1996 Parental Leave Directive requires that a minimum individual entitlement for each parent 
should exist: 'to promote equal opportunities and equal treatment between men and women 
... the right to parental leave ... should, in principle, be granted on a non-transferable basis.' 
There is also a trend towards bolstering the possibilities for the two parents to share leave 
and some countries have introduced incentives to encourage greater sharing. 
Several studies, mainly based on the duration and compensation of the leave package for 
mothers and fathers, have led to similar typologies of leave arrangements in Europe. We 
present in this chapter the typology proposed by Math & Meilland (2004c) based on 20 
European Union countries. This typology is based only on the characteristics of the leave 
package provided to parents, in particular the length of leave and associated payments. We 
will compare this typology with Wall‘s (2007) analysis of 19 European countries based on 
characteristics such as the level and type of compensation, the duration of leave, the gender 





 Very short and unpaid parental leaves, targeted at mothers. This group includes 
countries such as Ireland, the Netherlands, the UK, Portugal and Greece. In these 
countries, parental leave is unpaid (but may be preceded by rather long paid 
maternity leave like in the UK) and either equals or only slightly exceeds the minimum 
of three months required by the 1996 Directive. In general, these countries have a 
certain amount of flexibility regarding the maximum age of the child concerned - eight 
years old in the Netherlands, six in Portugal, five in Ireland and the UK. Spain shares 
some characteristics with these countries in respect of the absence of compensation 
for parental leave. However, it comes closer to ―long leave‖ countries with regard to 
the length of leave (three years) and the restriction to young children up to the age of 
three. 
 Short leave, low compensation, targeted at mothers with very young children. The 
second group, which seems very similar to the first, comprises Belgium, Italy and 
Luxembourg. As in the first group, parental leave is short in these countries (three 
months in Belgium and Luxembourg and between six and seven months in Italy) but 
they differ from the first group in that leave is mainly geared to young children. 
Compensation is low in Italy and Belgium but is higher in Luxembourg where the 
parent on leave receives a rather generous flat-rate benefit.  
Among the two previous groups, Wall (2007) distinguishes three groups (Belgium and 
Luxembourg are not included in her typology):  
 The ―short leave part-time mother policy model‖ in countries like Ireland, the 
Netherlands and United Kingdom. In these countries, the main social sphere for 
caring are the family and the market, with underdeveloped state provision of leave 
arrangement and child care services. Short leave packages are designed for mothers 
who are encouraged to combine work and childcare by working part-time, and gender 
equality in leave arrangements, compared for instance to child care services, is low 
on the agenda. 
 The ―short leave male breadwinner model‖ in Southern European countries like Italy, 
Greece and Spain which conforms more strongly to the idea of the male 
breadwinner/female home carer pattern with a short if very well compensated leave 
for mothers, no or very short paternity leave, unpaid short parental leave (with a small 
shift a few years ago in Italy towards a low-paid parental leave). 
 Portugal would represent the ―early return to full-time work leave policy model‖. It 
provides a short highly compensated post-natal leave, but there are signs of a gender 
equality objective such as a ‗compulsory‘ five-day paternity leave and two ‗daddy 
weeks‖ fully compensated parental leave. 
 Long leave, low compensation, targeting mothers with very young children, and with a 
high risk for future employment (at least for low qualified mothers). This group is 
composed of Austria, Finland, France, Germany (before the 2007 reform), Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia. These countries have the longest leave, at two or three years. 
Leave is generally restricted, with little or no flexibility, to young children up to the age 
of three. It is designed to be taken by one parent after maternity leave. Arguably, it is 
implicitly targeted at mothers in as much as the benefit is paid at a flat rate, which 
encourages the parent with the lowest wage or poorest employment prospects to take 
the leave. These provisions may especially target women facing difficulties finding 
employment. Finland also falls into this group, if we exclude the initial 26 weeks of 
leave shared by the two parents, which attract partial wage compensation, and 
consider only the subsequent longer parental leave. France may be distinguished 
from other countries in this group, as the long leave does not concern parents of one 
child who are consequently encouraged to work after maternity leave (or after a 
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shorter 6 months‘ low paid parental leave introduced in 2004). This group is referred 
to by Wall (2007) as the “long leave mother home-centred policy model‖ including 
countries like Austria, Germany, Hungary, Czech Republic, Estonia (but not France). 
In these countries, a long low paid leave emphasizes maternal home care until a child 
is three years old, with a low emphasis on gender equality in leave arrangements and 
low availability of child care services. 
 ―Short leave and well paid leave model‖. Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Slovenia, 
Finland to a certain extent, and possibly Germany after the recent reform, are part of 
this group. Parental leave in these countries attracts compensation as a percentage 
of pay and is shared by both parents. Total leave stands at eight months in Denmark, 
one year in Norway, one and a half years in Sweden, nine months in Slovenia and 
now one year in Germany. Finland, that has also been placed in the third ―long leave‖ 
group, is similar to Norway and Sweden in terms of the initial 26 weeks of well paid 
parental leave. However, Math & Meilland distinguish two groups among these 
―Nordic‖ countries: a gender-orientated leave package in Sweden and Norway and a 
more traditional female-orientated one in Denmark, Finland and Slovenia. In the first 
group of countries, a proportion of the shared leave may not be transferred to the 
other parent, the flexibility of parental leaves (over time and between parents) is very 
high and the leaves may be taken up to when the child reaches the age of 8 and 12 
respectively. On the contrary, in Denmark and Finland, there is no ‗daddy‘s quota‘, 
parental leaves are not as flexible (they may not be taken full-time simultaneously by 
both parents for instance) and they are conceived to be taken to care for a very 
young child immediately after maternity leave. In Finland, furthermore, there exists a 
second low paid long leave de facto designed for low qualified mothers. 
Wall (2007) classifies countries differently. France would be with Norway and Finland and 
represent a ―parental choice orientated policy model‖ that has emerged in the 1990s 
(Belgium would be also part of this group). These countries have long provided important 
child care services and developed more recently rather long low paid paid parental leaves. In 
these countries where gender equality is high on the agenda, there is a concurrent 
relationship between leave arrangements and child care services leading to ambiguous 
employment effects according to mother‘s status. 
Lastly, Wall (2007) proposes a ―one year leave gender equality orientated model‖ including 
Sweden, Iceland, Denmark and Slovenia. Leave is short with full or very high compensation 
of previous earnings. The promotion of gender equality is very high on the policy agenda and 
there is a true complementarity between the one-year leave and child care provision. 
Finally, research has shown that in order to fully understand the complete picture of family-
related leaves, and their effect on gender equality and work-family balance issues, it is 
important to take into account the whole range of provisions, parental leaves together with 
maternity, paternity or other leaves, and the way they are combined, shared between 
parents, or follow on from one another chronologically. Leaves have also to be placed in the 
context of other policy measures, in particular childcare services. The effects of leave 
policies on gender and work-family balance issues are presented in chapter 5. 
If statutory schemes are rather well known, little information is available on leaves and/or 
compensation provided through collective bargaining (Math & Meilland, 2004a). Studies have 
shown that they may play an important role in certain countries, for instance in the UK and 
Denmark, where collective agreements are important in regulating family-related leave. In 
other countries, such as the Netherlands, bargaining has preceded and prompted more 




Cash support to families and family benefits in cash 
The main policy instruments aimed at compensation for direct child-related costs are family 
benefits in cash (other than compensation for leave). All European countries provide some 
kind of cash family benefits. Other instruments, especially tax breaks, may complement 
them. From ESSPROS data however, only expenditure on family benefits in cash (other than 
compensation for leave) is available. This item includes benefits aiming at compensating the 
cost of children, such as child benefits, allocations familiales or Kindergeld, but also benefits 
for certain specific situations (lone parenthood, a disabled child, etc.). 
On average, these benefits represent around 60 % of the total « family/children » function 
and 1.2 % of GDP. There are very large discrepancies between countries: from 0.2 % of 
GDP in Spain up to 2.7 % in Luxembourg. Countries that dedicate the greater proportion are 
found in continental Europe with countries such as Luxembourg, Austria, Germany, Belgium, 
France, as well as Ireland and Cyprus. Other countries, including Nordic ones, are below the 
EU average. The financial commitment to families is particularly low in Latvia, Lithuania, 
Portugal, Italy and Spain.  
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Sources : ESSPROS (Eurostat) 
 
Family cash benefits may differ in many aspects that cannot be examined through 
ESSPROS database: 
- in most countries, there is some kind of basic child benefit that are provided regardless of 
the level of income. The exception, where the child benefits depend on the household‘s 
resources, are Czech Republic, Spain, Italy, Cyprus, Iceland, Malta, Portugal and Slovenia. 
- the upper age limits of children differ greatly from one country to another, from a low of 16 
years old in Sweden up to 27 years old in Germany and Luxembourg. 
- in nearly half of European countries, the amount of basic child benefit varies with the age of 
children. 
- the amounts of basic child benefits vary significantly between countries, with the highest 
amounts in continental Europe countries such as Luxembourg, Austria, Germany, Belgium 
and France. The amounts are lower in southern European countries, such as Greece, Spain, 
Italy, and in Eastern and Central Member States. 
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- basic child benefits are provided regardless of the number of children, i.e. to all families, 
with the notable exception of the French basic non means-tested allocations familiales that 
are not provided to one child families. 
- In most countries, there exists more than one kind of family benefit (including those related 
to raising children). As there often exist other benefits, and even in some countries rather 
numerous ones, generally targeted at particular situations (large families, lone parent 
families, disabled children, etc.), one cannot compare one type of benefits in isolation from 
the whole package of benefits available to families. 
 
Limits of available data on family policy instruments and ways of improvement 
An underestimation of support to families/children with the ESSPROS “family/children” 
expenditure data 
Despite its significant advantages (good comparability, regular production over several 
decades, large geographical scope), the ESSPROS data has severe limitations for the 
analysis and comparison of family policies.  
 Doubts about some country specific data provided to Eurostat 
There seems to be some problems concerning the reliability of data provided by member 
states to Eurostat:  
- Some social benefits provided by infra-national entities (regions, communes) are 
underreported 
- Expenditure for maternity or parental leaves are sometimes forgotten. For instance, 
the Netherlands report no expenditure on these measures while there exists a paid 
maternity leave, as well as a widely used paid parental leave in the public sector (75 
% of earnings).  
 Many social benefits to families/children are classified under other social protection 
functions (overlapping classifications) 
This occurs when the benefit is granted for two or more social risks or needs rather than a 
single one (where the risks are overlapping). One example of this is housing benefit granted 
only to large families. If none of the combined functions is clearly dominant, the basic rule of 
ESSPROS is that a more specific function takes precedence over a more general one. The 
list of social protection functions in order of decreasing specialization is:  
Sickness/Health care (health care),  




Sickness/Health care (cash benefits),  
Family/children 
Social exclusion not elsewhere classified. 
 
Following this principle, as family/children is considered as one of the most general functions, 
benefits also granted for other reasons tend to be classified in the other more specific social 
protection functions. There are many examples of this: 
- Health/sickness: all health insurance protection, even if provided to children, is 
classified under the health/sickness function. This includes specific medical care 
provided to expectant mothers. 
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- Paid leaves in the case of sickness or injury of a dependent family member (in most 
cases a child) are reported under the sickness/health care function, not the 
family/children function. 
- Orphan pensions may be and are often classified in the survivors function 
- Benefits to disabled children are allocated to the Disability function 
- Housing benefits are allocated to the housing function even if they are reserved for 
families (large families, lone parent families, etc). 
- More generally, the numerous family or child components/supplements for benefits 
that are granted for another specific purpose such as unemployment, old age 
(supplement of old age or survivors pensions), housing, etc. are to be classified under 
the more specific function, e.g. unemployment, old age or housing benefit, and not 
under the family/children one. 
- For social assistance not classified elsehwere, higher rates of benefits may be paid 
to the beneficiary if she/he has dependants (a child or a non-working spouse, for 
example). The supplements thus paid integrate or replace the family allowance, and 
therefore in principle they should be separated from the main benefit and included in 
the Family/children function that is considered as more general. However, as this 
proves very difficult (e.g., because, in establishing the rate of benefit, the policy-
maker will have taken account of economies of scale in consumption of the 
household), in practice the supplements are retained under the functions to which the 
main benefit belongs. 
As a consequence, ―family/children‖ social benefits give an underestimation of the 
actual support to families provided by social protection schemes, and comparisons 
between countries may be strongly biased. 
 Other support to families and/or children not within the scope of the core of 
ESSPROS (not regarded as social protection). 
Education public spending is excluded 
 
ESSPROS data do not include education. This leads to an under-estimation of the support 
provided by public authorities to children and their families. This omission is not a real 
problem for international comparison as long as, for all studied countries, the access to 
education is free or almost free for all families. But this omission may lead to a bias for the 
comparison of countries where the proportion of education costs left to parents is very 
different (the same reasoning applies if the share of expenditure paid by families for health 
care to children is very different from one country to another). 
However, according to ESSPROS methodology, ―family/children‖ expenditure should include 
education expenditure that takes the form of ―support to indigent families with children‖, that 
is, if the ―object of the measure is to redistribute income in favour of those who have 
insufficient resources rather than to provide free access to education‖. In practice, in spite of 
this recommendation, some countries do not include such support in the ESSPROS data. 
For instance, this is the case for means tested grants to pupils (bourses nationales des 
collèges et des lycées) in France. 
The exclusion of public education expenditure raises a problem if one wants to compare 
policies regarding childcare arrangements, especially for countries where children are cared 
for by the education system from very young, such as by écoles maternelles in France or in 
Belgium where these schools care for children all day long from the age of 2 or 3. The 
comparison with other countries is biased where, for example, these very young children are 
still cared for, but by other arrangements that are considered as social protection benefits in 
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kind. This is the case in the Nordic countries where children are cared for up to the age of 5 
or 6, and where entrance to the education system starts at around 6 years old. 
The OECD SOCX data base (Social expenditure database) provides a complement to and 
correction of ESSPROS ―family/children‖ expenditure by including childcare and education 
services before primary school (data are available for OECD member countries, at the 
earliest from 1998 and up to 2003). The following graph compares benefits of the 
―family/children‖ function in kind in the SESPROS database and childcare and pre-primary 
school expenditure as counted by the OECD. The inclusion of pre-primary school 
expenditure (especially écoles maternelles) modifies the results of the comparison: 
expenditure in countries such as France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Portugal is much 
increased and the gap with Nordic countries is strongly reduced. 
 
Public spending on family benefits in cash, services and tax measures, as a proportion of GDP, 2003 – 

















 Employer and private support to families are excluded 
According to the ESSPROS methodology, ―all schemes that are solely based on individual 
arrangements or where simultaneous reciprocal agreements exist are not regarded as social 
protection‖. As a consequence all direct transfers between households or individuals in cash 
or in kind such as gifts, family support are excluded.  
The conventional definition of social protection is that the measure must not be  
compensation for work (such as wages), that is to say that it must not be a simultaneous 
reciprocal measure. Any expenditure by employers for the employees' benefit that can 
reasonably be regarded as compensation for work is therefore not considered a social 
benefit.  
As a consequence, all expenditures by employers that may be considered as a part of the 
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Therefore the following measures provided by employers to their employees‘ families are 
excluded from ESSPROSS family/children expenditure:  
- Crèches for the children of employees; sports, recreation and holiday facilities for 
employees and their families.  
- benefits provided by employer to employees with children, such as holiday homes, 
special bonuses 
- non statutory family benefits or advantages provided by employers. 
 
However, some measures provided directly by employers to their employees are considered 
as social protection and included in the ESSPROS ―family/children‖ expenditure : 
- cash benefits that replace loss of earnings during a temporary inability to work, eg. in 
case of pregnancy 
- continued payment of normal, or reduced, wages and salaries during periods of 
absence from work as a result of maternity 
- payment of statutory special allowances for dependent children and other family 
members 
 
In conclusion, ESSPROS data include very few benefits provided by employers to families. 
This may underestimate the support to families, especially in countries where, by tradition, 
employers offer important advantages to their employees with children. 
 
 Tax breaks to compensate for the cost of children are also excluded:  
 
Some countries provide tax breaks or allowances for children against gross income. There 
are however very strong differences between European countries as regard income tax. 
Firstly, there is a possible distinction between countries that tax the individual and countries 
that tax the household adults together (with possible other distinctions according to marital 
status). Secondly there is a distinction as to how children are taken into account in the 
calculation of tax income. Some Nordic countries such as Denmark, Finland and Sweden do 
not take children into account in the fiscal system (despite some measures to compensate 
for childcare costs). In these countries, the income and local taxes paid by a household 
without children are not greater than those paid by a household with children where both 
have the same earnings. The goal of income tax is not to compensate for the cost of children 
and/or to redistribute to families.  
Most other European countries do take into account the presence of children in their income 
tax system. This type of support may take the form of a tax reduction (for instance, in 
Germany, Italy, Netherlands; UK), or of a reduction of taxable income (for instance in Spain) 
or of being integrated into the calculation of income tax such as through the quotient familial 
in France.  
All these tax breaks may vary with the size of the family and the age of children: some 
measures are targeted at very young children or at older ones. They may vary between 
couples and lone parents. Countries like Austria, Germany, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands have specific tax measures for lone parents. Measures 
may also take into account other situations: presence of a handicapped child, childcare 
costs, compensation for school costs, compensation in case of non payment of child 
maintenance, etc..  
Tax breaks to compensate for the cost of children tend to be more favourable for well-off 
households: non taxable households are generally excluded from these tax breaks and the 
tax breaks may increase with income such as in France. However, with the objective of 
making work pay, there is a trend toward the creation or increase of tax credits for low 
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income working families (with at least one working adult) such as in the United-Kingdom, in 
the Netherlands or in France. 
Tax breaks for families are an alternative to cash benefits. However they are not social 
protection schemes and are not reported in ESSPROS. This omission of information on tax 
breaks for family reasons is a serious problem when comparing family policies, since many 
researchers have underlined the importance in certain countries of such types of support for 
families. 
The OECD estimated tax breaks for families in 2003. According these estimates, tax breaks 
are very important – they may represent from 0.4 to 1 % of GDP - in countries such as 
Germany, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and 
the United Kingdom. However, these OECD estimations do not take into account tax breaks 
for couples (for instance, the couple part of quotient familial in France).  
Some estimations for Germany show that all tax breaks for family reasons represent 32 % of 
expenditure counted in the ―family/children‖ expenditure of ESSPROS. 
 

























































































































































Cash Services Tax breaks towards family OECD-24 (2,4%)
 
Notes:   
- Public support accounted for here only concerns public support that is exclusively for families (e.g. child payments and 
allowances, parental leave benefits and childcare support). Spending recorded in other social policy areas as health and 
housing support also assists families, but not exclusively, and is not included here. 
- OECD-24 excludes Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Poland, Switzerland and Turkey where Tax spending data are not 
available. 
Source: Social Expenditure Database (www.oecd.org/els/social/expenditure) 
 
Some illustrations of the important underestimation of public support to families with 
ESSPROS data 
 Germany: 
Expenditure for families in 2001 amounts to 2.9% of GDP in ESSPROS, but other measures 
to support families are excluded : measures reported under other functions of ESSPROS 
(orphan‘s pensions, child-related components in basic income support, inpatient delivery) 
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and measures excluded from ESSPROS such as tax breaks (including tax-splitting) and 
support for education and vocational training. By adding all these measures together the total 
support to families in Germany amounts to 4.5% of GDP, as compared to 2.9 % of GDP 
(Eichhorst, 2007). By also including transfers from communes, Länder, employers and 
churches, the total estimation is more than 10 % of GDP (Rosenschon, 2006). 
 France:  
Expenditure on ‗core‘ family policies (ESSPROS data) is 2.7% of GDP in France in 2003. 
Damon (2006) found that this proportion rises to 4.6% of GDP when other items such as 
family-related spending on poverty and « housing », tax breaks and family-related 
advantages in the pension system are included . 
By gathering information from different national statistical sources, our own estimation of total 
public support to families in France produces  even higher figures (see table 5). 
 
Estimation of expenditure that may be counted as family policy expenditure – France - 2005 
 Montant des dépenses  
Family benefits 25,6 
Including “accueil jeune enfant” 9,5 
Others (child benefits…) 16,1 
―Action sociale‖ 10,4 
Caisses d’Allocations Familiales (CAF) 3,3 
Communes 1,6 
Départments 5,5 
Pensions (advantages linked to children) 17,6 
Minimum guaranteed incomes (child supplements) 0,8 
Housing benefits (child supplements) 4,5 
Health care insurance (health care for children) ? 
Tax breaks (for family reasons) 38,4 
quotient familial (children component) 13,1 
Other fiscal tax breaks due to children 1,4 
quotient familial (spouse component) 23,9 
Preliminary public education 10,7 
Total 108 
         as % of GDP 6,3 % 
Total without spouse component of fiscal quotient familial 84,1 
         as % of GDP 4,9 % 
Bozio A., Landais C., Fack G (2008) « Politiques familiales et droits familiaux de retraite. Objectifs, 
coûts et évaluations »,Rapport pour l‘IRES and own calculations. 
Chiffrages en milliards d‘euros 2005 réunis à partir de différentes sources nationales (Direction 
Générale des Impôts, Cour des Comptes, Comptes de la Sécurité sociale 2007, Conseil d‘Orientation 
des Retraites, Social Actualité n°212-213 juillet-août 2008). 
 
These illustrations on Germany and France show the need for improving and complementing 
ESSPROS data in order to better evaluate and compare family policies in the European 
Union. 
Data on expenditure cannot help in analyzing and comparing targeting or the redistributive 
effects of family policies 
With ESSPROS expenditure for the ―family/children‖ function, one may calculate an average 
cost (e.g., per child, per family or per capita as % of GDP per capita).  
However, data on expenditure does not allow analysis and comparison of its targeting and 
redistributive effects. It may not provide information on the effects of the expenditure and on 
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its distribribution across family types ie. how expenditure is distributed across families 
according to their size, the number and age of children, their income, etc. Other 
complementary sources and methods are necessary to analyse and compare its 
redistributive effects. Family models (household type, case studies are particularly suited to 
analysing the way policies function. Other sources and methods may also provide 
complementary information, in particular household surveys including reliable questions and 
answers on incomes, and micro simulation models  
 
How are policy instruments packaged together? A preliminary typology 
Comparing each policy instrument separately is useful to identify their relative development 
country by country. But in order to understand their impact one important aspect is to analyse 
how these different instruments are combined to ensure (or not) comprehensive, 
complementary and continuing support over the childhood period. Here different patterns of 
policy support can be identified from the comparison of these packages, which refer to 
different sets of countries. Thevenon (2008) provided such an analysis for OECD countries, 
using the OECD Family Database. 
A principal component analysis (PCA) of the OECD data makes it possible to identify the 
main similarities and differences in family policies between European countries. Apart from 
European countries, several other OECD countries were included: Anglo-Saxon countries 
(USA, Australia, New Zealand) and Asian countries (Japan and Korea). Figure 1 represents 
the countries‘ positioning according to that analysis. The analysis confirms the contrasts 
highlighted by previous studies (Gornick et al. 1997; Gauthier 2002; De Hénau et al. 2006). 
The more detailed data available in this database make it possible to highlight heterogeneity 
within given groups of countries. Some countries exhibit characteristics that are quite 
different from their geographical neighbours. 
FIGURE 1: OECD COUNTRIES ACCORDING TO PATTERNS OF FAMILY POLICIES 
 
The Nordic countries: substantial support for families with small children 
Two distinct groups of countries stand out for the first focus of the PCA: the Nordic countries, 
on the right hand side of Graph 2, and the southern European and Anglo-Saxon countries on 
the left. That division can be attributed mainly to differences in the parental leave and child 
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care systems for working parents with children aged under three. Parental leave in the 
Nordic countries is longer than in other countries: 53 weeks at the full-time equivalent of the 
average wage in Sweden and 47 weeks in Denmark, compared with only 27 weeks on 
average for all OECD countries (Table 1). The disparity can be attributed to a relatively high 
compensation rate in Nordic countries, since the length of leave is limited. 
Full-time equivalent leave specifically reserved for fathers is also longer than in other 
countries: 13 weeks in Iceland and 11 weeks in Sweden, compared with an OECD average 
of only one week. However, paternity leave actually taken by fathers only represents a tiny 
fraction of total parental leave, which is almost entirely taken by women. In all, the spending 
on leave is much higher in the Nordic countries, totalling on average 57% of per capita GDP 
for each child, versus 25% in the other countries, and only 4.7% in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. 
The percentage of children in formal child care is also much higher in the Nordic countries. 
Roughly half the children aged under three attend formal child care there, compared with 
less than one-fifth in the OECD countries as a whole. The amount invested per child is also 
much higher: on average $5,758 in purchasing power parity in the Nordic countries, versus 
$2,520 for the OECD average. However, the volume of cash benefits for families is below  
average, and clearly targets low-income families. 
The total investment in child care and education for all children aged under six is higher in 
the Nordic countries as well, at 1.8% of GDP on average, versus 0.7% in the other countries 
(and only 0.6% in the Anglo-Saxon and Asian countries, and 0.7% in southern Europe). 
Denmark: a model of comprehensive family policy 
Denmark and Iceland stand out from the other Nordic countries (Figure 1), and partly for the 
same reasons: the percentage of children aged under three in formal child care is much 
higher in those two countries (62% in Denmark and 59% in Iceland). The level of spending 
on child care services is also higher in Denmark (2.3% of GDP). The effective tax rate, i.e. 
the aggregate percentage of tax levied on earned income, is also much higher in Denmark—
and in all Nordic countries—than in the other countries. That can be seen as the trade-off for 
the relatively high level of support granted as paid leave and child care services aimed at 
reconciling working and having young children. Denmark is probably the most developed 
model based on strong public intervention offering high, continuous support to enable 
parents to reconcile work and family. The system provides relatively high financial security 
during parental leave. Leave is relatively short but followed by easy access to formal child 
care then preschool and school. Consequently, the fertility rate is among the highest among 
OECD countries, with a particularly high (full-time equivalent) female employment rate. A 
high level of female labourforce participation nevertheless comes at the expense of a 
pronounced occupational segregation between men and women (Gilles and Terraz 2008). 
The Anglo-Saxon countries: support targeted on preschool-age children and poor 
households 
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the Nordic countries, the Anglo-Saxon countries, 
Japan, Korea and the southern European countries are in a similar position to each other, 
with generally lower support for reconciling work and children aged under three. There is little 
or no compensation during leave after the birth of a child. The supply of child care and 
education services is also generally lower, but there are sharp variations between countries. 
Public investment is also clearly targeted at preschool education. Public spending per child 
aged under three and attendance at child care facilities are much lower than for children 
aged three to six.  
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However, the Anglo-Saxon countries, plus Switzerland and Japan and Korea, differ from 
southern Europe in several respects, as illustrated by the vertical opposition between these 
two groups of countries in Figure 1. First, support for families through family benefits and tax 
breaks is much higher. It is actually the main form of intervention in those countries, where 
this support accounts for 1.9% of GDP, compared with an OECD average of 1.6% (the USA 
is an exception, with only 0.8%). This support also clearly targets low-income families and 
has an objective of poverty reduction. Little more than one child in four (28%) nevertheless 
attends formal child care, often privately provided, compared with an OECD average of 
slightly fewer than one in four (23%). 
… and a work/family balance based on labour-market flexibility  
In other words, the Anglo-Saxon countries are characterised by limited public support for 
reconciling work and children aged under three. Public investment is higher for preschool 
facilities for children aged three and over, usually on a part-time basis. The main objective is 
to provide preschool education to ensure equal opportunity for all children. In this context, the 
reconciliation of work and family life is fairly strongly based on the adjustment allowed by 
labour-market flexibility, i.e. the ability to change jobs without being unemployed for too long, 
and especially the increase in part-time employment for women with small children. 
Work/family balance is therefore based on strong asymmetry between the positions of men 
and women in the labour market and implies that families with small children forego some 
income, which is not offset by public support. Family income is therefore often inadequate 
and family poverty rates are among the highest in these countries. Conversely, the 
adjustment made via the labour market enables these countries to maintain high fertility 
rates. 
Southern Europe: more limited assistance  
In the other countries, fertility and women‘s workforce participation rates are generally lower. 
They are especially low in the countries of southern Europe, where poverty rates are also 
higher. These countries are characterised by a ‗deficit‘ of policies, whichever aspect is 
considered. The volume of cash benefits for families is very low. Parental leave can be 
relatively long, but uncompensated or poorly compensated. Portugal stands out from the rest 
of this group with slightly shorter parental leave, more targeted cash benefits for low-income 
families, and much higher attendance of children under three in formal child care: 23% in 
Portugal, versus less than 7% in Italy and Greece. Spain has almost the same low 
attendance at child care services, but much longer, unpaid parental leave. 
The other countries, in eastern and central Europe, are in an intermediate position, except for 
France and Hungary, where indicators are far higher than average for all forms of family 
support. In these countries the full-time equlivalent length of parental leave is longer than in 
most countries in central and Eastern Europe. Above all, cash benefits for children are far 
less targeted on low-income families than in the other countries. The investment in child care 
services is also significantly higher than average, but attendance among children under three 
in public child care facilities is much higher in France (29%) than in Hungary (7%).  
Eastern Europe: at the crossroads of diversity? 
Compared to the other three eastern European countries (i.e. the Czech Republic, Poland 
and Slovakia), Hungary provides more comprehensive support to parents with a young child 
through a balanced combination of policy support: parental leave payment compensation is 
higher (70 weeks of full-time equivalent against 39 in Poland and 35 in Czech Republic); 
public spending on child care services is also higher and their coverage for preschool 
children is also higher (87% of children) than in Poland (36%), for example; families are also 
supported through relatively generous financial benefits which amount to 2% of GDP 
compared to only 1% in Poland. However, the poorest families receive a relatively small 
share of this support compared to households earning two average wages. Slovakia is also 
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in a unique position with a rather limited period of paid parental leave, while unpaid leave can 
be extended to three years. Investments in child care facilities are also relatively low despite 
higher coverage rates for children under age 2 than in other eastern European countries. As 
in Hungary, the level of family benefits is relatively high as a percentage of GDP but does not 
appear to target poor families in particular. Thus, the combination of a long period of unpaid 
leave and the limited availability of other types of support make Slovakia comparable to other 
Southern European countries. However, this situation remains quite specific in a 
geographical area where the development of family and child care policies has varied in its 
timing and followed different patterns (Szelewa and Polakowski 2008).  
Conclusions and recommendations for the analysis of family policies 
Two series of recommendations come from the analysis of sources of information on family 
policies. One is aimed at improving available data on expenditure to support families. The 
other aims at complementing available information with other sources. 
Improving available ESSPROS data on social protection expenditure for families 
ESSPROS and new OECD SOCX including tax breaks are the best available sources of 
reliable expenditure data. Some improvements or supplements should be made to improve 
the data on expenditure in the field of family policies.  
 Increasing the reliability of data, based on current methodology. More thorough 
reporting of data should be done by member States, following current ESSPROS 
methodology, and some evaluations of the quality of data should be undertaken from 
time to time. Expenditure for paid maternity and parental leaves, as well as benefits 
provided by infra-national public entities should be better reported in ESSPROS than 
they are now. For comparative studies, family expenditure data should be aggregated 
according to international definitions, as the role of public spending for family 
purposes and its impact can only be assessed properly if based on solid comparable 
data. 
 Complementing the ESSPROS analysis of family/children benefits with an ad hoc 
evaluation of the family/children components or supplements that are classified in 
other social protection functions: sickness/health care, unemployment, housing, old 
age, social exclusion, etc. 
 Evaluating and analysing the support provided to family/children through policies that 
are outside the scope of social protection, especially the education system and the 
income tax system.  
Education expenditure: the OECD SOCX database already adds to ESSPROS data 
expenditure on pre-primary education services (from the OECD Education Database) 
for those EU countries where the amounts reported by ESSPROS are 
underestimated (available from 1998). It includes all public financial support for 
families with children participating in both formal day-care services (i.e. crèches, day-
care centres and family day-care for children under 3) and preschool institutions 
(including kindergartens and day-care centres for children). This is an improvement 
enabling better comparison of the commitment of different countries as regards 
childcare arrangements. 
Tax breaks. Comparative classification systems should be ―neutral‖ with regard to 
budgetary assignment. Tax breaks are an important feature of family policies and 
cannot be neglected – expenditure data for cash benefits and services only are 
insufficient, as tax breaks can be functional equivalents. For the moment, OECD 
SOCX actually provides some estimates but only for some countries, and not yet on a 
very regular basis (the last data available are for 2003). Furthermore, tax breaks for 
married couples (tax splitting) are not reported by OECD SOCX 2007. 
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 Evaluating the support provided to family/children by employers. In certain countries, 
benefits and advantages provided directly by employers represent an important part 
of the support received by families to cope with the cost of children. Furthermore, too 
little is known from a comparative perspective on the support to families provided in 
the framework of collective agreements. 
 
 Complementing information on family policies by sources other than public spending 
As the information needed to analyse family policies cannot be completely gathered from 
expenditure data, one needs to develop other sources of quantitative and qualitative 
information. 
 Developing more systematic and more regular comparative information on the 
multiple dimensions of the different instruments of family policy 
Many schemes cannot be reduced to spending, and still less to a few figures or 
indicators, if they are to be fully analysed and compared. Detailed information on 
schemes, especially childcare arrangements and leaves, is necessary to analyse 
properly their multiple dimensions. The OECD family base is a step towards covering 
the gap in this domain. Networks of researchers, such as the existing Network of 
experts on leave policies & research, or the European Observatory of National Family 
Policies (unfortunately interrupted in 1998), should be supported in order to provide 
independent updated analyses and comparisons of family policies. There should be 
more systematic production and confrontation of data. For instance, data on childcare 
provision from the EU-SILC household survey should be complemented by data 
coming from other national sources. 
 Developing complementary sources to analyse family policies, such as international 
databases of family models 
Household surveys, such as SILC, provide comparative information on incomes, but 
due to limited sample size and lack of reliability on questions such as family benefits 
or tax breaks, their usefulness for fully analysing family policies is limited. Micro-
simulation methods such as Euromod encounter the same kind of limitations. 
The family model method is a way to overcome certain limits previously noted. This 
method provides a precise illustration of the way transfer and fiscal policies work and 
vary according to family size, income, age of children, etc. It also fully integrates, 
besides family benefits, the effect of other policies, especially tax systems and 
housing benefits, that have a particularly large impact in certain countries. Unlike 
other sources, the most recent legislation may be taken into account using this 
method. There is already some previous international experience to refer to in relation 
to the use of this method. The OECD tax and benefit models are based on this 
method but are not sufficiently adapted to account for the diversity of types of families 
(little variation by number and age of children and by income level). Previous family 
model data bases using international data have been set up and successfully 
analyzed, especially within the framework of the European Observatory of National 
Family Policies that was funded by the European Commission between 1994 and 
1998 (Ditch et al., 1995, 1996, 1998; Bradshaw et al., 1995, 1996). This fruitful 
experience was stopped and, since then, there has been a lack of continuity, even if 
several international ad hoc studies have continued to show that this method is useful 
to analyse and compare the redistributive dimensions of family policies (Bradshaw et 
al., 1993a, 1993b, 1994; Eardley et al., 1996; Bradshaw and Finch, 2002; Math, 2003, 
2004 ; Bradshaw and Mayhew, 2006). However, these ad hoc studies have not 
covered all present EU member States. A more regular and systematic production of 
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The demographic situation in the European Union has become a major issue for the 
European institutions in so far as the consequences of fertility decline on the ageing of the 
population; the labour force supply and the funding of social protection are concerned.  The 
cost of raising children may influence the individual‗s decisions to have children, thus 
contributing to fertility decrease in Europe. Policy actors argue that the observed gap 
between the ―desired‖ and the ―effective‖ number of children should be reduced. However, 
the reasons for the fertility decline are multiple and complex, as shown in the abundant 
literature available on the topic. In addition, the impact of policy measures on fertility 
decisions is still controversial among researchers and demographers. In this chapter, we first 
identify the fertility decline and its implications for policy, highlighting the contrasted situations 
across EU member States with respect to various patterns and reasons for fertility decline 
and to policy responses across the European Union.Next, we review the literature assessing 
the impact of policy on individuals‘ decisions with a special focus on methodological issues. 
Finally, new ways for research and policies are explored.  
 
Evidence of fertility decline in EU countries  
Persistent low fertility rates in EU member states are a growing concern for policy makers at 
EU and national levels. One basic reason is that low fertility rates cannot offset the positive 
increase in life expectancy, thus accentuating the process of population ageing. As stated 
quite widely in the literature, this process seriously challenges the aptitude of countries with 
the lowest fertility rates to reach a sufficient renewal of their active population to respond to 
future labour force shortages and to the needs of Welfare States. The evidence of fertility 
decline and its consequences has been underlined in many researches over the last 
decades, most of them being commissioned by the European Commission (for instance: 
IPROSEC; See Hantrais, 2004) or by the European Council or the OECD.  More concern 
about the impact of such a process is expected where the total population has started to 
decline or is expected to decline strongly in the years immediately ahead (European 
Commission, 2007). While the rate of population growth is one of the lowest among the 
major regions in the world, EU member states face a similar slow down in population growth 
but with different intensities (United Nations, 2007).  
Recent observations have pointed out that evolution can overcome this process to some 
extent since the total fertility rate (TFR) has started to re-increase in some countries after a 
period of decline. Such an increase is attributable to a fertility rise at higher ages, thus 
indicating that the decline of periodic fertility may be partly due to a postponement effect. In 
addition, the increase in migration, and its potential contribution to fertility is also a debated 
(although rather poorly documented) issue. Finally, the positive cross-country correlation 
between the TFR and female labour market participation rates, which is now observed within 
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 Most of the developments included here are based on previous contributions by the authors for the EU research project 
REPRO: Reroductive decision-making in a macro-micro perspective, 7
th
 framework programme. More detailed developments 
can be found in Bernardi et al. (2009) and Thévenon (2009) quoted in the list of references.  
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OECD countries, in contrast to the negative association pointed to in the 1980s, often 
supports optimistic conclusions on the role of policies in overcoming fertility decline. The 
extent to which this relationship has changed over the past decades is still a controversial 
issue. 
The following sections review the main trends in fertility and the related issues discussed in 
the demographic literature. We first look at fertility trends and discuss to what extent they are  
related to changes in the timing of births, in family size, and to changes in the use of 
contraceptives. We also mention the literature, although limited, that estimates the migrant‘s 
contribution to fertility. Next, the relative dissatisfaction regarding fertility, as measured by the 
gap between intended and effective fertility, is discussed. Finally, we present the debate 
relating to the changing relationship between fertility and women‘s participation in the labour 
market. 
Fertility decline: universal but more or less substantial 
The most commonly used period indicator for fertility is the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) which 
estimates the average of the age-specific number of births per woman for a given year. This 
synthetic estimation is often used for fertility projections but its relevance is bounded by the 
hypothesis according to which the age profile of family formation will remain stable. To put it 
more precisely, the use of the TFR for fertility projections assume that the future fertility 
pattern of younger women will comply with those currently observed among the older cohorts 
of women. In contrast to that situation, a growing number of women postponing births will 
inevitably impact negatively on the TFR even though the likelihood of having children at a 
later age may contribute to maintain stable fertility. In this case, we may say that the 
decrease in TFR reflects a tempo effect as opposed to a quantum effect. Thus, the possible 
changes in the timing of births are not taken into account in the TFR, and the extrapolation 
from current periodic rates may overestimate the overall fertility decline. Finally, the 
sensitivity of the TFR to postponement and to catching-up effects explains why the TFR is a 
volatile and unstable indicator. 
Given these reservations on the interpretation of trends, table 6.1 shows a quite universal 
decrease in the TFR experienced by the EU member States since the 1970s. This decrease 
has been quite important in the EU, since the periodic fertility rate dropped from 2.6 children 
per woman on average around 1965 to 1.5 children in 2005 for the EU-25. The intensity of 
the decline, however, varies across Europe, having been very substantial and rapid in 
countries like Ireland or Poland, where a drop of almost 50% or more has been observed. 
The decline was lower in most Western and Northern European Members States (see table 
2.1 p.6, EC. Report Europe’s demographic future 2007) 
Wide differences persist across the EU member states with respect to fertility rates, 
especially between two groups of countries in the enlarged Europe (EC, 2008). According to 
the authors of the report on Europe‘s demographic future, the first group includes countries 
with a moderately low fertility, in the range of 1.6-1.9 births per women. The relatively limited 
decline in fertility rates may lead to an expectation of a slight recovery of fertility, possibly 
through immigration, that could contribute to guaranteeing the full-replacement of the 
population. Such a replacement is not expected for the second ―lowest low‖ group of 
countries which exhibit rates in the range of 1.5 children per woman births or below12. Most of 
the ―lowest-low‖ rates (i.e. around 1.3) were found in the new member States while the 
average fertility rate was about 1.6 children per women in the EU-15.  
However, recent trends indicate that most of the EU member States (i.e. 17 out of 25) have 
experienced an increase in the TFR over the last years, although the increase varies in 
intensity and durability. France Prioux (2007) pointed that the increase has been quite 
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remarkable where fertility rates are already quite high. For instance, an increase in the TFR 
(+4.5%) was observed in Sweden in 2006 (0.08 children per women) and also in England 
and Wales where it increased by 0.07 points (+3.9%). Other Nordic European countries have 
also experienced an increase, although smaller, in the TFR which is now higher than 1.8 
children per woman. Among all the countries experiencing such an increase, France stands 
in a rather specific position since the fertility rate has been continuously rising from the mid 
1990s. As a consequence, France was the first European country to display a periodic 
fertility rate at 2 in 2006. Together with Iceland and Ireland, France displays the highest 
fertility rates among European countries. Despite a slow down in fertility over the last years, 
Ireland still has one of the highest rates in Europe.  
Compared to the other Continental European countries, France figures as an outlier. 
Whereas Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands show a relatively stable TFR around the 
intermediate level of 1.7, Germany, Austria and Switzerland with rates at 1.3-1.4 children per 
women are closer to low-fertility countries.  
More challenging are the increases in fertility rates observed in the so called ―lowest-low‖ 
Eastern and Southern European countries (Van Nimwegen & Beets, 2008). An increase in 
the periodic rate can be observed in almost all Eastern European countries, namely in Latvia 
(+ 6% between 2004 and 2005), Czech Republic (+ 4%), Hungary (+ 3%) and Estonia where 
the TFR rose from 1.21 in 1998 to 1.50 in 2005. A similar rise is visible in Spain, Italy and 
Greece, contrasting with Portugal where a tentative reversal was observed in the early years 
after 2000 but not confirmed thereafter. These trends contrast with the dramatic fall in fertility 
rates recorded in Malta and Cyprus over the last ten years. Nevertheless, all these trends 
tend to converge towards a fertility rate amounting to 1.4 children per woman that is far 
below the population replacement rate, and therefore challenging to family policies 
(Rychtarikova & Kocourkova, 2007 for the Czech Republic).  
Fertility decline or change in the timing of births?  
Numerous reasons may be behind the fertility decline. Demographers are highly concerned 
by the phenomenon, which has been a major topic for conferences and symposiums over the 
last decades. Understanding the reasons for fertility decline is of major interest for policies 
that have to adapt their responses.   
The up-turn of the total periodic fertility rates observed in many countries questions the 
extent to which rates reflect trends in ―quantum‖ or changes in the ―tempo‖ of births13.  A look 
at age-specific fertility rates suggest that the tempo effect may be important in determining 
the fertility level. However, fertility rates for women under 30 years old have decreased 
continuously over the last decades and continue to decrease in most EU member states, 
while fertility after age 30 increases, indicating that many women are delaying the moment of 
becoming mothers. The increase in fertility rates at higher ages has accelerated in some 
countries like France since the early years after 2000 (Prioux, 2007) while the decline at 
young ages slowed down in many member states and even stopped in several countries. 
The combination of these two trends explains why the decline in the total fertility rates (TFR) 
has slowed down in some countries or even turned into an increase, suggesting that the 
stabilisation or the rebound in fertility rates may be resulting from a ―catching-up‖ effect from 
cohorts having postponed childbirths rather than strictly forgone motherhood.  
The impact on fertility decline of childbearing postponement remains highly controversial 
however.  Whereas Gustafsson (2001) defines an optimal age at motherhood which would 
not have implications on fertility level and family size, other authors explore the possible 
                                                 
13
 Cohort fertility trends are more stable indicators of long-term trends. However, an obvious problem in using cohort rates is that 
they are not available for (younger) cohorts that have not yet completed the end of their fertile life span therefore preventing a 
timely observation of fertility trends. In addition, measurement of complete fertility for a birth cohort may also raise problems, 
notably when societal change is pronounced, thus inducing a distortion in the measure (for an overview of the problem, see: 




contribution of fertility at higher ages to counterbalance the decrease at earlier age. Fertility 
rates of women aged over 30 may be higher than those of women under 30, as is observed 
in the Netherlands where the TFR equals 1.75, of which 1 child per woman is realized at age  
30 and over (Nimewegen and Beets, 2007). In North European countries and France, fertility 
at age 30 and over is also relatively high, at a level of about 0.9 children per woman whereas 
in most South European countries fertility at  age 30 and over is slightly lower (between 0.6 
and 0.8) but still rising considerably. By contrast, fertility at 30 and over equals only 0.5 in 
Germany, whereas fertility at younger ages is as low as in the Netherlands. Therefore, the 
recovery of fertility at higher ages is far less visible in countries like Germany and Austria 
than in other Continental European countries (Nimewegen & Beets, 2007). 
However, it is also assumed that the consequences of motherhood postponement on fertility 
rates are not complete, whereas the stage reached by countries in that process is variable. 
De Beer (2006) points out that in some countries other than in Central and Eastern Europe, 
the rise in fertility at older ages has been slowing down, suggesting that the ‗recovery phase‘ 
is close to the end. Nevertheless, a strong increase in fertility at 30 and over is still going on 
in most countries, suggesting that the TFR may increase in next years. 
Another debated issue concerns the overall impact of childbirth postponement on completed 
fertility. This is a major concern since ―natural biological‖ constraints to reproductive 
behaviour may lead to a negative impact of the delay of motherhood on the final family size. 
To assess the relevance of this argument, Toulemon (2004) analysed changes through 
cohorts in the estimated correlation between mothers‘ age at the birth of their first child and 
the completed size of the family in France and other European countries.  A very diverse 
picture emerged from the analysis, but any kind of systematic relation between the 
postponement of family formation and the changes in completed family size could be 
assessed. Thus, the relation between the age at first birth and family size is persistent in 
spite of the homogenization of family size. However, no conclusion can be inferred from this 
relation in order to explain the evolution of behaviour across cohorts. Fertility behaviour 
encounters natural limits but the ways those limits extend are diverse as illustrated by the 
various patterns of cohort changes in Europe. The postponement of first births for the 
generations of women born between 1950 and 1960 coincides with a decrease in family size 
in only a few countries (cf. fig 19 and 20 in Toulemon, 2004).  
By contrast, a decrease in the age at first birth co-existed with a decrease in family size in 
Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Bulgaria or Portugal. Far more unexpectedly, an 
increase in the average age at first birth seems to be correlated with an increase in family 
size in Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and France. Thus, changes in the social 
construction of parenthood appear to be more important factors explaining cohort changes in 
fertility behaviour than natural constraints. The author concludes that there is no reason to 
expect a general and unavoidable strong decrease in completed fertility rates due to the 
postponement of births (Toulemon, 2004). On the one hand, the postponement of first births 
does not automatically imply a decrease in the proportion of women having children; on the 
other hand, the numbers of children per woman remain constant in many countries.  
The above argument certainly establishes persuasive limits on the impact of family formation 
postponement on long-term completed fertility. However, this postponement also has a 
significant although short-term impact on periodic rates. Van Nimwegen & Beets (2008) 
estimate that a stop in postponement would raise the cohort level of fertility by 10%, enabling 
an increase from 1.5 to 1.7 children per women on average in all member states. The 
expected impact would be lower in Spain, Italy and Germany and higher in most NMS 
countries, where postponement started more recently, than in old western countries. This, it 
can be argued, is a ―window of opportunity‖ for policies aiming at influencing fertility timing in 




To sum up, despite a recent upward trend in the total fertility rate, a large majority of the 
population in Europe live in countries with fertility rate is considerably below replacement, 
whatever measure is used. The fertility rate however varies across countries. In Western and 
Northern Europe, fertility was slightly below replacement in the early years of the 21st 
century. In Southern, Central and Eastern Europe, fertility quantum (measured by the period 
total fertility rate) was markedly below replacement: whereas the TFR was around 1.5 in 
many countries, it was as low as 1.3 to 1.4 births per woman in some others. There is a deep 
change in childbearing patterns throughout Europe, which is characterized by a marked 
delay of entry into parenthood. This secular trend towards later childbearing has contributed 
strongly to the decline and fluctuations in period fertility rates (Frejka and Sobotka, 2008).  
Exploring the determinants of family formation and childbearing in Central and Eastern 
Europe during the transition, Tomas  Frejka (2008) examines two theories that prevail to 
explain what caused changes in family formation and fertility trends, i.e. the replacement of 
societal conditions favouring early and high rates of childbearing by conditions generating 
late and low levels of fertility. One theory argues that economic and social crises were the 
main causes of change whereas the other theory considers the diffusion of western norms, 
values and attitudes as the prime factor of change. The author found that the very low period 
TFR around 2000 resulted from the low fertility of older women overlapping with the low 
fertility of younger women.  
Reduction in family size 
As a consequence of the decline in fertility, the completed family size has dramatically 
decreased in Europe. By the end of the 20th century, the two-child family became the norm in 
Europe. Between 40 and more than 50 % of women of the 1950s and 1960s cohorts had two 
children (Frejka, 2008). However, two-child families are becoming less common, especially in 
Central, Eastern and Southern Europe where the one-child family tends to be prominent 
now. Meanwhile, an increase in childless women was observed among younger generations. 
The combination of the two trends affects particularly Southern, Central and Eastern 
European countries.   In Nordic countries, progression ratios to first and second child are 
relatively stable, and even more so in France where most people opt for two children but very 
few for one child or for three or more. 
Although there are fewer large families everywhere and especially in Germany and Austria, 
at the same time there is an increase in the number of childless women especially among 
highly educated women; this therefore raises the issue of tension between working and 
mothering and its impact on fertility for some categories of women. Although the proportion of 
childless women remains low in France (10%) the proportion is noticeably high in Germany 
(25%), raising the issue of the impact of policies supporting parenthood and especially 
childcare policies on both reproductive decisions and labour force participation.  Comparing 
Austria and Sweden, Neyer & Hoem (2007) point to noticeable differences in the high 
incidence of childlessness for highly educated women in the two countries.  
Goldstein et al. (2003) suggest that the two-child family, one boy and one girl, which has long 
been considered the ―ideal family‖ in West European countries is no longer the ideal for 
younger generations in Germany and Austria, and to some extend in Italy, Spain and 
Greece.  They assume that sub-replacement fertility ideals have emerged as a natural 
consequence of a history of low fertility, since young cohorts have witnessed below-
replacement fertility for their entire lives.  
Birth regulation and contraceptive behaviour  
Is the use of contraceptive methods a cause of fertility decline? Is there an incidence of 
abortion on fertility? Over the last decades, legal restrictions on contraceptive use were 
removed in most member states and ―modern‖ contraceptive methods have been made 
available in a growing number of countries, though selectively. According to a United Nations 
report (2008) modern contraceptive methods (primarily hormonal methods) have become the 
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main instrument of birth regulation in Northern and Western Europe in the early 21st century, 
also gaining ground in Southern Europe where they were less used, and in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Most women of reproductive age (15-49), either married or partnered, use 
modern contraceptives, but in most of the NMS modern contraception was not yet prominent. 
The use of traditional methods remains relatively high in Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia, as also in Italy and Spain, suggesting that the so called 
‗contraceptive revolution‖ (from restricted to fully accepted contraceptive behaviour, and from 
traditional to modern methods) is more or less achieved in Western countries, slightly less in 
Southern EU countries and clearly less in NMS. These findings indicate that there is no direct 
relationship between contraceptive use and fertility decline. Legal abortion use which was 
highly prevalent in Central and Eastern Europe, has been declining since 1990. Nonetheless, 
abortion is still used in the formerly soviet countries; But although modern contraceptives and 
modern induced abortion technology have enhanced women‘s health and have contributed 
to changes in partnership relations and in the values associated with sexuality, reproduction 
and childbearing, they have not been a major cause of low fertility (Frejka, 2008). In some 
countries, assisted reproductive technology may have a slight positive impact on fertility.  
The fertility of immigrants  
As a result of international migration, the demographic diversity of the population is 
increasing, resulting from socio-cultural diversity. Besides, the diversity of living 
arrangements is also increasing in relationship to changes in demographic behaviour. 
Although migrant groups have on average higher fertility rates than native groups, the impact 
of immigrant fertility behaviour on the national fertility level seems to be often overestimated, 
as suggested by François Héran for the French case (Héran, 2002 and 2007). A study from 
Héran & Pison (2007) indicates that the TFR of French women (metropolitan area) increased 
from 1.7 to 1.8 over the last decade while the TFR of immigrant women increased from 2.8 to 
3.3. The study also points to the impact on fertility of the duration of the stay in France: 
immigrant women who have been living in France for longer tend to have a lower fertility rate 
than women recently arrived. Similar results were obtained from comparative research 
carried out for the Council of Europe (EC, 2002), showing that the second generation of 
immigrants tends to limit their family size, although they have on average a higher fertility 
level than native women. But since immigrants form a small fraction of the total population, 
the overall impact on national TFR remains limited. Another research by Tomas Sobotka 
(2008) examines the influence of immigration on childbearing trends in the countries of 
Western, Northern and Southern Europe, which have received a relatively large number of 
immigrants during the last decades. The author analyses the contribution of migrants to the 
total number of births and compares fertility rates of migrant women with the fertility rate of 
native women, pointing out a huge diversity among migrants. The research reveals that 
migrant women display higher levels of period fertility than native women, but this difference 
diminishes over time and with the duration of their stay in the country. Immigrants contribute 
substantially to the total number of births and their share of total births has increased in the 
last decade, exceeding in some countries one fifth of the recorded live births. However, the 
net effect of the higher fertility of migrants on the TFR remains relatively small in particular 
countries (between 0,05 and 0,10).  
Finally, there is a convergence in research findings showing that national fertility levels are 
barely affected by migrants despite the higher fertility level of some groups. However, data 
on migrants‘ fertility should be interpreted with care since the data collection methods vary 
widely across countries.  
 
Analysing the gap between intentions and fertility behaviour 
Predictions about future trends in fertility cannot only take account of tendencies at macro 
level; they also have to consider trends in attitudes and values related to family and children. 
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Fertility decline does not only result from structural considerations. Changing values and 
preferences are also concerned. The Euro barometer surveys, confirmed by national 
surveys, indicate that men and women report that they have fewer children than they would 
wish to have. Most policies accordingly rely on the assumption that policy measures may be 
able to change fertility decisions and so  to increase the number of children families have, 
although the reasons for failure to realise expectations are not yet well known.  
 According to the last Euro Barometer survey in 2006, in all EU member states men and 
women report having fewer children than they expected. Based on the last wave of this 
survey, Maria Rita Testa‘s research provides a valuable overview of major findings on 
childbearing preferences and family issues in Europe, confirming the results from the 
previous Eurobarometer survey in 2001 (Testa, 2006). A consistent gap between the 
intended and the effective number of children is observed in all countries (Fig.24 in Testa, 
2006). The findings also confirm the emergence of below replacement family size ideals all 
over Europe, and notably in Germany, Austria, Italy, Spain, Slovakia, the Czech Republic 
and Malta, where a ―low fertility culture‖ is emerging among young people. According to 
Testa (2007:378), ―this could be read as a first sign that below-replacement fertility 
preferences may become more common also in other European countries in the future‖. The 
fact that young Europeans who report being satisfied with their family size have on average 
1.9 children tends to reinforce this assertion. The report also indicates that like the ideal 
number of children, the ideal time for becoming a mother is higher than the current age at the 
first chid birth. Countries with a higher mean ideal age for motherhood also show a larger 
family size ideal.  
The ongoing DIALOG project entitled ―Population Policy Acceptance Study‖(PPAS) funded 
by the European Commission and coordinated by the Federal Institute for Population 
Research in Germany, provides convergent information on opinions about family and family 
policy, desired number of children and reasons for not achieving fertility expectations (among 
other issues) in fourteen European countries. The survey based study shows that the 
average number of desired children is more or less around two children, with a higher figure 
in Cyprus (2;4 children on average) Poland (2.3) followed by Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, 
Hungary and the Netherlands (only for women in the later two countries). By contrast, the 
desired number of children was far below two in four EU countries of the sample: Germany, 
Austria, Belgium and Italy. The lowest number is to be found in Germany where women wish 
on average 1.75 children and men 1.59. However, the average number does not say 
anything about the distribution of responses. In Cyprus, Poland and Finland, there is a high 
share for the preference for three children and more (34% of men and women wish to have 3 
or more children in Poland whereas the largest group wish to have two children in other 
countries, a trend that is particularly strong in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, 
Lithuania and Slovenia (60% of men and women in this later country wish to have 2 children 
and only 20% wish 3 or more).  
Few people prefer remaining childless: only less than 10% on average do not expect to have 
children (less than 5% of men and women in Cyprus, Slovenia and Lithuania). By contrast, 
desired childlessness is remarkably high in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium: 15,4% 
of women and 22;5% of men in Germany; 12.5% and 17.5% in the Netherlands, 10.4% and 
15.3% in Belgium (BIB, 2007). In Eastern European countries where the average number of 
desired children is high and the fertility rate low, the gap is high between expectations and 
reality. The gap is lower in Germany where both expectations and fertility level are low, as 
also in Belgium and Italy.  
The observed gap between the desired number of children and the effective number is a 
major issue for policies that are expected to implement measures aimed at encouraging 
more family-friendly attitudes. However, as mentioned by the authors of the report : ―The 
considerable share of those wanting no children in some countries gives rise to the problem 
of whether family policy is still able to promote more births‖ (BIB, 2007: 40). 
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Reasons given for not achieving expectations 
 According to the Euro-barometer survey in 2006, having children is predominantly seen as 
being conditioned to the presence of a supportive partner, and to the partner‘s involvement in 
childbearing and family tasks : ―the presence of a supportive partner is the most important 
circumstance in childbearing decisions, and consistently, the lack of the right partner for 
raising children is the most frequent reason given for not meeting the fertility desires 
formulated at the beginning of the reproductive career‖ (Testa, 2007: 357). So; if the 
contribution of both partners is considered necessary to a good family life, it should be 
noticed that the countries that are more liberal in terms of gender roles in family life are also 
those with preferences for large families. Good health is also an important precondition in the 
fertility decision process. But, beyond the lack of a partner, postponement and changes in 
priorities are the most important factors competing with fertility preferences (Testa, 2006: 
fig.29: 77). In line with the relevant influence of a good partner on reproductive decisions, 
family size ideals are higher in those countries where a majority of respondents agree with 
the idea that men and women should share childrearing and family responsibilities equally. 
The positive link between egalitarian gender roles and fertility ideals suggests that fertility 
and childbearing intentions are influenced not only by current difficulties in combining work 
and care, but also by the perceived tension between working and mothering (Testa, 2007). 
This result was confirmed by a comparison of the fertility level in Germany and France 
(Fagnani, 2007) 
However, the main problem with the Euro barometer survey is the limited sample of 
respondents in each country and especially in small countries. This is probably the reason 
why some results seem surprising. Other international surveys, such as the those planned 
within the Gender and Generation Surveys programme, are expected to provide more robust  
results, allowing more consistent cross national analyses on similar topics. Nevertheless, 
according to the author of the 2006 report, the general trends in childbearing preferences 
and family size issues in Europe highlighted in this study are informative, and cross national 
comparisons may be used (carefully) to supplement the main results.  
According to the PPAS survey, reasons given by women who have already completed their 
family formation for having had fewer children than the number they previously desired differ 
slightly from reasons given in the Euro barometer survey. In the first rank of reasons was a 
misgiving about the future that prevented the achievement of the expectations (especially in 
NMS), and being too old for another child (especially in countries where family formation 
starts relatively late, namely Austria, Belgium, Finland, Italy and the Netherlands). The high 
costs of raising children were mentioned as the second most important reason in Lithuania 
and Poland, and also in Hungary.  The fear of not being able to maintain ones‘ standard of 
living was the third most important reason given by German respondents (BIB, 2007).Health 
reasons are also mentioned in several countries, whereas individualistic motives are given 
little importance except in Austria, Germany and Belgium. Since many respondents consider 
themselves as being too old to have another child, the question raised for family policies may 
be how to support an earlier start of family formation, and how to facilitate the reconciliation 
between work and family obligations, so as to avoid women facing an impossible dilemma or 
an impossible choice.  
Although politicians rely on the evidence of the gap between expected and realized fertility to 
implement policy measures aimed at raising the fertility level, several authors are 
circumspect about data measuring fertility intentions, and the relevance of the indicator for 
policy purposes (Bongaarts, 2007; Philipov, 2007). While some authors suggest using new 
indicators (for instance: Devolder, 2007), others have doubts about the reliability of 
responses to such questions, arguing that respondents tend to conform to the norm of the 
country, and therefore consider that policies should not be based on such data sets, but 
rather on countries experiences (Régnier-Loilier 2007; Leridon 2007).  
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Limits of public opinion/intentions data 
The discrepancy between the ideal and the actual number of children has often been used to 
legitimate the opportunity of policies. It is argued that people have fewer children than the 
number they consider as ideal because of barriers to fertility, such as the high cost of 
children and the difficulties in reconciling work and family life. A low gap between wishes and 
practices may be attributed to generous policies supporting the costs of children, whereas a 
high gap may be the result of poor family and work-life balance policies. However, the 
relationship is not so clear, since in some countries including the UK, Austria and the 
Netherlands, the gap is relatively low in spite of relatively limited policies (Gauthier, 2007). 
Indeed, the use of ―ideal‖ number of children to capture the potential impact of policies 
remains problematic since as stated earlier,  data on the expected number of children tend to 
be volatile for two main reasons: : 
 tempo-controlled measures of the gap exhibit a lower gap (Lutz) 
 when asked about the ideal number of children, people tend to refer to global norms 
and expectations rather than to what they themselves consider as ideal; responses about the 
ideal number of children tend to cluster around the two-child norm (Goldstein et al., 2003, 
Frejka et al;. 2008).  
 
In order to overcome these limits other data sources may be used, for instance on the 
perceived causes of low fertility or on the preferred family policy measures (Eurobarometer; 
Population Policy Acceptance Survey). Respondents in the nine-countries of the Population 
Policy Acceptance Survey in the early 1990s were asked whether or not they would have an 
additional child if their preferred family policy were introduced. Results suggest that only one 
or two respondents out of ten would have another child in that case, thus translating to an 
increase in fertility of 01.-0.2 children per woman (Kamaras et al., 1998). As stated by 
Gauthier (2007), this may be a more realistic estimate of the policies‘ window of opportunity 
than the 0.5-0.6 children per woman estimated on the basis of the gap between the ideal and 
the actual number of children. 
This review of literature on ―ideal‖ number of children suggests that it would be preferable to 
formulate questions about real intentions. It also suggests the importance of analyzing the 
contribution of the policy context to the realization of intentions.   
Fertility and female labour force participation: which link? 
The relationship between fertility and women‘s participation in the labour market is complex 
and deserves specific attention. Recent research in e.g. Ahn and Mira (2002), Rindfuss et al. 
(2004), D‘addio and Mira d‘Ercole (2005) found that the cross-country correlation between 
the TFR and the FLP in OECD countries, which had been negative until the mid 1980s, had 
turned to positive value. The explanation of this change remains a controversial issue. Ahn 
and Mira (2002) and D‘Addio and Mira d‘Ercole (2005) argue that the income effects of 
female wage increases, high unemployment in Mediterranean countries, the increase in part-
time work and the extension of childcare availability could explain the change in sign of the 
cross-country association. Somewhat differently, Rindfuss et al. (2004) and Brewster and 
Rindfuss (2000) point to changes in the institutional context, such as changing government 
policies, changing attitudes toward working mothers, and an increased availability of child-
care that had contributed to minimising incompatibilities between childrearing and female 
employment. All these studies argue, however, that the female labour force participation has 
a positive impact on fertility. 
By contrast, studies by Englehart et al. (2004) and Kögel (2004) moderate to some extent 
this optimistic viewpoint. They argue that looking at inter-country correlations may be 
misleading, as the strength of the relationship between fertility and female employment rate 
may vary between countries. Such patterns at the macro level do not necessarily reflect 
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causality in terms of individual behaviour. Englehart et al. (2004) found in macro-level time-
series data from six representative OECD countries that the value of the time-series 
association between the TFR and the FLP did not change from negative to positive. Kögel 
(2004) replicated this finding with a larger sample of OECD countries.  
He argues instead that the reversal in the sign of the cross-country correlation is most likely 
due to a combination of two elements: the presence of country-specific factors, and country-
heterogeneity in the magnitude of the negative time-series association between fertility and 
female employment. Controlling for unmeasured country-specific factors, he found no 
change in the negative relation between fertility and female employment rates, in line with the 
micro-economic prediction. He also found heterogeneity in the time-series association, 
especially negative in Mediterranean countries. However he found for countries that are 
neither Mediterranean nor Scandinavian countries, the magnitude and the significance level 
of the time-series association were lower after 1985 than before. This finding is consistent 
with the role of policies that reduce incompatibility between childrearing and female 
employment. However, controlling for country effect prevents misinterpretation that would 
conclude that, from the mid 1980s the increase in female labour force participation has a 
positive impact on the TFR. Instead, female employment increases with simultaneous 
decrease in the TFR, although the magnitude of the negative relation varies from one country 
to another but has decreased in several countries. However, differences in magnitude of 
changes are observed across countries. Policies, as well as work-related institutions, may 
contribute to explain these differences in magnitude. 
The effectiveness of policies supporting parenthood on reproductive decisions  
The role of institutions and policies in shaping fertility 
How policies exactly contribute to explaining cross-country performances in fertility still 
remains an open question.  One basic reason lies in the methodological difficulties that face 
those who seek to investigate policy impacts on fertility behaviour (Gauthier, 2007). While 
properly conducted, empirical investigations have overcome such problems and have clearly 
demonstrated policy effects in specific circumstances. Micro-based evidence on the impact 
of policies and institutions is however not sufficient to understand the macro-level differences 
observed in the relationships between policies and fertility trends. 
Higher female employment and fertility rates in countries with higher support to families 
Many studies have emphasized, more or less recently, the variety of policies supporting 
families and working parents across OECD and European countries (Gornick et al. ,1997; 
Gauthier, 2002; De Hénau et al,.2007; OECD, 2002-2007; Thévenon, 2008a). These 
analyses basically stress the differences in the degree and in the nature of support, as 
reflected by the use of cash benefits, the provision of childcare services, entitlements to 
child-related leaves, and working time flexibility. They also emphasize the differences in the 
ways in which part-time work, working hours flexibility or other support provided by 
employers contribute to balancing work and family life (Gornick and Meyers, 2003; OECD, 
2002-2007; Thévenon, 2008b). Macro-level comparison then shows that both higher fertility 
and female employment rates are simultaneously found in countries where the institutional 
support to working parents is comparatively extended (OECD, 2002-2007). Patterns of 
support differ, however, from one country to another. Thus, schematically, a relatively high, 
balanced and continuous support to working parents during childhood is found in Nordic 
European countries (and France) where high fertility rates and relatively high female full-time 
employment rates exist together (Thévenon, 2008a). A rather wide flexibility in working hours 
is also frequently provided by employers (Thévenon, 2008b). By contrast, the balance 
between work and family life is more frequently achieved through part-time work by women 
in anglo-saxons countries where fertility rates are also high in spite of a more clearly targeted 
State support to poor families. Other groups of countries show less extensive support, and 
both female employment and fertility rates are at lower levels. Thus, macro-level observation 
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exhibits a rather clear positive correlation between policy support and both fertility and 
female employment rates, without causality being investigated. Micro-level evidence on the 
impact of policies on fertility is, however, more mixed. 
Fertility as a rational economic decision 
Economic theory has been very influential in the literature and is at the core of the assumed 
relationship between policies and demographic behaviour. Thus, according to neoclassical 
economic theory of fertility, the decision to have a child is subject to an economically rational 
decision (a utility maximisation process), and is a function of the economic costs and benefits 
of children, subject to an income constraint and to households‘ preferences for children (as 
opposed to other goods). According to this model, any reduction in the cost of children (as a 
result of public subsidy) or any increase in income (as transfer payments) is therefore 
expected to increase the demand for children (Becker, 1981; Cigno, 1991). Major 
developments do not only include direct costs in their evaluations but also take into account 
the indirect or opportunity costs. Direct costs are the additional costs incurred by households 
when children are present (e.g. food, clothing, childcare, education, housing, etc.) Indirect 
costs refer to the loss of income incurred by parents as a consequence of the presence of 
children, for example when the mother drops out of employment or reduces working hours to 
care for children, or when her career prospects decline following the birth of children. 
The theoretical impact of policies and their limits 
Policies such as child and family cash allowances, tax relief for children, and especially work-
related policies to overcome ―opportunity cost‖ (subsidies to childcare, maternity and parental 
leave benefits), are all expected to have a positive impact on fertility by reducing the direct or 
indirect (opportunity) cost of children. There are, however, limits to the scope of this 
argument. Various reasons are indeed advanced to explain the low fertility in Europe or the 
relatively highlevel in some countries. Among the reasons are:  
 The postponement of the age of emancipation, since young people spend a longer 
time in education, and therefore enter later into the labour market. Longer transitions 
to adult age and later economic autonomy may impact both on fertility quantum and 
tempo (Blossfeld and al., 2004). Access to independent income is also mentioned as 
a factor limiting fertility, especially in South European countries. Beyond the longer 
period in education, increasing difficulties in accumulating resources for making up an 
independent household (housing difficulties, precariousness of employment, income 
insecurity) have a negative impact on fertility quantum, beyond the postponement of 
the first birth (see supra).   
 Change in social and family norms, in norms related to raising children, and in gender 
division of parental responsibilities may also influence fertility decisions. Women‘s 
preference for work may explain the high incidence of childless educated women in 
countries where childcare provisions are not available and where few working time 
arrangements are offered. But when childcare facilities are available, when gender 
division of parental responsibilities are more effective and when there is a family-
friendly work and policy context, like in Nordic countries (Ellingsaeter, 2007; Kravdal, 
1996) and to a certain extent in France (Cette, Dromel & Méda, 2005) the fertility level 
remains high, as does also women‘s employment level. Changing values are also 
mentioned to explain low fertility in some countries, especially a trend towards 
individualistic values.  
 The ―low fertility trap hypothesis‖ is based on three components of a self-reinforcing 
mechanism (Lutz et al., 2005): 
o demographic: negative population momentum, i.e. the fact that fewer potential 
mothers in the future will result in fewer births 
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o sociological: the ideal family size for younger cohorts is declining as a 
consequence of the lower actual fertility observed among previous cohorts 
o aspirations of young people are increasing while their expected income may 
be declining as a consequence of the rising costs of population ageing. 
 
Among other reasons being discussed are the quantity-quality trade-off. According to this 
hypothesis, parents prefer to have a small number of children in order to concentrate their 
investment on them, rather than to have several children and no time and money to spend on 
them. However, the relatively ―good‖ situation of France and Sweden for instance is not yet 
explained.   
Finally, there is no one main reason explaining the decline in fertility in Europe, but rather a 
complex set of reasons, mixing structural reasons, values and norms, which combine 
differently in various countries according to histories, cultural traditions, economic contexts 
and policy orientations.   
Fertility has been, and still is, a challenge for policy in most European countries. Although 
there is no consensus on the reasons for the low fertility rate in some countries, there are two 
questions to be raised in this section: first, is there any evidence of the impact of policies on 
the reproductive decisions of individuals?, Second, what kind of instruments do we have to 
assess the impact on fertility of policies supporting parenthood? Until recently, in countries 
where policies aimed at supporting fertility were explicit, as in France, instruments were 
mainly cash childcare benefits encouraging parents to have more children by reducing the 
direct costs of children. More recently, these kind of policies were less explicit because of 
being rather unpopular, while policies have tended to support parenthood and in particular 
working parents, helping them to combine work and family responsibilities. Countries where 
substantive measures supporting working parents have been implemented are those 
countries where the level of fertility has decreased less than in other countries with few 
support, therefore suggesting that work related policies may limit the tension between 
working and mothering. In addition, attention should be focused on children and the quality 
issue in a context of changing values around childhood and children.   
 
Before reviewing the empirical results, we first draw attention to some difficulties in  
assessing the precise impact of policies on fertility .Next, we begin the review of the empirical 
literature by first examining the empirical evidence based on public opinion data. We then 
move to studies assessing the impact of policies and effective behaviors. Finally, we discuss 
some issues deriving from such assessment: limits and issues that remain to be investigated. 
Difficulties in measuring policy impact on fertility decisions  
Cross-country analyses suggest that total fertility rates are higher in OECD countries 
with wider childcare availability, lower direct cost of children, higher availability of part-time 
work and longer leaves. The precise evaluation of the impact of each of these policy 
variables faces several difficulties:  
 First, the range of policy instruments that can influence fertility is broad, and this wide 
range makes it necessary to define conventionally the scope and borders of such policies 
in order to enable cross-country comparisons. Furthermore, given this wide range of 
instruments, it is difficult to capture the potentially complementary nature of instruments, 
i.e. the fact that one instrument would have an effective impact only in combination with 
another one, or if the associated support is higher than a given threshold. In particular, 
the effectiveness of policy instruments may depend on the existence of a complementary 
and continuous support over the period of childhood, to deal with the different aspects of 
childrearing and the evolution of needs over the life-cycle.  
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 Second, there are also obvious temporal lags in the adjustments of reproductive 
behaviour to policy changes, and such lags make it difficult to assign the impact of 
specific instruments or specific policy change.  
 A third issue is that both fertility and labour market behaviours are decided 
simultaneously and this may induce some endogeneity within explanatory variables such 
as mothers‘ labour supply. This issue is, however, now relatively well-treated when 
longitudinal data are available 
 A fourth difficulty lies in the estimation of the real cost of children, which varies with 
household economic and demographic situations. Thus, most  cross-country comparison 
does not account for such inter-group heterogeneity and focuses on average values. 
However, policy impact may vary across socio-demographic groups, such as by ethnicity, 
socioeconomic status, and also according to the form of the relationships between 
parents (Sleebos, 2003). Gauthier (2007) stresses, for example, that policy has 
differential impact by birth parity. 
 A related issue is to circumscribe the scope of policy measures since they can have an 
impact on the behaviour of subgroups of population who are not directly targeted by 
these measures. As we will see, parental leave payment paid in France to parents with 
two children may have had an important impact on behaviour of larger families. 
Moreover, very active policies, even targeted to specific groups of population, may act as 
a signal of a support to families that can affect a wide proportion of families, by a 
contagion effect. 
 This possibility leads to a sixth difficulty: the potential endogeneity of policies. The 
development of family policies can surely induce change, but can also be generated by it 
and be a feature of it. Long term series study finds evidence that childcare policy has 
been developed, for example in Sweden, in parallel with the expansion of female labour 
participation, but was not a pre-requisite (OECD, 2005). In that case, childbearing would 
not be a consequence of policies but the causal relation may be the reverse. Policy may 
thus contribute to changes in family-related values and in fertility intentions. 
 Last but not least, the evaluation of policy should consider a broader impact than the 
(immediate) response to financial incentives. Thus one effect of institutions is to reduce 
uncertainty and to enable people to make long term commitments (such as childbearing). 
There are, however, several conditions that policy background must fulfil in order to have 
such an effect. A longstanding policy is in particular required in order to keep trust and to 
convince people that no very profound changes will occur in the future. A continuous and 
diversified policy is also needed to guarantee long-term support and to create ‗systemic‘ 
coherence. This is certainly a key aspect to explain good performance, but this aspect 
goes beyond financial incentives. 
Given these obstacles, it is an intricate task to assess the exact impact of family policies on 
fertility. 
One approach to such assessment is given by cross-country comparisons 
investigating the effect of policies on fertility rates in industrialized countries. Most of these 
studies consider the aggregated level of TFR, and merge the data concerning all countries, 
even if they allow country-specific effects. They use either cross-section or time-series or 
longitudinal data. In a survey published in 2003, Sleebos asserted that findings are often 
inconclusive or contradictory, partly because of methodological differences. The review of 
studies suggested, however, a positive but weak relation between reproductive behaviour 
and family policy. The same dubitative statement is reiterated by Gauthier (2007). One 
obvious reason for the lack of evidence is that policies‘ influence can be detectable only in 
the long-term. However, both authors point out that the more obvious and robust results 
concern the impact of cash benefit and transfers, while the impacts of work-related policies 
are more contradictory:  the duration and payment of maternity leave are generally found to 
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have a rather weak impact, while some studies conclude that there is a larger impact of 
childcare availability and/or affordability. Flexible working hours and the availability of part-
time work are also pointed to as important factors influencing fertility. Thus, a key issue for 
fertility decisions appears to be the possibility of combining family formation with labour force 
participation. For this reason, attention should be paid to policies that aim at reconciling work 
and family-life. 
A limited impact of cash benefit and financial support 
Among the most significant studies assessing the impact of cash transfers, Blanchet 
and Ekert-Jaffé (1994) investigate the effect of family benefits on the TFR of 11 industrialized 
countries over the period 1970-1983. They construct a family policy index that accounts for 
the global generosity of financial support through cash benefits, tax relief, parental leave 
compensation, and find a rather weak impact of such a package. They found that the French 
family policy could lead to an extra 0.17 child per women as compared to some other 
developed countries like the UK. Such an impact is not insignificant, but shows that that no 
major fertility upswing may be expected from family policies. 
Gauthier and Hatzius (1997) model the dynamic relation between fertility rates and 
policies for 22 OECD countries over the period 1970-1990. They find that neither the duration 
nor the benefits provided by maternity appeared to be significantly related to fertility. By 
contrast, direct cash benefits are found to have a positive and significant effect, although it is 
small. They also considered the differences in policy impact according to birth parity and 
found a greater effect of benefits for the first child. One of their conclusions is that targeting 
benefits at the third child, as done in France, is unlikely to increase fertility. Overall however, 
the magnitude of the effect is small since their estimation is that a 25% increase in family 
allowances would result in an increase of fertility of about 0.07 children per woman on 
average. However, they also observed differences in the responsiveness across groups of 
countries. Basically, a greater impact is found in Scandinavian countries and is interpreted as 
the effect of the co-variation of in-kind support in these countries. Thus the authors 
(indirectly) stress the importance of institutional complementarities although they could not 
quantify it directly. 
Investigating the French case, Laroque and Salanié (2008) try to evaluate the 
sensibility of fertility to financial incentives at the household level. They use an identification 
strategy relying on the fact that variation of wages induces variation in benefits and tax 
credits among ―comparable‖ households. The two authors implement this approach by 
estimating a discrete choice model of female participation and fertility using individual data 
from the labour force survey and a detailed picture of the French tax-benefit system. Their 
results suggest that financial incentives play a notable role in determining fertility decisions in 
France, both for the first and the third child. They estimate that an unconditional child benefit 
with a direct cost of 0,3% of GDP might raise the TFR by about 0.3 point (Laroque et 
Salanié, 2008).  
A visible effect on the timing but an uncertain effect on the quantum 
When assessing the effectiveness of policies in raising fertility, an important issue is 
also whether these policies impact the ―quantum‖ of or the ―timing‖ of births only. The first 
case relates to the long-term effect of policies, but the second case to temporary effects.  
Macro-level studies that distinguish between the two possibilities by using age and 
parity specific fertility rates conclude that the impact of policies is more significant on the 
timing than on the overall number of children (Sleebos, 2003; Gauthier, 2007). For instance, 
Ermisch (1988) found that the rise in child allowances in Britain increased the likelihood of 
higher-parity births but also encouraged young motherhood. A tempo effect of policies was 
also observed in Sweden (Hoem, 2005; Andersson et al., 2006). These authors suggest, for 
example, that the introduction of a ―speed premium‖ in the Swedish parental-leave system 
accelerated childbearing decisions by reducing the spacing between the first and second 
85 
 
births. Andersson et al. (2006) found that responses do not markedly differ across social 
groups. Swedish parents at all educational levels adjusted their childbearing behaviour to 
reduce birth intervals in response to the premium measure. Interestingly, not only the 
magnitude of the change in behaviour but also the rapidity of adaptation to the new policy 
was very similar whatever the educational level. 
The consequences on fertility level are more uncertain. Lutz and Skirbeckk (2005) 
argue that policies may increase the period fertility rate while also having an indirect effect on 
cohort fertility. However, this hypothesis has not been empirically tested so far. 
Impact of work related policies 
More recent studies confirm the impact of standard family policy, and also provide 
evidence of the effects on labour market and work organisation.  
Comparing changes in cross-sectional data, Castles (2003) argues that the provision 
of child-care facilities for children aged 0-3, which is crucial to early labour force re-entry, 
may have been the main factor contributing to the reversal of the relationship between fertility 
rates and female labour market participation in OECD countries. Micro-evaluation evidence 
is however more mitigated. While a positive impact of reduced childcare cost and increased 
childcare availability on fertility is estimated by Di Prete et al. (2003) and Del Boca et al. 
(2007), no statistically significant impact of childcare characteristics is reported for example 
by Ronsen (2004) for Norway and Finland, Hank and Kreyenfed (2003) for Germany and by 
Andersson et al. (2004) for Sweden. 
D‘Addio and Mira d‘Ercole (2005) analyzed cross-country differences in total fertility 
rates in 1999 for 19 OECD countries. Their investigation was based on models that allow for 
dynamic effects, potential heterogeneity between countries, and endogeneity of some of the 
explanatory variables. They find evidence that transfers to families with children, as well as 
the provision of services to working parents to better cope with their care responsibilities 
have positive impacts on childbearing. The impact is, however, relatively weak: a one-week  
increase in the total length of parental leave would on average increase the total fertility rate 
by 0.3%14 (when the impact is estimated with pool mean group estimators including time 
effect). A 1-unit increase in the percentage of wages replaced during maternity leave or in 
the net income transfers to families produces an increase in TFR of 0.9% and 1% 
respectively15. The study also suggested that an increase in female labour market 
participation, in the share of women in part-time work, and in the ratio of female to male 
hourly earnings all have a positive impact on fertility.  
Del Boca et al. (2007) also modeled the role of childcare arrangements, parental 
leave, family allowances and labour market flexibility, but adopted an individual-based 
approach to women‘s joint decisions on fertility and labour supply. Their results based on the 
ECHP show that a non-negligible portion of the differences in participation and fertility rates 
for women of 6 European countries (including France) can be attributed to the characteristics 
of these institutions, but the impact varies with educational levels. The impact of childcare 
availability and optional leave on both fertility and labour force participation decisions is 
higher for lower educated families. Parameter significance on fertility is, weak however. By 
contrast, labour market policies such as part-time opportunities have a larger impact on the 
outcomes of women with higher education. In all cases, the impact is more significant and 
larger on labour supply than on fertility. 
                                                 
14
 The interpretation of this result is not straightforward, however, since leave provisions are often longer in countries with fewer 
out-of-home caring facilities. These facilities are not included in the model because of lack of time series data. 
15
 Net transfers to families with children are computed as the difference between the average effective tax rates of singles 
without children earning the average wage and a married couple with two children aged 6 and 4, where one spouse earns the 
average wage. The estimated impact means here that an increase in transfers to families by 25% translated on average into a 
long-run increase of 0.05 children per women. This increase is half-way between the increases of 0.04 children per women 
(following a 25% increase in the family benefit index) in Ekert-Jaffé (1986) and of 0.07 children per women reported in Gauthier 
and Hatzius (1997). 
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In this section, we have outlined the positions in the current debate about the 
possibility of using public policies to influence fertility decisions. We have outlined the 
methodological difficulties encountered when seeking to investigate policy impact on fertility 
behavior. Some empirical investigations have overcome such problems and have clearly 
identified policy effects in specific circumstances. But we conclude as do other authors 
(Hoem, 2008) that in general national fertility may be a systemic outcome depending more 
on broader attitudes such as the degree of family-friendliness of a society, and only to a 
certain extent on the availability of monetary benefits.  
All these reviewed micro-based studies thus suggest that policies influence fertility 
behaviour, even if policy determinants may contribute to explaining a limited part of cross-
individual heterogeneity. The extent to which such micro-based evidence can serve to 
account for the differences in fertility rates at the macro-level is however far from obvious. 
One reason is the need to better understand (still at the micro-level) how institutions interact 
to influence behaviour. One may indeed expect the complementarity of institutions and 
continuity of support over childhood to be important determinants of the effective impact of 
policies. One may, for example, expect one institution, for example parental leave, to have a 
positive impact on fertility only if it is designed consistently with other institutions to offer 
continuous support, i.e. if for example childcare services are available at the end of the 
parental leave period. Such attributes of institutions (i.e. complementarity and continuity) may 
be seen as conditions creating the trust required to secure effective or greater impact of 
institutions. One challenge for future investigation is to better assess how much the influence 
of institutions depends on such attributes.  
A second obstacle lies in the changing nature of processes that have to be clarified when 
turning to the macro-level. Thus, ―institutional settings‖ and other macro-level determinants 
shape different sets of constraints and opportunities which may interact quite diversely with 
individual characteristics from country to country. In that case, national fertility may possibly 
be best seen as a systemic outcome that depends more on the degree of family-friendliness 
of the entire institutional setting, and less on the design of monetary benefits or other types of 
support (Hoem, 2008; Thévenon, 2008a). Here again, a balance between the different types 
of support in cash, services or time seems to lead to a higher score in both fertility and 
female employment rates. However, stronger statements may be possible only when micro-
macro approaches close the gap between macro-based evidence and individual behaviour. 
 
Conclusion  
Finally, the review of literature shows that the links between policies and demographic 
decisions in EU Member states are inconclusive. No evidence of a direct causal impact of 
policy on the decision to have children is found. Rather, a complex array of factors may be 
making up a favorable policy and economic environment, enabling family policies to be 
conducive to family building. Indeed, fertility decisions remain dependent on various factors.  
 Economic theories on the costs of raising children are not sufficient to explain changes in 
family formation behaviour. And financial supports to families cannot alone influence 
fertility behaviour: when their measurement is possible, their impact seems to be low, 
although it is difficult to isolate this factor. 
 Most research findings agree on an impact of policies on the fertility tempo but only 
uncertainly on quantum 
 The impact of work-related policies is more clear than that of exclusively cash policies 
 Policy effectiveness in influencing fertility decisions seems to depends on the ―reliability‖ 
for individuals of economic perspectives, of the government, and more generally of the 
future. The importance of ―reliability‖ has several consequences: 
a. Policy signals are important in creating a confident/secure climate 
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b. Policy impact cannot be observed over short periods, since policies impact on 
long term behaviour; so the stability of policies is a factor to be taken into account, 
and the coherence and continuity of polices as well. 
 Only a combination of measures may impact on family decisions by providing a durable 
and long term support. Policy effectiveness depends on the existence of combined 
supports (cash/service/time to care) which provides coherent and continuous support 
over the childhood period. But most quantitative studies do not capture the ―institutional 
complementarity‖ required to be effective.  
 To create real incentives, account must be taken of non-linear incidence and of the 
existence of thresholds.  
 Reduction of family support policies can have a serious negative effect. 
Finally, in line with Esping-Andersen perspective (Esping-Andersen, 2008),  we would 
recommend that policy makers consider children not as a cost but as an investment for the 
future, therefore considering child support as a priority for policy.   
 
Recommendations for future investigations  
 
Since there is a large amount of economic and demographic literature on fertility and the 
impact of policies on reproductive decisions, we would recommend combining quantitative 
and qualitative methods of investigation, both for improving knowledge about the rationale of 
individuals concerning their fertility and family decisions, and for improving knowledge about 
methods of measurement of policy impact on individual behavior.  
Qualitative investigations should be developed for a better understanding of reproductive 
decisions, for scrutinizing the representations, norms and values behind fertility decisions, 
taking more account of the socio-economic context. Small scale comparative research 
projects between a limited number of countries would be useful to better understand the 
complex set of reasons behind decisions related to family size and family life.  Small scale 
qualitative surveys may contribute to improve the measurement of policy impact on individual 
behavior in various contexts.  
Nevertheless, the macro-level differences still remain to be explained. Basically, the positive 
correlation observed at the macro-level between the level of women‘s employment and the 
level of fertility continues to raise interesting questions. Why are countries with the highest 
mothers‘ employment rates those with the highest TFR?. Only complex picture putting 
together micro- and macro-level determinants can explain the macro-level differences (and 
differences in the relative position of countries). Particularly important is to understand 
extreme cases (Billari, 2004). Future research will gain a great advantage from the new 
generation of longitudinal surveys, coupled with contextual-level databases, that is foreseen 
for instance in the generations and gender programme 
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Assessing the effectiveness of policies supporting parenthood for mothers’ 
employment and work-life balance  
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In this chapter we examine how the literature has studied the effectiveness of policies 
designed to support parenthood by promoting the labour force participation of mothers, work-
life balance and the well-being of children. The European childcare targets set at the 
Barcelona summit in 2002 confirmed the goals defined by the Lisbon European Employment 
Strategy, by stating that member states should remove disincentives to female labour force 
participation and that, taking into account the demand for childcare facilities and in line with 
national patterns of provision, they should strive to provide childcare for at least 90% of 
children between the ages of three and mandatory school age and for at least 33% of 
children under 3 years of age by 2010. All member states are required to develop childcare 
provision to facilitate the reconciliation of work and family responsibilities, raise women‘s 
participation in the labour market and promote gender equality. The OECD‘s Babies and 
Bosses (OECD, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2007) reports also urge governments to do more in the 
work and family policy field to meet a wide range of objectives, including increasing female 
employment, stimulating child development and addressing the pension crisis. But what 
evidence is there to show that policies can be effective in meeting these objectives? 
According to researchers who have attempted to track the implementation of the EU 
childcare policies, the Barcelona targets are not easy to monitor (Plantenga et al., 2007). 
Statistical complexity and institutional differences make it difficult to assess the effectiveness 
of the various policies that have been implemented to date.  
The literature reviewed in this chapter is organized around three major topics. First, we 
explore the impact of children on mother‘s employment.  Secondly, we appraise the role of 
enterprises as family policy actors, especially with respect to work-life balance.  Thirdly, we 
review the literature exploring the effectiveness of policies supporting parenthood in 
promoting mothers‘ labour force participation, with attention to different forms of parenthood 
and policy options presented in chapter 3.   
  
Evidence of the impact of children on mothers’ employment  
The literature based on secondary analyses of Eurostat and other international harmonized 
data suggests that the presence of children in households has relatively little effect on men‘s 
working patterns but can profoundly affect maternal labour market behavior by interrupting, 
reducing or curtailing mothers‘ involvement in paid work. Hence, the presence of children 
explains the lower earnings for women, which can have negative consequences for children, 
as the contribution of mothers‘ paid work to household income is important for the children‘s 
material well-being in a context where a single wage is insufficient to meet the cost of living 
of families. The impact of children on maternal labour market behavior and women‘s 
earnings, their economic security and their career opportunities are presented more broadly 
as ―indirect‖ costs in terms of the time and money required to raise children (OECD, 2007). 
Increasing female employment rates has become a key component in the European 
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Employment Strategy16 (Thévenon, 2004), as an attempt has been made to offset the 
economic effects of population decline and ageing.  
In recent decades, in Western Europe, mothers have increased their labour market 
participation, while in central and Eastern Europe their labour force participation has been 
decreasing. Although much of the literature tends to generalize from observation of EU15, 
the situation is rather different in the CEE countries, where very few women were able to 
choose between work and family life during the Soviet era, and where their employment 
rates fell sharply during the transition, and to a greater extent than those of men. Even in 
EU15 member states, the constraints on female employment vary widely from one country to 
another, resulting in marked differences in female employment patterns. The following 
subsections report in more detail on the data that are usually cited in the literature to 
describe and compare the impact of motherhood on women‘s labour market participation, 
focusing on changes in mothers‘ employment patterns, the impact of the number and age of 
children on working patterns and the time devoted to paid work by mothers . It also considers 
the consequences of parenthood for gender differences in the contribution to household 
earnings, in the gender wage gap and the related issue of family poverty and social 
exclusion.  
Mothers’ employment rates: wide disparities across countries  
Several studies show how the proportion of women in the working population in Europe has 
been growing consistently since the 1970s (Thévenon 2007; Shippers and Vlasblom 2004). 
Recent Eurostat LFS data for the 27 EU member states indicate that the average gender 
employment gap (population aged 15 to 64) fell from 18,9% in 1996 to 14,2% in 200717. This 
reduction is mainly due to a rise in female employment rates. In the 12 new member states in 
1996, the employment gap, at 11,9%, was smaller than in the EU15 (20,2%), but increased 
to 13,4% in 2007 whereas in the old member states the gap decreased to 14,5% in 2007. 
However, the evolution of the employment rates over the last decade in Eastern Europe 
should be carefully interpreted since in the 1990s female and male employment rates fell 
strongly during the transition to a market economy, before increasing again with the upturn in 
the economy following the inclusion into the EU in 2004. The gender employment gap was 
still the lowest in the Northern countries and the highest in the Mediterranean countries in 
2007.   
With regard to unemployment, the literature generally comments on the fact that female 
unemployment rates tend to be underestimated because women with young children who are 
not in paid employment may not declare themselves as being ‗unemployed‘ even though 
they would like to work (Jaumotte, 2003 for OECD countries). At the same time, women still 
suffer from higher long-term unemployment rates than men. According to Eurostat LFS data 
using ILO definitions,  on average in the EU 27, 3,3% of women were long-term unemployed 
against 2,8% of men in 2007, but the differences in long-term unemployment rates between 
women and men vary widely across countries (up to 4,8 percentage points in Greece).  
A wide range of factors, such as educational differences and motherhood, play a role in the 
explanation of the gender-gap in employment. Furthermore, mothers may not stop working 
completely but may reduce their working hours or take up a part-time job. Overall 
employment rates do not reflect the employment ‗penalty‘ in the form of work time reduction, 
since the rates include all employed persons irrespective of hours worked. Throughout 
Europe, women‘s full-time equivalent employment rates are lower than their overall 
employment rates but the gap between the two differs widely across countries. According to 
the European Labour Force Survey (2005) for EU (15) the gap is smallest in Sweden, 
                                                 
16
 EU Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997; 60% target for female employment rate set by the European Union‘s Summit of Lisbon in 
2000. 
17
 The gender employment gap is the difference between the male and the female employment rate, whereas the employment 
rates are calculated by dividing the number of women (men) aged 15 to 64 in employment by the total female (male) population 
of the same age group. The employed population consists of those persons who during the reference week did any work for pay 
or profit for at least one hour, or were not working but had jobs from which they were temporarily absent.  
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Denmark where part-time work is relatively common but covering relatively long working 
hours even for women with children, whereas it is not common in Finland or in Portugal 
where the gap between the effective women‘s employment rate and the full-time equivalent 
is low (Graph 1). The same holds for Southern and Eastern European member states where 
the incidence of part-time work is lower than in most other member states. The gap is the 
widest in the Netherlands (more than 75%), followed by the UK and Germany (40%).  In 
these countries, women‘s full-time employment rates have stagnated since the early 1990s 
and, as a consequence, the increase in female employment is mainly due to a rise in 
women‘s part-time work (Afsa-Essafi and Buffeteau, 2006). In the Netherlands, whereas the 
overall employment rate of women aged 15 to 64 years is about 67%, the full time equivalent 
would be around 42%, indicating that the high level of women‘s employment is mainly 
attributed to part-time work; whereas in France the overall employment rate is lower, but also 
the proportion of mothers who are in employment is higher. In all 15 European countries, the 
full-time equivalent employment rate of mothers is below that of women without children. 
However, since the size of the difference between the two rates varies widely between 
countries, it is more relevant to consider the number of hours effectively worked.  
 
Graph 1: Employment rates and full-time equivalent  
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Source: Eurostat, Employment in Europe, 2005. Thévenon, 2007. 
 
Using Eurostat LFS data, de Hénau et al. (2004)18 found that the employment gap between 
men and women in Europe is mainly due to motherhood, since mothers rather than fathers 
face a dichotomous choice between working and parenting. In analyzing the impact of 
children on parents‘ employment, de Hénau et al. (2007) focus on the labour force 
                                                 
18
 Results from the MOCHO EU Research Network (The rationale of Motherhood Choices: Influence of Employment Conditions 
and Public Policies). 
 http://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/knowledge/projects/article_3516_en.htm  
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participation of men and women aged between 25 and 49 years, which is widely considered 
to be the age bracket when mothers devote most time to parenting19.  
Data presented in Table 1 show that fathers in the 25 to 49 age group are more likely to be in 
employment than men without children in all EU member states (European Labour Force 
Survey 2006). By contrast, in all countries, mothers‘ employment rates are lower than those 
of women without children (aged fewer than 12). The average EU 27 employment gap 
between women without children and mothers is 13.6 percentage points20.  The gap is much 
smaller (below 5 percentage points) in Portugal, Romania and Lithuania, but it is particularly 
large (more than 20 percentage points) in Malta, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia.  
The gap is also relatively large (between 15 and 20 points) in the UK, Germany, Estonia, 
Spain, Luxembourg and Austria. The explanation would seem to be that, in these countries, 
employment rates are relatively high for women without children. Mother‘s labour market 
participation is particularly high in Nordic countries, where the dual earner model of families 
is widespread. It is also relatively high in Portugal which has always been an exception in the 
South European countries with respect to women‘s labour force participation. One 
explanation may be that the low average wage levels oblige mothers to contribute to the 
household income (De Hénau et al., 2007). By contrast, the employment rate of mothers is 
well below the EU 27 average (62.4%) in the Mediterranean countries, since low female 
wages, insufficient childcare infrastructure and persistently high unemployment may 
discourage mothers from working. However, the gender culture, the strength of the male 
breadwinner family model and the care burden may also explain the low labour force 
participation of women.  
Table 1:  Employment rates of women and men (aged 25-49), depending on whether they have children (under 12), 2006  
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Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Survey, annual averages. 
Notes: No data for Denmark, Ireland and Sweden. 
 
                                                 
19
 In some countries the age of mothers at first birth may be lower for some groups of women and men may become fathers at a 
later age. 
20
 Data are not available for Denmark, Sweden and Ireland. According to data from the EHCP, in Denmark and Sweden the gap 
is relatively low and average in Ireland (Chaupain-Guillot et al., 2008). 
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Impact of the number and age of children on mothers’ labour force participation 
The impact of the number and age of children on mother‘s labour force participation has long 
been of interest. Using the Eurostat LFS data, De Henau et al. (2007) and Thévenon (2007) 
find that the probability for mothers of not working increases with the number of children they 
have in all EU member states where data are available. The difference between the 
employment rates of mothers and those of women without children is largest for mothers with 
three or more children in all countries, but the incidence of the first and second child differs 
from one country to another. Moreover, Thévenon (2007) showed that, in some countries, 
the increase in employment rates of women without children over the 1992-2005 period was 
higher than the rise for mothers. Work and family-life reconciliation policies can hardly be 
seen as the main driver of female employment expansion in this case. 
Using wave 7 of the ECHP (EU 15, 2000), Chaupain-Guillot et al. (2008) showed that the 
impact of the number of children on the labour participation of mothers was smallest in 
Sweden, Denmark, Spain and Greece. In Sweden, 75% of mothers with at least three 
children were in the labour force and more than 80% in Denmark, suggesting that the 
presence of young children did not prevent women from being economically active. In Spain 
and Greece, where overall employment rates for women were much lower, rates for mothers 
with three or more children were very similar to those of mothers with one or two children, 
that is to say relatively low.  
The exact role of childbirth in labour market behaviour has also focused attention. Some 
authors have analysed the short-term change in labour market status following the birth of 
children, differentiated by birth parity (Thévenon, 1999; Schippers and Vlasblom, 2004). The 
birth of the first child is found to have the highest impact in most European countries; by 
contrast, the second and third births have a larger impact on female labour market 
partiticipation in France (Thévenon, 1999; Méda et al., 2003; Lefèvre, Pailhé and Solaz, 
2007). Longer-term impact of children has been the subject of fewer country-specific studies. 
For example, Schippers and Vlasblom (2005) show that children have had long-term 
consequences for mothers in the Netherlands, over a ten years period from 1993 to 2003.    
The issue of causality between having children and labour market decisions has also been 
investigated (Del Boca et al., 2007; Moshion, 2007). For France, Moshion (2007) concludes 
that mothers with one or two children are often in employment, whereas mothers with at least 
three children tend to withdraw from the labour market.  
Not only the number of children but also the age of the last one impact on maternal 
employment, with wide variations across countries. Using data from the Eurostat LFS for the 
years 1992 to 2005, Thévenon (2007) shows that mothers‘ employment rates still vary with 
the age of the youngest child: in general in EU 27, the older the youngest child, the more 
likely is the mother to be in the labour force, especially in Eastern European countries, the 
UK and the Netherlands where mothers tend to resume work when the youngest child starts 
primary school. This was also the case in Germany where two out of three mothers whose 
youngest child is aged between 6 and 11 are employed, but less than one out of two mothers 
whose youngest child is aged between 3 and 5 (see also Chaupain-Guillot et al., 2008). In 
France, the turning point for mother‘s employment is somewhat earlier, since most children 
from the age of three are enrolled in pre-schools (Thévenon, 1999, 2007; Jonsson and 
Letablier, 2005). Schippers and Vlasblom (2004) show that the negative impact of the 
youngest child‘s age on the mother‘s employment is lowest in Mediterranean countries, 
where family size is among the lowest in EU, and where the parental leave is not paid and 
where family networks provide informal childcare.  
Impact of children on time dedicated to work    
According to the LFS data (2007), in all European countries, the proportion of women (aged 
15 to 64) working part-time is higher than that of men regardless of the presence of children. 
In the EU 27, the proportion is on average 31,4% for women, four times higher than that for 
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men (7,8%). Besides, part-time work is not only a means of reconciling work and family 
responsibilities but reflects a broad variety of situations. It may be used by men and women 
as a transition into and out of the labour market or as a flexible working arrangement 
imposed by employers on their employees, as documented by the Company Survey on 
Working-time and Work-life balance commissioned by the European Foundation for the 
improvement of working and living conditions (Anxo et al., 2007).  
So, to analyze the impact of parenthood on time dedicated to work, we focus on the part time 
employment rates of women and men at the age of parenthood (20-49 years old) with regard 
to the presence of children in 25 European countries, as shown in table 2. Data are based on 
the Eurostat Labour Force Survey (2003), using a harmonized measure of part-time work 
defining part-time as working  up to 30 hours a week. Based on this data, De Hénau et al. 
(2007) show that the presence of children increases the difference in the working time 
patterns between men and women in all countries.  On average in the EU (25) in 2003, 9,5% 
of all working women without children worked part-time against 2,7% of working men without 
children. The presence of children reduces the proportion of men in part time to 2,2%.  With 
4,7%, Lithuania is the country with the highest proportion of fathers working part time. For 
women on the contrary, the presence of children raises significantly the proportion in part 
time work to 15,4% on average. This is especially true for the Netherlands where more than 
one of two women with children, but only one of three women without children work part time. 
Visser (2002) has qualified the Netherlands as the ―first part-time economy‖ in Europe, 
emphasizing part-time work as an individual option characterizing transitions over the 
working life cycle.  
Mothers‘ part-time employment is also very frequent in the UK, Germany and Austria where 
more than 30% of mothers work part-time. Chaupain-Guillot et al. (2008) argue that, as these 
countries offer only limited childcare facilities to parents, part-time work appears to be a 
compromise for reconciling work and family responsibilities. Visser and Yerkes (2005) 
confirm this finding. Comparing part time work in the Netherlands, the UK and Germany, they 
argue that mother‘s part-time work emerges from preferences for what is considered in the 
three countries as the ―second best option‖ for combining work and care responsibilities, but 
in Germany and in the UK it is more difficult to overcome the ―marginalisation‖ of part-time 
workers than in the Netherlands. This holds also for France where part-time work is also 
relatively wide spread, but numerous part-time workers would prefer to work full time. Here, 
for trade unions, the feminist movement and a large part of public opinion, part-time work is 
viewed as a form of precarious employment, resulting more from public employment policies 
and employers‘ practices than from parents‘ preferences.  
Table 2 shows that mother‘s part time work is relatively low in Finland and in South European 
countries, but for different reasons. Although full time work seems to be the norm in Finland, 
motherhood is correlated with a decline in labour force participation in southern countries.  
Visser and Yerkes (2005) also argue that in Sweden and Denmark on the one hand, part-
time work tends to be developed as a flexible working arrangement for parents, while on the 
other hand, recorded part-time work of under 30 hours a week is relatively rare, as part time 
work equates to a relatively small reduction in working hours. In the 10 new member states, 
part time work is also limited (mostly under 10%), mainly because in these countries, part 
time work does not provide a sustainable income for families. With regard to reconciling work 
and family life, the analysis shows that part-time does not have the same meaning in all 
countries. Furthermore, several researches put into perspective the impact of motherhood on 
female labour participation, emphasizing that the higher the level of education, the level of 
earnings and the better the working conditions for women, the higher is the probability for 
mothers to participate in the labour market (OECD, 2002;  Rivaud and Ulrich, 2007; Méda et 
al., 2003). Nevertheless, in all European countries there are significant differences in part 
time employment rates between women without children and mothers. This shows that 





Table 2 –Part-time employment rates of women and men aged 20-49 with and without children, 2003 
 













































































































































Source: Eurostat, European Labour Force Survey, 2003. 
Impact of children on women’s work careers 
Not only do children impact on mothers‘ time dedicated to work but they also impact on 
women‘s careers and pensions (see also the discussion of the family pay gap in chapter 1). 
Looking at the impact of the Danish Welfare State on women, Datta Gupta, Oaxaca and 
Smith (2006) observe that family-friendly policies encourage a high participation in paid 
employment for mothers, resulting in a low gender wage gap, while also resulting in a high 
labour market segmentation since more than half of female work force is employed in the 
public sector against only 20% of men. Indeed, most women, of all ages, are participating in 
the labour market, even when they have children. However, the wage gap between men and 
women still persists and women are on average in the lower part of the wage distribution in 
Denmark as well as in other Scandinavian countries (Rosholm and Smith, 1996; Albrecht 
and al., 2003; Datta Gupta and al., 2003). Three hypotheses are suggested to explain why 
Danish women are ‗stalling‘ or floating downstream: first, some aspects of family–friendly 
policies such as maternal and parental leave schemes may have negative effects on 
women‘s wages; second, the segmented labour market between public and private sector 
may also explain the wage development; third:  time allocation and housework may impact 
on wages. Although maternal and parental leave schemes have positive effects on female 
attachment to the labour market, especially by increasing the chances of returning to work 
after child birth, by enhancing tenure or by facilitating the combination of work and family life, 
negative effects may also be observed on wages and careers. Negative effects may result 
from a depreciation of human capital during maternal leave (with the largest effects for the 
most high skilled women), from lower investment in on-the-job-training, or from lower wage 
bargaining power. Empirical research for Denmark shows that childbirth has a negative effect 
on mothers‘ wages because of lost human capital accumulation, while having a positive 
effect on fathers‘ wages (Datta Gupta and Smith, 2002). In addition, the effect of the 
segmented labour market was also identified: the welfare state and the large public sector 
production of services have facilitated the entrance of women into the labour market, but 
public sector jobs tend to be low paid compared to comparable jobs in the private sector 
demanding the same length of educational investment: women who intend to have children 
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may select public sector employment where they are not penalized as mothers. Indeed, 
women with children tend to be employed in the public sector (Nielsen and al., 2003). All 
these arguments tend to raise the issue of the effect of family-friendly policies: ―are they a 
blessing or a boomerang?‖ (Smith, 2006, op. cit.). This author concludes that these policies 
have a lot of positive effects with respect to combining work and family life, and in helping 
women to get more economic security, but observes that the Danish system which has been 
good for low skilled women may have penalized highly skilled women.  
Not only do children impact on the gender pay gap but also on the careers of women and 
therefore on their pension rights. Several researchers have recently explored the impact of 
children on transitions over the life cycle in various national contexts (Anxo and Erhel, 2008; 
Leitner and Wroblewski, 2005; Leschke and Jepsen, 2008). They all underline the 
interactions between children and the transitions between work and family over the life 
course, and their negative impact on women‘s careers, thus raising the issue of policy 
support to make mothers less vulnerable to these transitions. The impact of children on 
mothers‘ pensions has also been stressed in several researches, especially in France 
(Bonnet et al., 2007a, 2007b, 2006). Policy implications of the unequal burden of children on 
parents‘ trajectories and social rights is on the policy agenda in several EU member states, 
raising the issue of compensations that could be offered to mothers when they retire in 
recognition of the time they have dedicated to child care over their working life.    
Impact of children on division of labour within households 
The rise of female employment and its relatively high share of part time work is also reflected 
in the division of labour within households in Europe. As more and more mothers try to 
combine professional careers and childrearing, all over Europe the number of households 
with only one male breadwinner has been decreasing constantly (Lewis, 2001) while the 
number of dual earner couples has been increasing rapidly since the 1990s.  Table 3 shows 
the division of paid labour of couples with children under 15 (source: Eurostat, OECD, EU 
(15) 2000). Only the Mediterranean countries, Luxembourg and Ireland still have a relatively 
high share of one breadwinner households (over 50 %). The share is the lowest in Sweden, 
Denmark, Portugal, Belgium and the UK (under 30%). So in most of the countries, dual 
earner couples are the dominant norm. However, women‘s contribution to paid work varies 
across countries: On the one side, in Denmark, in more than 75% of dual earner couples 
both partners work full time, and in Portugal in more than 66%. On the other side, the 
medium levels of female part-time work stay relatively high in all other countries. In the 
Netherlands, the UK and Germany, the dominantt norm is a household in which the husband 
is working fulltime and the wife part time. Households with both partners working part time or 
with the husband working part time and the wife working full time are in the minority in all 
observed countries.  
Table 3 – Division of paid labour (couples with children under 15), 2000 
 









































































































Hence, despite the rising employment of women, the division of parental responsibilities 
remains rather traditional in most European countries. Furthermore, Moss and Wall (2007) 
point out that the traditional division can not only be found in households where the 
husband‘s income and status in working life is higher than the wife‘s, but is also found in 
households where the parents have equal education and incomes. Dribe and Stanfors (2007) 
show that even in Sweden, parenthood strengthened further a traditional task division of 
household labour between couples in 2000, although the influence has been declining 
strongly since the 1990s.     
The discussed literature shows that the impact of motherhood on female employment and on 
the work time patterns of mothers varies widely between the countries of the European 
Union. In general, four clusters of countries can be identified with regard to mothers‘ 
employment patterns. In a first cluster are the countries with a high female employment rate, 
and where the impact of children on mothers‘ labour force participation is relatively low: 
mothers tend to continue working full time rather than reducing to part time. In the first rank 
of these  countries are Denmark, Sweden and Finland whereas in the second rank we find 
Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia, Cyprus, Lithuania and Portugal which are also in this cluster 
although their female employment rates are generally lower. The second cluster includes 
countries with relatively high levels of female employment, but with a strong discontinuity in 
the working activity of mothers.  In general, motherhood leads first to a work interruption and 
in a second stage to part time work when the child gets older. Part time rates of mothers are 
generally relatively high in these countries, which are mainly the Netherlands, the UK, 
Germany and Austria. The third cluster is similar to the second group, except that mothers 
change their professional activity only after the second child and go back to full time work 
earlier. As a consequence, overall part time work rates are smaller than in the second group. 
This cluster is represented by France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Ireland. In the countries of 
the fourth group, motherhood mainly leads to work discontinuation and part time work is 
rather uncommon. As female employment rates are rather low in general, the working activity 
of mothers appears to be quite continuous. The leading countries in this respect are Spain, 
Italy, Greece and Malta. Poland, Hungary, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and 
Bulgaria can also be counted in this cluster of countries although their overall female 
employment rates are somewhat higher (50-60%). 
Impact of children on gender equality  
The significant impact of motherhood on women‘s labour participation also has costly 
consequences on gender equality in a wider sense: Disruption and gaps in women‘s 
employment biography may lead to work segregation, deterioration of working conditions and 
of access to social rights related to work as well as to income losses, income insecurity and 
financial dependence of women in some countries. Single parents are particularly concerned 
by employment penalties and their negative consequences for financial security (Fondazione 
G. Brodolini, 2005).  
Table 4 shows that in 2006, the gender pay gap reached 15 points on average in the EU 27, 
but was over 20 points in Estonia, Cyprus, Slovakia, Germany, the UK, Finland and Austria 
(source: Eurostat, LFS). The gap was under 10 points in Malta, Belgium, Slovenia, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, Romania and Greece. In most countries, the gender wage gap reduces much 
more slowly than the gender employment gap. To isolate the impact of motherhood on the 
gender pay gap, Sigle-Rushton and Waldfogel (2007) compare the earnings of women with 
children relative to childless women and to men in eight European countries by using data 
from the Luxembourg Income Study. They find that mothers‘ earnings lag behind those of 
women without children for all countries, but the gap varies widely, between only 11% in the 
Nordic countries and as much as 44% in Germany and the Netherlands. Nevertheless, as 
the earnings of non-mothers also lag considerably behind those of men, the gender pay gap 
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cannot be interpreted as a pure motherhood effect.  To measure this effect precisely, 
Gregory and Connally (2008) identify the pay penalty of children for mothers in the UK. They 
show that, while the gender gap has been narrowing for mothers working full time, the pay 
penalty has been rising for mothers working part-time, reflecting the polarization of part-time 
jobs in low wage occupations. In addition, women often experience down-grading from 
higher-skill full time jobs into lower-skill part-time occupations as they reorganize their 
working lives around the presence of children. The crowding of part-time jobs into low wage, 
low status occupations had already led to part-time workers being categorized as the new 
social underclass (Humphries and Rubery, 1995). The disadvantage of this underclass is 
growing, despite legal regulations protecting part-time workers (Gregory and Conally, 2008).  
Several studies emphasize that in a variety of countries, the gender pay gap is mainly due to 
two factors, women‘s responsibility for childbearing and the segregation of jobs (Meurs, 
Pailhé and Ponthieux, 2007; Davies and Pierre, 2005;  European Commission, 2006;  
England, 2005). Table 3 shows that although women record a higher educational attainment 
on average than men in all member states, gender segregation of occupations and economic 
sectors of activity persists. Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Finland display a 
high segregation in occupations while segregation in sectors is the highest in Estonia. As a  
consequence, women are under represented in economic sectors that are crucial for 
economic development (and where wages are higher). England (2005) points out that 
segregation and motherhood can be, but are not necessarily related. Several comparative 
researches highlight the impact of motherhood on segregation in Europe (OECD, 2007; 
Gilles, 2007 and 2008), establishing that high levels of female employment often go together 
with high levels of segregation in sectors that facilitate a reconciliation of work and family life. 
This is especially the case in the Nordic countries, though this segregation is not considered 
as conducive to gender equality. This holds inversely for the Mediterranean countries where 




Table 4:  Gender pay gap, educational attainment, gender segregation, distribution of managers      
            
            




 (2006) Gender segregation
3
 (2006) Distribution of Managers
4 
(2006) 
 1995 2007 Variation Women  Men  Diff. Women 
- Men 
in occupations in sectors Women Men Diff. 
Women 
- Men 
Austria 22 20 -2,0 86,7 84,9 -1,8 25,9 19,3 28,7 71,3 -42,6 
Belgium 12 7(p) -5,0 85,6 79,1 -6,5 26,1 18,3 31,3 68,7 -37,4 
Bulgaria : 14 : 81,1 80,0 -1,1 28,7 19,6 30,5 69,5 -39,0 
Cyprus 29 24(p) -5,0 90,7 76,1 -14,6 29,3 19,6 16,1 83,9 -67,8 
Czech Republic : 18 : 92,4 91,1 -1,3 18,9 19,1 29,2 70,8 -41,6 
Denmark 15 17 2,0 81,5 73,4 -8,1 27,8 19,4 24,3 75,7 -51,4 
Estonia 27 : : 89,8 74,1 -15,7 31,6 24,3 33,4 66,6 -33,2 
Finland : 20 : 87,0 82,3 -4,7 29,0 22,7 29,5 70,5 -41,0 
France 13 11(p) -2,0 84,3 80,0 -4,3 26,6 18,1 38,5 61,5 -23,0 
Germany 21 22 1,0 73,5 69,8 -3,7 26,5 18,2 27,4 72,6 -45,2 
Greece 17 10 -7,0 86,6 75,5 -11,1 22,4 15,9 26,8 73,2 -46,4 
Hungary 22 11 -11,0 84,7 81,2 -3,5 28,8 19,9 37,1 62,9 -25,8 
Ireland 20 9 -11,0 89,1 81,8 -7,3 26,8 22,7 30,2 69,8 -39,6 
Italy 8 : : 79,4 71,7 -7,7 23,7 17,8 32,9 67,1 -34,2 
Latvia : 16 : 86,2 75,9 -10,3 29,4 23,8 40,6 59,4 -18,8 
Lithuania 27 16 -11,0 91,2 85,3 -5,9 29,4 23,1 40,7 59,3 -18,6 
Luxembourg 19 14 -5,0 74,5 64,0 -10,5 26,4 18,3 25,9 74,1 -48,2 
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Malta : 3 : 52,8 48,1 -4,7 24,7 16,5 18,6 81,4 -62,8 
Netherlands 23 : : 79,6 69,9 -9,7 25,6 18,0 27,0 73,0 -46,0 
Poland : 12 : 93,8 89,6 -4,2 25,5 19,4 35,2 64,8 -29,6 
Portugal 5 8(p) 3,0 58,6 40,8 -17,8 26,5 20,4 33,1 66,9 -33,8 
Romania 21 10 -11,0 77,8 76,6 -1,2 22,8 15,5 31,1 68,9 -37,8 
Slovakia : 22 : 91,7 91,2 -0,5 29,9 22,8 27,7 72,3 -44,6 
Slovenia 14 8(p) -6,0 91,4 87,7 -3,7 26,8 17,8 33,4 66,6 -33,2 
Spain 13 13 0,0 69,0 54,6 -14,4 27,1 20,4 31,8 68,2 -36,4 
Sweden 15 16 1,0 88,6 84,5 -4,1 26,8 21,6 31,8 68,2 -36,4 
United Kingdom 26 21 -5,0 80,3 77,3 -3 25,6 18,6 34,8 65,2 -30,4 
EU (27 countries) 17(s) 15(s) -2,0 80,7 74,8 -5,9 26,6 19,7 32,6 67,4 -34,8 
EU (25 countries) 17(s) 15(s) -2,0 82,2 75,1 -7,1 26,6 19,7 30,8 69,2 -38,4 
EU (15 countries) 17(s) : : 79,9 73,0 -6,9 26,6 19,7 31,7 68,3 -36,7 
12 new member states 23,3 14,2 -9,2 81,1 74,6 -6,5 26,4 19,5 31,7 68,3 -36,5 
:=Not available s=Eurostat estimate p=Provisional value         
Source of Data: Eurostat, Labour Force Survey (LFS)        
            
1 
Gender pay gap (in unadjusted form) is given as the difference between average gross hourly earnings of male paid employees and of female paid employees as a percentage of average gross 
hourly earnings of male paid employees. The population consists of all paid employees aged 16-64 that are at work 15+ hours per week. Germany includes ex-GDR from 1991. 
2 
Educational attainment (at least upper secondary school) of women and men aged 20-24. Students living abroad for one year or more and conscripts on compulsory military service are not covered 
by the EU Labour Force Survey, which may imply lower rates than those available at national level. This is especially relevant for the CY.   
3
 The Gender occupational segregation is calculated as the average national share of employment for women and men applied to each occupation; differences are added up to produce the total 
amount of gender imbalance expressed as a proportion of total employment (ISCO classification). Gender segregation in sectors is calculated as the average national share of employment for women 
and men applied to each sector; differences are added up to produce the total amount of gender imbalance expressed as a proportion of total employment (NACE classification).  
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Since parental and care responsibilities are not equally shared between parents, motherhood 
may also lead, in addition to segregation and income losses, to a limitation of mothers‘ 
participation in political and civic decision making. With respect to decision-making in the 
economic sphere, table 4 shows that women‘s share in the gender distribution of managers 
was 32,6% on average in 2006, but exceeds 35% in Poland, Hungary, France, Latvia and 
Lithuania. The share was notably lower in Cyprus and Malta. In 2007 (and with no change 
since 2004), on average for all 27 European countries only 23% of national parliament 
members are women (European Commission, 2008). This share exceeds 35% in Belgium, 
Spain, Denmark and the Netherlands and 40% in Finland and Sweden, but is below 15% in 
Greece, Cyprus, France, Slovenia, Ireland, Romania and Hungary. It did not exceed 10% in 
Malta.  
The disadvantaged position of women in the labour market raises women‘s poverty risk, both 
at the age of raising children and at the age of retirement. The average share of those people 
living in households at risk of poverty (income below the threshold set at 60% of the median 
income) was significantly higher for women than for men in the EU 25 (25% vs. 16%) 
(European Commission, 2008).  
Finally, the literature reviewed shows that the impact of motherhood on female labour market 
behaviour is significant in all European countries. Furthermore, the work penalty of children 
has further costly consequences for mothers. This suggests  that the change in women‘s 
labour market behaviour induced by children can not only be attributed to women‘s working 
time preferences, but rather to the economic constraints that mothers face (Del Boca and 
Locatelli, 2007; Fagan, 2003; Bielenski, Bosch and Wagner, 2002).  The efforts and methods 
implemented by enterprises and the State in order to alleviate these constraints vary widely 
in Europe. It is possible that this is one main reason why there are such large differences in 
the impact of motherhood on female labour participation.  .  
 
Enterprises as actors in family policies 
 
Since dual earner couples are becoming increasingly common in most EU countries, 
enterprises are increasingly concerned by work-life balance requirements. Support to 
parenthood is also a corporate issue, not only in terms of costs of children but also in terms 
of time and flexible working arrangements.  In most EU countries, organizations supplement 
or substitute public provisions. Also, it is at the organizational level that work-life balance 
arrangements are worked out. 
Several researches have underlined the negative effect of working conditions on women‘s 
labour participation and on mothers‘ return to work after childbirth. This negative effect is 
observed notably for low educated and low qualified women who are more often exposed to 
unsocial working hours, precarious employment and involuntary part-time. Across EU 
countries, working conditions are more strictly protected and monitored in the public than in 
the private sector.  Furthermore, large companies are more likely to offer facilities to parents 
in terms of flexible working arrangements, as well as in terms of services. Over the last 
years, the issue of companies‘ social responsibility with respect to work–life balance has 
been investigated in several countries and at the EU level, bringing new knowledge on how 
enterprises take account of their employees‘ parental responsibilities.    
Legislation limiting the impact of maternity on gender equality 
The integration of women into formal employment has become an important issue for debate 
in EU countries that are committed to introducing legislation on equal pay and treatment, and 
also to developing incentives for enterprises to pay greater attention to the work-life balance 
issue. Concern is expressed about the effectiveness of the law and its implementation. 
Measures to prevent discrimination at work on grounds of maternity have been signed into 
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law but the unevenness of implementation is still a cause for concern. The challenge is also 
to take account of parental responsibilities at the work place. A summary of the measures 
introduced in response to gendered working patterns was presented in Hantrais (2003: p. 73) 
resulting from the IPROSEC research network. It shows that several countries have 
implemented both the letter and the spirit of the EU law to protect women as working 
mothers and prevent discrimination against them (especially on the basis of maternity) in the 
workplace. France and Sweden appear to have gone furthest in attempting to reduce 
inequalities in the opportunities and treatment of men and women in public policy, closely 
followed by the United Kingdom.  
Recent developments in legislation have tended to limit the effect of maternity on women‘s 
careers by providing incentives through re-training schemes and support services to enable 
more women to remain in the labour force and to stay in contact with the enterprise while 
being on leave. In all member states, reinstatement of women returnees is mandatory after 
maternity and parental leave, though not necessarily in the same job and with wide variations 
in current practice, as shown by the company survey on working time and work-life balance 
commissioned in 2004-2005 by the European Foundation for the improvement of working 
and living conditions (see Riedmann, 2006 for an overview). The survey provides valuable 
new data on how enterprises take parenthood into account in their management practices in 
21 EU member states. The comparative review of reconciliation of work and private life in 
thirteen countries coordinated by Plantenga and Remery (2005) also provides interesting 
findings about companies‘ support to working parents, as well as the OECD Babies and 
Bosses research programme (see Witheford and Adema, 2007 for a synthesis).   
Work-life balance of employees: a manager’s responsibility? 
The company survey on working time and work-life balance commissioned by the Dublin 
foundation in 2004-2005 provides information both from managers and from employee 
representatives in 21 European countries. Results show that both managers and employee 
representatives consider that it is the responsibility of the ―establishment‖ to take work-life 
balance issues into consideration in the work organization and in the design of working time 
policies (Riedmann, 2006). National surveys tend to confirm this statement, in particular the 
―Familles et Employeurs ―survey carried out in 2004-2005 by the French institutes INED and 
INSEE (Lefèvre et al., 2007; Eydoux et al., 2008). In many countries, the most important 
issue for employee representatives is the introduction or improvement of flexible working 
arrangements and working time accounts. This coincides with the findings of various surveys 
among individuals that also see flexible working times and working time accounts as positive 
instruments with regard to employees‘ work-life balance (see for instance: Fagan, 2003). 
Nevertheless, such schemes are not the only remedy to work-life balance issues, since they 
may exist in enterprises but their implementation in everyday life may not be effective.   
Companies’ support to childcare services and leave facilities 
In most European countries, the role of employers in providing child care facilities is fairly 
limited. The few exceptions refer to large companies, especially banks and hospitals. In 
Greece, France, Luxembourg, Slovenia and the United Kingdom, companies may offer 
childcare services or participate in providing them. The public sector is more likely to offer 
such facilities than the private sector, as in Ireland and the UK. In some of the new member 
states, the transition has resulted in closing childcare institutions because of financial 
retrenchment and enterprise restructuring. Only in the Netherlands is the provision of formal 
childcare considered as a combined responsibility of the government, the employers and the 
employees. Financing is therefore on a tripartite basis shared between employers, 
employees and the state (EU expert group on ―Gender, Social Inclusion and Employment‖, 
report 2005, Plantenga and Remery, 2005).  
With respect to leave facilities, national regulations may be extended by companies, with 
regard to both the length of the leave and its payment. However, in most countries, the role 
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of employers remains limited, except in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and to some 
extent Denmark, where employers seem to play an important role in the provision of leave 
(Plantenga and Remery, 2005; Anxo et al., 2007).  
Working time policy 
The growing variety of working time patterns tends to blur the distinction between 
―normal/standard‖ and ―unusual‖ working hours, at national level and a fortiori at multi –
national survey levels. For instance, the notion of ―extended hours‖ does not have the same 
meaning in Southern and Northern countries. However, the Dublin company survey has 
overcome these difficulties, showing that ―regular requirements to work at unusual hours 
such as Saturdays, Sundays or at night are  part of the working conditions in many European 
establishments of various branches‖ (Riedmann, 2006: p. 71). Constraints on work at night or 
week-ends varies across countries, depending on the structure of the economy and on legal 
norms concerning working time and shops and services opening hours. As reported by 
employee representatives, work at unusual hours is in most establishments an issue of 
debate between employers and employee representatives, in particular with respect to the 
possibility of scheduling these hours in advance, which is an important issue from a work-life 
balance perspective.  The survey shows that employees in large companies tend to be in a 
better position than others with respect to the reversibility possibility (Kümmerling and 
Lehndorff, 2007). National surveys have investigated the impact of unusual working hours on 
childcare use and gender equality, stressing the difficulties encountered by parents (ie 
generally mothers) who have such working hours (Bressé, Martin and Le Bihan, 2007; 
Eydoux and Letablier, 2008).  
Overtime work is widespread in European establishments whatever the size and economic 
sector. Considerable differences exist between countries concerning the compensation of 
overtime hours, either with time off or money. Whereas a monetary compensation prevails in 
Mediterranean and Anglo-Saxon countries as well as in the new EU member states, 
compensation by time off has become more common in Scandinavian countries and most of 
the former EU 15 member states (Riedmann, 2006). From a work-life balance perspective, 
this option may be preferable to the money option.  
Part-time work is one of the most widely known ―a-typical‖ working time arrangements in 
Europe. In principle, part-time work may offer a good opportunity to combine paid work with 
family obligations, but the compatibility of a part-time job with family obligations heavily 
depends on the part-time working regime. The financial conditions, social benefits, career 
prospects, and the distribution of working hours during the day or the week determine 
whether the part time work is really attractive as an alternative to full time work. Recent 
surveys among individuals have shown that many full time employees would like to 
temporarily switch to working part-time, especially in the childrearing period of life, but decide 
against it fearing a negative impact on their career (Groot and Breedveld, 2004: p. 293). The 
Dublin company survey indicates that although part-time work has become an important 
issue for working time policy in the majority of European establishments, in several Southern 
European countries the offer of part-time jobs is still not a matter of course even in large 
companies (Anxo et al., 2007). The profiles of part-time workers in establishments vary 
across countries, but women still dominate the part-time workforce. Part-time remains the 
preferred working pattern of many mothers, however not all women working part-time do so 
deliberately. In several countries, some of them work part-time because they could not find a 
full time job. Whether part-time work favors the work-life balance of employees depends on 
several factors such as the organization of part-time work, the tasks assigned to part-time 
employees, their position within the establishment, the possibility of reversibility and the 
career prospects (Letablier et al., 2008).  According to the survey giving the viewpoint of the 
managers, a large part of offered part-time work shows some problematic features which 
vary across countries: career prospects tend to be worse than those of full time employees 
and possibilities to shift to full time jobs are not always guarantied.   
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Flexible working arrangements  
The term ―flexi-time‖ covers a variety of working time arrangements which enable employees 
to vary the beginning and the end of their daily work to adapt it to their personal needs and 
preferences. However, flexi-time schemes should be differentiated between the regulatory 
framework and the way the potential for flexibility is used in practice. These possibilities are 
often set out in companies‘ collective agreements, but sometimes, especially in small 
establishments, such schemes are informal (without any written rules).  
There are wide differences across EU countries with regard to flexible working time regimes. 
Both the overall number of enterprises using flexible working time arrangements and the 
scope of the schemes differ widely across countries. Differences appear to be relatively 
independent of economic activity or size, suggesting that flexi-time practices are influenced 
by national institutional frameworks and by cultural factors. The comparative study by Schief 
(2006) based on establishment data (EUCOWE survey) from five EU countries (Germany, 
France, the UK, the Netherlands and Portugal) confirms the importance of geographical 
location on the dissemination of flexi-time practices. The main reason declared by managers 
for introducing flexible working arrangements is to improve work-life balance (Chung et al. 
2007). However, it may also result in an increased pressure on employees to adapt working 
hours to the requirements of the establishment instead of responding to personal needs as  
is frequently observed for more highly skilled employees. Establishments may also profit 
from flexi-time schemes resulting in a better adaptation of working time to the work load, 
lower absenteeism and a reduction in overtime (Chung, 2007).  
The ambivalence of work-life balance policies  
The role of companies and social partners is relevant to analyzing the effectiveness of 
policies supporting parenthood. In most EU countries, women with children work shorter 
weekly hours than women without children. When working time preferences are compared to 
with actual working hours, women with children would everywhere prefer to work shorter 
hours than they do (Bielenski et al., 2002), but even women without children would prefer to 
work shorter hours. Nevertheless, working parents often report being under time pressure, 
especially when they have young children. The available literature seems to suggest that 
both the argument of institutional pressure and the economic argument apply in explaining 
national differences between work-family policies provided by firms. The national social 
policy context does matter, and employers tend to develop work-family arrangements which 
supplement existing legislation. Also, provisions made by employers seem to be sensitive to 
economic factors (Klammer and Letablier, 2007). These findings confirm that employers are 
conscious of the role they can (and should) play in helping employees to combine work and 
family life, suggesting that work-life balance policies may also benefit the organization. 
However, long working hours make balancing work and family life difficult while reinforcing 
gender inequalities and gender specialization. Disadvantaged groups are particularly 
exposed to extra pressure from working conditions and working time organization. 
Ambivalence of work-life balance policies and practices was also pointed out in the 
IPROSEC research that demonstrated the importance and the complexity of the changing 
shape of gender relations from one country to another and also within countries, 
emphasizing the need for careful monitoring of local situations  (Hantrais, 2003, op. cit.).       
 
The complementarity between public and employer support 
Thévenon (2008c) examines how public policy is supplemented by support from employers 
in the form of childcare services and flexible working time practices. He suggests that 
differences in the latter support are part of the variations in patterns of work-family 
reconciliation in European countries. On the one side are the countries, notably those of 
Northern Europe, where companies allow their employees considerable scope to modify their 
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working times, with a working week that varies depending on the time made available to 
compensate for extra hours already worked. On the other side, in countries like the UK, the 
Netherlands, Ireland and also in the Mediterranean countries, flexibility applies primarily to 
working hours, and companies do not allow employees to modify their weekly working week 
on a regular basis. However, this lower incidence of advanced flexibility arrangements is 
compensated by the higher frequency of female part-time work than in the other countries. In 
other words, the same need among employees for time to adapt their working life to family 
obligations seems to be handled by different mechanisms for the adaptation of working 
times. These mechanisms are clearly not equivalent since the first is accessible to a broad 
spectrum of employees, whereas most of those who opt for part-time work are women. In 
addition, the first regime is less restrictive, easily reversed or modified, whereas part-time 
work usually implies a permanent status and a narrower margin for negotiation by 
employees. 
 
Assessing the effectiveness of policies supporting parenthood for mothers’ 
labour supply and gender equality 
 
The impact of maternity and children on female labour force participation may be reduced by 
policies, especially policies supporting parenthood and reducing the costs of raising children. 
A wide range of literature has explored this relationship since the reconciling of work and 
family life has become a major issue on the European agenda.  We first examine how the 
links between policies and female employment have been explored in research, examining 
not only the role of the overall expenditures dedicated to support the costs of children but 
also the various impacts of different forms of support. Then we investigate the effectiveness 
of family policies for gender equality. 
 
Mapping mothers’ labour force participation and “reconciliation” facilities in EU countries  
Numerous typologies have been produced to map the relationships between mothers‘ labour 
force participation and policies supporting parenthood (for instance: Gornick and Meyer, 
2006; De Hénau et al., 2004; Hantrais, 2004; Thévenon, 2006 and 2008a; Da Roit and 
Sabatinelli, 2007; Chaupain-Guillot et al., 2008).  Using the ECHP data, Chaupain-Guillot et 
al. (2008: graph p. 12) distinguish four clusters of countries in the EU 15 to which a fifth 
group may be added.  
In a first cluster of countries (France, Austria, Finland and Germany), mothers‘ employment 
rates are highly dependent on the number and age of children. Parental leave is a major 
dimension of reconciliation policies since in these countries, parental leave was until recently 
longer than in other EU countries; it was also paid with reference to mother‘s caring activity 
rather than to wage replacement. Moreover, child benefits for the third child are generally 
higher than in other countries, representing more than one third of the average salary of 
women, and therefore explaining the decrease in employment rates following the birth of the 
third child.   
In a second cluster (Denmark and Sweden) mother‘s labour force participation is high (more 
than 80% are in the labour force) and the proportion of parents using childcare facilities is the 
highest among the EU 15 countries. The length of parental leave is shorter than in the former 
cluster of countries. Finland displays a very similar pattern except for the length of the 
parental leave.  
Greece, Spain and Portugal form a third cluster in which policies supporting parenthood are 
limited and the labour force participation of mothers is also limited, except in Portugal. Italy is 
apart from this cluster because of its paid parental leave, a take up rate of childcare facilities 
higher than in other south European countries and child benefits a little more generous. In 
the fourth group (Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK), mothers‘ 
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participation in the labour force is relatively high, but often part-time, and child enrolment in 
preschool at the age of 4 is slightly higher than in other EU member states.  
Although this typology does not include the NMS, these countries are likely to form a fifth 
cluster (see Hantrais, 2004: p. 200) characterized by a ―re-familisation‖ of the family–policy 
relationship. They share an under-funded reconciliation policy with the former cluster of 
countries, making working parents more and more dependent on family and kinship 
solidarities since access to childcare facilities is becoming too expensive for most parents.  
Although the clustering of countries may differ from one research to another depending on 
the data and the variables taken into account, it is clear that both participation in the labour 
force and the amount of time dedicated to paid work by women between 25 and 49 years are 
closely linked to the number and age of children, and that this is not the case for men. 
Variations in women‘s labour force participation across countries may be resulting from 
policies supporting parenthood. The effectiveness of such policies is now examined.  
The impact of the tax and benefit system on the parent’s work choices  
A rapid look at women‘s employment rates and public expenditure dedicated to support 
parenthood show that in Nordic countries, a high women‘s employment rate is correlated with 
a high level of expenditure. By contrast, in South European countries where public 
expenditure dedicated to support parenthood is low, women‘s employment rates are also 
low, though rapidly increasing in the young generations. However, the relationship is not so 
clear and more variables need to be considered to assess the impact of policies on women‘s 
labour force participation and women‘s employment patterns.  
Several researches in the 1990s and onwards have attempted to assess the links between 
family policies and women‘s labour force participation, using various data sources (from 
OECD or from Eurostat) and combining quantitative and qualitative sources (for instance, 
Daly, 2000; Gornick et al. 1997; Hantrais and Letablier, 1996; Barrère-Maurrisson and 
Marchand, 1990). More recently, several researches confirm that effective public policies 
assist parents in the reconciliation of work and family life, resulting in higher mothers‘ labour 
force participation in addition to reducing child poverty and improving future outcomes for 
children. Higher labour force participation also contributes to the well being of parents, by 
reducing the risk of poverty, especially in old age. Increased labour force participation may 
also contribute to improving the sustainability of social protection systems in a context of 
population ageing and changing family structures (see for instance the publications from the 
IPROSEC network in the Cross National Research papers of the University of Loughborough 
(5 and 6 series and also Hantrais, 2004). The OECD Babies and Bosses research series 
also links mothers‘ employment to family-friendly policy measures, such as tax benefit 
policies, public childcare related policies and work place practices, emphasizing the 
differences between countries in parental family and labour market outcomes (OECD, 2007). 
Using the labour force surveys, Thévenon (2008b) explores women‘s participation in the 
labour market after the arrival of children and concludes that there are wide disparities 
across Europe, due not only to differences in the levels of expenditure dedicated to 
supporting parenthood but also to the content and targets of these policies.   
However, most of these researches point out correlations rather than the general impact of 
policies on women‘s employment. Whereas there is a correlation between policies supporting 
parenthood and women‘s employment rate, it is difficult to access the causality of this 
relationship. Policy outcomes have to be identified with respect to the objectives and content 
of these policies, whether they are targeted or not on specific populations, and whether they 
include or not education policies or other forms of support to families to combine work and 
family life.  
Del Boca et al. (2007) attempted to assess the role of childcare arrangements, parental 
leave, family allowances and labour market flexibility, in women‘s joint decisions on fertility 
and labour supply. Their research, based on the European Household panel (ECHP) 
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indicates that part of the differences in women‘s labour participation (and fertility rates) in 6 
European countries can be attributed to policies, but the impact differs according to 
educational levels. They show that childcare facilities and optional leave have more impact 
on participation decisions (and on fertility decisions) for low educated women than for others.  
By contrast, labour market policies, such as part-time opportunities, have a higher impact on 
participation in the labour market for women with a higher level of education. In all cases, the 
impact is more significant on labour supply than on fertility. 
Nevertheless, the financial incentive structure is not the only driver of individual labour 
market participation decisions. The general policy approach towards parents on income 
support determines to what extent such families rely on benefit support, and especially lone 
parent families.  
Impact of policies supporting parenthood on work choices by parents  
In chapter 3, key characteristics of the tax and benefit system have been presented with 
respect to the support they provide to parents and children. We now look at spending on 
family benefits and their impact on the incentive to work for second earners in couple 
families, and at how they affect the distribution of paid work in these families. We also 
examine how tax/benefit systems may provide lone parents with incentives to work and how 
differences in policies supporting lone parents may contribute to differences in labour market 
participation and welfare dependency.  
Some countries pursue a universal comprehensive approach of support to parenthood, 
whereas others restrict spending and target their support on low income families. The Nordic 
countries are successful at providing a wide array of supports to working families throughout 
childhood. In all Nordic countries, policies provide a consistent and coherent system of 
support, but whereas Denmark and Sweden invest more in care and early education services 
for young children, Finland and Norway focus public resources more on supporting parents, 
usually mothers, providing home care for very young children (Ellingsaeter and Leira, 2006). 
A similar profile was identified in Hungary. Associated to this profile is the risk of weakening 
the position of women in the labour market and their ability to have an independent income. 
In research on ―Paying for the costs of children in 8 North European countries‖, Bjornberg 
(2007) highlights the ambivalent objectives behind policies supporting the work and care 
balance in some countries, despite pursuing similar goals associated to the promotion of the 
adult worker family model. Although Nordic countries follow a welfare tradition of equalizing 
living conditions for children out of poverty, and childcare policies receive a high priority, 
there is still ambivalence in certain policies with respect to measures aimed at achieving 
gender equality. By contrast, most countries restrict spending by focusing benefits (and tax 
burdens) on some areas of family policy and/or by targeting resources at low income 
families. But, as underlined by OECD (2007: p. 98), such income-tested benefit systems may 
be at risk when (additional) earnings are made, by discouraging parents from coming back 
into the labour market unless financial incentives to work are also provided as in most 
countries nowadays, along with activation policies.  
Differences in tax/benefit systems affect parental labour market decisions including working 
time patterns. Most EU countries have individualized tax systems, but nearly all countries 
have some form of tax relief either for non-employed spouses or for children. These 
arrangements produce weak incentives to work for the second potential earner, especially 
when the effective marginal tax rate of the second earner is close to that of the primary 
earner (Périvier, 2003). In the long term, the interest of all families including lone parent 
families is to engage in paid work, as it is the most effective way of reducing the poverty risk, 
and giving children the best possible start in life. Therefore,  countries such as Nordic 
countries but also France, have developed policies encouraging lone parents to work after 
the parental leave or have limited the income support period (to three years in France). This 
approach requires an early active intervention in order to re-integrate lone parents on income 
support into employment, involving provisions for childcare, in-work benefits to make work 
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pay and employment supports. So far, in Ireland and in the UK, lone parents have been 
protected from having to work until their child is 12 or even older, explaining why lone 
parents‘ employment rates are relatively low in these countries compared to Nordic countries 
or France (Fodazione G. Brodolini, 2005). The UK has undertaken policy measures to 
increase the labour force attachment of parents on income support. Since 1997, the UK has 
increased both the generosity of child benefits, in-work benefits and childcare support in a 
context of a wide policy reform, resulting in an increase in employment incidence among lone 
parents.  
Impact of parental leave on parents’ labour market participation and employment patterns  
Child related leave programmes have been presented in chapter 3, showing the wide array 
of parental leave arrangements in Europe, from the perspective both of time and of paying 
arrangements.  We now consider their effects on labour supply and gender equity, with 
regard to public policy objectives. With respect to duration of parental leave, two clusters of 
countries may be identified: in the first one, the combined duration of maternity and parental 
leave is about one year whereas in the second cluster, policies provide support for a three 
year parental care. With respect to payment, three groups of countries may be distinguished: 
in a first group, parental leave is paid as a percentage of the former wage; in a second group, 
parents on parental leave may be eligible for a parental leave allowance or a home care 
allowance, and in a third group, parental leave is not paid.  A third point to consider is the 
fathers‘ entitlement to share part of the parental leave, splitting countries into two groups, 
one group where fathers are encouraged to take part of the parental leave and another group 
where fathers are not concerned.  It is clear that these features do not have similar impacts 
on women‘s employment trajectories and gender equality.  
So, parental leave can promote labour supply when it offers good conditions for a break in 
working trajectory, but if it is too short or too long or if it is not flexible, parents, in practice 
mothers, may be less likely to return to work. This dilemma was clearly described by Moss 
and Deven (1999) raising the question of whether parental leave is an advance or a pitfall for 
parents.  An abundant literature, comparative and country based, has been dedicated to the 
impact of parental leaves on mothers‘ labour market participation and employment and on 
gender equity (Deven and Moss, 2002a and 2002b and 2005). Another set of literature has 
been dedicated to the impact on child development which will be examined further.   
Several country based studies have examined the impact of changing conditions of parental 
leave eligibility on the labour force participation of women. In France where the issue has 
been debated for more than two decades and the objectives have been often shifting, the 
negative impact of parental leave on mothers‘ employment has been underlined. Piketty 
(2005) evaluated the incidence of the change in parental leave compensation (APE) on both 
fertility and women‘s labour supply using both Labour Force Surveys and the 1999 Family 
Survey. He concludes that there is a spectacular impact on mothers‘ withdrawals from the 
labour market, especially for low educated women with low wages. However, part of these 
withdrawals is temporary, and most mothers with two children resume work after parental 
leave, mostly full time.  Piketty‘s results are also confirmed by Thévenon (2007) who 
observes that the probability of resuming work after a parental leave is high in France.  
Case studies show that the impact of parental leaves on women‘s employment, as well as its 
impact on gender equity, depends on the characteristics of the scheme - in terms of duration, 
level of compensation, flexibility, provisions for sharing by the two parents - but also on a 
wider context: Several interlinked factors building up into a system explain low take-up rates 
among parents, including problems of access to information, leave compensation and 
payment, flexibility, available childcare facilities, prevailing family model and 
conceptualization of child education and development, and relationship to work. As noted by 
OECD (2007: p. 118), ―the different policy objectives that underline public leave policies often 
reinforce each other, but there can also be some tension between them‖. The use of long 
leaves by mothers can damage their ability to achieve their labour market potential, affect 
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their well-being and limit future earnings and family income.  In order to reduce the penalty 
on women for taking leaves, policies in Scandinavia, Portugal, Austria and more recently in 
Germany, have attempted to get more fathers to take up parental leaves by reserving some 
paid weeks of leave for their use. Although these policies have had a limited success so far, 
mothers being the main leave takers, they have at least a high symbolic meaning.   
Explaining variations in take-up rates  
Take up variations may have different reasons. In countries where leave schemes recently 
developed, as in Ireland and the UK, parents may be poorly informed about their rights. 
However, the level of compensation appears to be a major explanation of variations in take 
up and also in father‘s share of leave, in Ireland, the UK and some other countries like Spain, 
Austria, France, Germany (before the reform in 2007), Luxembourg, Hungary and Slovakia, 
where the compensation is a flat rate allowance and not a wage replacement.   By contrast, 
in countries where the compensation is related to the former wage as in Denmark, Finland, 
Norway and Sweden, and since lately in Germany21, more fathers are likely to take up leave. 
However, even when compensation is high, fathers‘ take-up rates are lower than for mothers. 
Pay disparities between men and women and cultural values also explain take up disparities. 
Furthermore, Greulich (2008) emphasizes that in Germany, the earlier take up of mothers, 
which can be observed since the reform in 2007, is due not only to the change in the 
compensation system (from flat rate to wage substitution) but also to the reduction of the 
compensation‘s duration for mothers from 24 to 12 months. This shows that the duration of 
the compensation also plays an important role in the take up behavior of mothers.  
The availability of affordable and good quality child care facilities also impacts on the take up 
of parental leaves. However, values regarding family and care also influence the take up of 
leaves, as for instance in Hungary and Slovakia where traditional family organization appears 
to be the main barrier to fathers‘ participation in family life, though some changes are being 
registered (Math and Meilland, 2004a). In Spain, little is done to foster greater sharing of 
parenting and domestic duties and to tackle a prevailing male-dominated culture while in 
France, fathers reluctance to take up paternity leave stems from their disapproval of the idea 
of stopping work to care for a child, viewing the new approach to child-rearing as too far from 
their values regarding fathers‘ and mothers‘ roles in the raising of children (Gregory and 
Milner, 2008). Reasons given by fathers for not taking up paternity leave are mainly related 
to financial compensation, and to perceived high workload especially in rather inflexible small 
companies. In the UK, difficulties in resuming previous or equivalent jobs after maternity 
leave is often mentioned by women as a reason for not taking up the leave, while in Denmark 
taking leave is said to hamper women‘s careers, and in Poland taking family-related leave 
may undermine women‘s pension entitlements (Math and Meilland, 2004a). Attitudes of 
employers may also impact on fathers‘ take up of parental or family related leaves. The 
higher take up in the public sector is often attributed to the higher acceptance of employers 
and to guarantees of returning to work after parental leave.  
Returning to work after a parental leave period is conditioned both by the availability of 
childcare facilities at a decent price and also by the quality of employment and work. Case 
studies indicate that despite the formal right to return to work in similar conditions after a 
parental leave, all women don‘t resume work in the same company or in the same conditions 
as before. In Germany, a large number of women return to work part-time whereas in 
France, low qualified women are found in unemployment after a parental leave (Milewski, 
2005). Working conditions (working schedules, quality of work, time to commute, etc) appear 
to be reasons for low qualified mothers not to resume work after a parental leave in France 
(Marc, 2004). In Austria, studies have found that the reformed childcare leave incentive 
system has encouraged numerous young mothers to quit their jobs, finding it harder than 
before to resume work after leave (Math and Meilland, 2004b). 
                                                 
21
 On reforms of policies on parenthood in Germany, see also Klammer and Letablier (2007). 
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The impact of parental and care leaves on gender equity 
An abundant literature has been dedicated to analysing the effectiveness of various forms of 
support to parenthood from a gender perspective.  In research for the Employment and 
Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO) in 2004, Math and Meilland (2004a) examine the 
impact of parental leave on take up and gender equity in 20 EU countries. They show that 
parental leave is a highly gendered reconciliation arrangement with negative impact on 
women‘s careers. This is because parental leaves may be perceived as a sign of low 
commitment to work and lead to lower pay.  However, the authors underscore the variety of 
available provisions and configurations, showing that in a majority of countries, leaves are 
framed by legal regulations. But collective agreements also play a significant role in 
improving parental leave conditions and take-up reflecting the wide differences in industrial 
relations across countries.  
Finally, leaves are one tool among others used to foster the work-life balance. Comparative 
research and case studies highlight the fact that the impact of leave depends on other 
contextual factors which enable parents to reduce the costs and time constraints of family 
responsibilities or prevent them from doing so. In addition to the availability and accessibility 
of childcare facilities, working conditions and the possibility of tailoring job and work 
schedules, these factors concern matters such as wage disparities, the prevailing values 
regarding gender roles, working attitudes and mothering commitment. In most EU countries, 
there is a policy debate about a more equal sharing of the care burden during the early years 
of children, but no satisfying solution has been found so far. To be efficient, parental and 
family leaves should be integrated in a continuum with other policy measures, with formal 
childcare policy and other related rights to care as suggested by Pfau-Effinger and Geissler 
(2005). 
The effectiveness of policies reducing the costs of childcare for parents’ labour force 
participation  
In this section, the literature investigating how policies contribute to relaxing constraints on 
mothers‘ employment is examined, with respect to the costs and time involved in raising 
children. In both domains, costs and time, there is an abundant available literature, mostly 
economic in the first case and in the field of social policies in the second case. The section 
discusses the effectiveness of policies supporting childcare for mothers‘ employment and 
gender equity. It describes current drivers of public investment in childcare, including funding 
mechanisms, and discusses the effects of cash or in kind benefits. The section examines 
whether work pays, after taking into account the costs of childcare. Other reasons  
underlying parental behaviour, besides the strictly economic, are also considered.  
 
Assessing the impact of childcare costs on mothers’ labour supply  
 
Despite a remarkable increase in mothers‘ participation in the labour market over the last 
decades in most EU countries, there are still mothers who wish to engage in paid work but 
cannot do so because childcare supply is limited or too expensive, or not available at the 
hours required. In some countries, mothers‘ labour force participation depends on informal 
childcare arrangements with relatives, neighbors, or other family members. In most EU 
countries, policy makers are increasingly concerned to develop early childcare facilities and 
pre-school education, shifting from formal home-based care to collectively–based facilities 
more or less integrated into the education system. Since the 1990s onwards, several 
countries have launched childcare programmes for the 2000 decade, aimed at developing 
childcare facilities in order to facilitate parents‘ employment as required by the Lisbon 
employment strategy and the Barcelona targets.  Although these objectives have been 
discussed, mainly in academic arenas (for example, Moss, 2006; Lewis, 2006) because they 
subordinate childcare development to the employment strategy, therefore neglecting the 
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quality issue, most of the debates focus on the funding of this development and on its 
implementation at different levels. The discussion about both the objectives and the 
instruments of childcare policies has been presented earlier in this report. We now examine 
the impact of these policies and the controversies about measurement and assessment.   
There is a large set of economic literature on the effect of childcare costs on mothers‘ labour 
supply and on the choice of childcare22. Authors focus less on the impact on labour force 
participation than on the trade-off between work and care. Generally, economic analysis of 
childcare policies is based on models of choice for the potential second earner in which the 
trade off is related to costs (wages versus childcare costs).  It is difficult to draw common 
conclusions from this literature because the data sources differ as does the population taken 
into account: some researches focus on married women and others on lone mothers or low 
income women. Outcomes also vary according to the age of children considered in the 
model (under 6 years, under 3 years, or under one year), and whether the age of all children 
is taken into account or only the age of the last one. Outcomes also differ according to the 
measurement of childcare costs.   However, these researches converge on some facts: it is 
not only the costs of childcare (or the compensation for these costs) that play a role in 
mothers‘ decision to participate in the labour market but also the level of education, the 
income from informal work, the number and age of children, other adults living with the 
family, the location and the unemployment rate in the area of living, and the quality of 
childcare services. Moreover, the cost of childcare is difficult to evaluate (see Perraudin and 
Pucci, 2007, for discussion on this point). However, most of these models have been 
developed in North America.  Research focusing on married women with children under 
seven in France shows that the trade off between work and care is conditioned by the local 
supply of services and by the partner‘s wage (Choné, Leblanc and Robert-Bobée, 2004). The 
authors also estimate the possible impact of economic policy measures, like the suppression 
of the parental leave allowance which would raise by 2 points the use of formal childcare 
services and by 4 points the women‘s employment rate.  They find that rather than the 
employment rate, it is the number of hours dedicated to work that are highly dependent on 
financial incentives. In general, these economic models conclude that there is a weak effect 
of the cost of childcare on women‘s labour force participation, but the importance of this 
effect varies from one research to another according to the variables taken into account in 
models. In fact, results are dependent on the measurement methods that are used. However, 
the impact on the choice of childcare seems to be more important, making informal childcare 
by family members more attractive when the costs of formal childcare are too expensive 
(Flippo and Sedillot, 2000).  Chaupain-Guillot et al. (2007) modeled the simultaneous 
decisions relating to childcare and female labour supply. They estimate that in many EU 
member states including Germany, the UK and Southern European countries, the childcare 
constraints remain particularly high. 
Evidence of  effectiveness 
Nordic countries began earlier than other west European countries to develop formal 
childcare structures, and they remain in the lead in childcare policy development in terms of 
participation, equity in access and quality. The system of childcare is comprehensive and 
extended to extra school hours. It is part of a policy model ensuring that combining work and 
family responsibilities is a life choice (Jonsson and Letablier, 2005; Moss, 2007). In Central 
and East European new member states, there used to be an extended system of childcare 
combining parental leaves and services for parents, but the system was under pressure 
during the transition as observed in Poland, Hungary and Estonia and represented in the 
IPROSEC research network  (see Cross National Research Papers, 2003 & 2004). In 
France, the dual system of ―ecoles maternelles‖ for children aged 3 to 6 and childcare 
support for younger children appears to contribute to a high labour force participation rate for 
mothers, especially for mothers with children over 3 years old, since parents do not have to 
                                                 
22
 For a survey of this economic literature, see Perraudin and Pucci (2007).  
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pay for pre-school (except in private schools, but they are not very common) and there is 
extra-school care available in most cities. However, although the system combines collective 
structures and private (subsidized) childcare by child minders, the demand for collective 
structures is not fully satisfied. In other countries, coverage is less widespread and is low for 
those 0-3 years old. Many children aged 3-6 participate in pre-school programmes but not 
always full time, therefore implying that one parent, in reality the mother, reduces her working 
time to take on childcare herself. In the UK, Germany, the Netherlands for instance, part-time 
work is common for mothers with young children, as a mean of combining work and care.  
Over the last decade, there has been a general trend across EU countries towards more 
investment in childcare capacity and quality, since many countries have developed childcare 
programmes in order to meet the Barcelona targets (Lewis, 2006). Several countries are 
tending to implement a ―right to care‖ for children as it already exists in Nordic countries. The 
Nordic childcare policy model has been extensively discussed in some countries as a way to 
follow. However,  restrictions on budgetary costs  have often resulted in developing forms of 
welfare mix to support childcare policy and in income testing and targeting public support on 
those families most in need. Similar trends have been registered by OECD (2007).  
In kind or in cash support?  
Whereas Nordic countries have developed high quality public services, other countries such 
as France have supported the development of both private individual childcare by child 
minders, and collective structures. However, the impact on women‘s employment is almost 
the same since childcare costs are reduced in both cases by various forms of State support. 
In fact, as noticed by the OECD (2007: p. 159), both demand and supply-side funding can be 
effective in achieving policy goals as long as support is made available only to good quality 
care, not only in terms of health and safety dimensions but also with respect to child 
development objectives. Despite efforts put into improving the qualification of child minders in 
France, the quality of care is not comparable to that in collective structures, but this seems to 
be accepted by parents. So quality may be a controversial issue, depending on who defines 
it (the State, parents, experts, professionals…). The place of parents in the development of 
the childcare system has been reconsidered in some countries and some innovative forms of 
participation have been noticed in commission funded research. Individual forms of childcare 
may be preferred by parents over collective structures, less because of the quality issue but 
more because of greater flexibility regarding atypical hours of work for instance (Eydoux and 
Letablier, 2008).  Flexibility in childcare structures remains a debated issue, both from the 
point of view of quality for children and of demand from parents.  
Support to after-school hours care services or to leisure time is also an important issue with 
respect to mothers‘ labour force participation and employment patterns. Denmark and 
Sweden, and to a lesser extent France, have developed a system of after-school hours  
childcare managed by municipalities, funded by the family policy and the municipalities, 
using existing public infrastructures (mainly school buildings) for the purpose of delivering 
such services. These services appear to be helpful for parents, especially for those who work 
full time.  
Finally, despite large differences across countries with regard to the costs of childcare for 
parents,  work generally pays for parents, even after accounting for childcare costs. In Nordic 
countries, subsidies to parents using quality childcare centers are so consistent that it is 
attractive for parents to engage in paid work. It is the same In France for parents who can get 
access to ―crèches‖ since costs for parents are means-tested. But for parents who have to 
pay a child minder, costs are notably higher, in particular for low income parents and despite 
the reform of the PAJE (Prestation d’accueil du jeune enfant) in 2004.  The picture is rather 
different in other countries where little formal childcare support is available and where the 
costs for parents may be substantial.  According to OECD calculations (2007), after 
accounting for income-tested childcare support, out-of pocket costs exceed 20% of the net 
income of a dual earner family with full-time earnings of 167% of the average wage in Ireland 
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and the UK. Childcare costs are above 40% of the family budget of a lone parent with 2/3 of 
average wage in Ireland. In Ireland and the UK, the costs of childcare may be so high that 




Since the 1990s, in most EU15 member states mothers‘ employment has increased 
substantially, but their working time patterns continue to vary widely across countries. 
Furthermore, in the 2000s in most EU member states women with children are less likely to 
be in employment than women without children, except in Nordic countries where the impact 
of the number of children on women‘s participation to the labour force remains low. The 
motherhood-induced employment gap has negative consequences on income, career 
opportunities and access to social security benefits for mothers. These losses can be 
interpreted as indirect costs of having children that primarily concern women.  Some 
countries attempt to compensate for the disadvantaged position of mothers with regard to 
independent income and self-responsibility by providing cash for care or by taking care work 
into account in the calculation of social entitlements.   
To diminish these costs, company policies as well as national policies would seem to play an 
important role, albeit not necessarily through policy specifically targeting families. By 
encouraging the reconciliation of mothers‘ work and family life they can contribute to gender 
equality. However, the analysis shows that the effectiveness of family policies in encouraging 
mother‘s employment varies widely across countries. Furthermore, the effectiveness differs 
even within a country according to individual characteristics such as the woman‘s level of 
education and income or the family status.  In some countries, family policy shifts have been 
huge in recent years, especially in the UK, Germany, in the Netherlands and in Eastern 
European countries, but it is too early to assess the outcome. Most of the long-running family 
policy debates continue, mainly concerning the choice between cash benefits or services, the 
welfare mix and the individualization of risks (IPROSEC, CINEFOGO, WELLCHI, MOCHO, 
etc). Many of the studies reviewed in this chapter focus on EU 15 despite the growing body 
of information about change in the 12 new member states with respect to childcare 
developments and work-life balance policies. 
To sum up, reconciliation of paid work and family life has long been on the Community and 
national agendas throughout the European Union, resulting in numerous policy proposals 
designed to achieve a variety of often incompatible objectives with regard to fertility, 
employment and gender equality. In general, in countries where governments have long 
supported childcare provision and parenting, women‘s employment rates are today higher 
than in countries with poor policy support to parenthood, but the various studies do not 
provide convincing and systematic evidence that isolated family policy measures are the 
cause, or that similar effects would be achieved elsewhere if specific policies were pursued.  
Furthermore, the studies reviewed suggest that family support measures concentrating 
essentially on women‘s childbearing and childrearing years are not sufficient to enhance the 
work-family balance. Not only does the availability of childcare facilities and parental leave 
matter but so also do the costs of childcare for parents and the level of compensation and 
duration of parental leave. In addition, the various forms of support for parenthood are not 
equivalent with respect to mothers‘ employment and gender equality. The available studies 
illustrating the possible side effects of reconciliation policies do not suggest that there is a 
formula that could be applied everywhere, nor are there any entirely new measures capable 
of guaranteeing that the many different objectives will be achieved.  
Instead of focusing on single policy measures, the effectiveness of policies needs to be 
examined using a holistic approach to policy support for parenthood, as recommended in 
several research projects. Some researchers have attempted to identify the overall effect of a 
whole range of policies that are known to have an impact on families, taking account of the 
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many policy actors intervening in the field. They show that policies that are based on an 
overall and a life-long approach to work-life balance are likely to have the most positive 
demographic outcomes. Countries in which generous and wide ranging reconciliation 
measures have been implemented are also those countries where the fertility rate is the 
highest among EU member states, although again other factors may explain the relationship.  
Finally, the review of literature points to the difficulties encountered in assessing the overall 
effectiveness of policies on mothers‘ participation in the labour market: Policies undoubtedly 
have an effect but are not sufficient to explain the entire process. Values, representations of 
gender roles, motherhood and parenting, the conceptualization of children‘s education, and 
political and societal contexts are intervening factors in the likelihood of mothers remaining in 
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The effectiveness of policies for work-life balance and child well-being 
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Policies supporting parenthood are also aimed at improving family life and the well-being of 
children. Very different authors like Esping-Andersen (1999, 2002), Lewis (2006), Heckman 
and Masterov (2007) or Moss (2007) advocate in favor of a child centred approach of policies 
aimed at balancing work and life, instead of a focus on women‘s employment rates or on 
fertility objectives. The work-life balance issue has progressively become part of the rhetoric, 
both in politics and academia, replacing the narrow conceptualization in terms of 
reconciliation of work and family life. The work and life balance rhetoric implies a life cycle 
perspective, taking account of intergenerational relations, thus extending care responsibilities 
to the elderly relatives and not only to children. Moreover, work-life balance implies a larger 
set of actors enabled to support parenthood responsibilities, not only in terms of the 
monetary costs of raising children, but also in terms of time allocation.  We now examine the 
effectiveness of policies supporting parenthood for family life and work-life balance on one 
hand and for child well-being on the other hand.    
 
Family life and work-life balance  
Family life in statistics  
In May 2005, the European Foundation for the improvement of life and working conditions 
launched EurLIFE, its interactive online database on quality-of-life issues, using existing data 
from Eurostat and the Foundation‘s first European quality of Life survey (EQLS). The data 
base covers 12 quality of life domains, each including 15 to 20 indicators: Health, education, 
employment, Income deprivation, family and life satisfaction are among the domains covered 
by the database. EurLIFE gives access to data covering a 10 years period. In 2007, new 
indicators were included in the database covering now the 27 EU member states and the 
candidate countries Turkey and Croatia.  
On average, Europeans seem very satisfied with their family life: respondents give a 
satisfaction rating of around 7.9 on a scale of between 1 and 10, with a small gap between 
men and women. In Latvia and Lithuania, however, satisfaction with family life is low and is 
lower for women than for men. People generally consider family life as very important, giving 
an average score higher than 9 on a 1 to 10 scale. Women tend to consider family life more 
important than men. With respect to housework, a large gender difference is on the share of 
housework borne. In all countries, except in Austria and Germany, more women than men 
feel they do more than a fair share of housework. The issue of work-life balance can be 
found under the employment section in EurLIFE. Almost 30% of men in the EU 25 find that 
their job prevents them from giving time to their family, compared to 28% of women23.  
                                                 
23
 The EurLIFE database is available on the Foundation‘s web site:  
 http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/areas/qualityoflife/eurlife/index.php  
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Factors influencing the quality of family life  
When people are asked about what matters most for their quality of life, the majority ranks 
family and social relations, along with income and health, as indispensable ingredients of a 
good life. It is not surprising therefore that the quality of life is increasingly a key focus of 
social policies.  
In recent decades, European families have undergone deep changes in their structure and 
composition, characterized by a fall in size, a lower incidence of marriage, an increase in 
marriage breakdown and separations, and changing patterns in transitions to adulthood. 
These trends differ between EU member states, due to variations in demographic trends and 
in patterns of family formation. Family life is hugely influenced by the size of the family, the 
number of children and the relationship to work. Single parents now form a notable part of 
families especially in Northern and continental Europe, and their number is increasing 
everywhere, while at the same time the number of childless couples is increasing in some 
countries.  
Despite these developments, the family remains an essential support for coping with the 
challenges of daily life. Results from the EQLS indicate that in the NMS10, the extended 
family appears to play an important role in facing economic risks and in socially integrating 
family members. However, as underlined by Anderson (2007) ―such family solidarity may not 
be available to all family members: older people and those who are unemployed may fail to 
benefit‖ (p. 12), therefore suggesting that policy makers should not assume that family 
support and solidarity are universally available; rather policy should focus on creating 
conditions for  good family life. When asked in surveys how governments could better 
support family life, respondents advance measures like reducing unemployment and 
promoting flexible working hours. However, respondents in the EU 15 tend to promote labor 
market participation measures whereas in the NMS the stress is more on family policy 
measures such as child allowances and parental leave (Anderson, 2007).   
Satisfaction with work-life balance  
The issue of balancing work and family life is now a major issue for contemporary social 
policies in Europe. Results from the Foundation‘s European Working Conditions Surveys 
(EWCS) and the EQLS suggest that people who succeed in balancing their work and family 
life are more satisfied with their family life in general. But it also appears that in all countries, 
and especially in the NMS 10, vulnerable groups such as lone parent families find it difficult 
to balance time commitments. However, women report a lower satisfaction rate regarding 
work-life balance than men, and in particular when it comes to the sharing of households 
tasks. Women also report a higher implication than men in caring for dependent adults or 
elderly relatives. Whereas much attention has been paid so far at EU level to childcare, more 
attention has to be paid to elderly care and to intergenerational issues, thus replacing the 
role of families in a life cycle perspective.   
 
Child poverty 
Child well-being has become an increasing concern of policy at both national and 
international level (in the EU, OECD, UNICEF). One of the main concerns has been the risks 
and consequences for children of living in a poor household. Broader approaches to the 
dimensions of well-being and the determinants of child development are also increasingly 
considered. We first examine how child poverty is defined and measured in comparative 
research. Then we look at the trends in child poverty and also at the reasons given to this 
development. After discussing the problems of validity and reliability of such measures, we 
explore other measurements of child well-being based on multi dimensional indicators using 
surveys and administrative data, as they have been explored in some of the contributions to 
the WELLCHI network funded by the European commission. We suggest here that child well-
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being cannot be evaluated by a single indicator of child poverty since other domains of well-
being have to be included in the measurement, such as child health or child development. In 
a second step, we survey the literature on the impact of policies supporting parenthood on 
the well-being and the cognitive development of children. Finally, the impact of gender 
inequalities on the risks of poverty and social exclusion is explored, in particular for 
disadvantaged groups.  
Defining and measuring child poverty 
The indicator of child poverty has been used in Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries for 
defining the objectives of social policies, on the assumption that the situation during 
childhood impacts on the development in adulthood.  Reducing child-poverty has been given  
priority on the policy agenda in several EU member states in the 1990s onwards. In the UK, 
an objective of eradicating child-poverty byl 2020 was announced by the government in 1997 
and since that time a large amount of research has been dedicated to this issue.  
Measuring child poverty implies considering the households in which the child is living. The 
standard of living of a child is defined with regard to the standard of living of the household in 
which he/she lives, where children are counted as consuming units who benefit from the 
household income. Children do not contribute resources to household income, except 
through child benefits or other child related allowances. The measurement of poverty also 
takes account of the composition of the family and especially of the size. In addition, to make 
comparisons across countries, income is converted into a standard of purchasing power in 
order to have a similar reference point in all countries (purchasing power parity). Household 
income is considered both before and after social transfers. The measurement of poverty 
relies on the median standard of living. The poverty threshold is a relative notion that 
corresponds to a portion of the median standard of living of all households: poverty threshold 
are conventionally fixed at 40, 50 or 60% of the median income. The 60% threshold is 
generally used in cross comparative research, although the threshold used in France for 
instance is usually at 50%, which gives a more restrictive perspective on poverty.  
Trends in child poverty in EU member states 
In the European Union, 19% of children are exposed to the risk of poverty (Commission 
européenne, 2008). In some countries, more than one child in four is poor or deprived. In 
addition, in most countries, children are more exposed to poverty risk than the population on 
average. Children who grow up in poverty and social exclusion have lower opportunities than 
others to succeed at school, to be in good health and to get a good job later on. For these 
reasons, the EU has given priority on its agenda to the reduction of child poverty and social 
exclusion. In spring 2006, the European Council decided to implement measures aimed at 
reducing child-poverty by giving equal opportunities to all children whatever their social 
origin. In 2008, a report on child poverty was published by the social protection committee in 
which the main causes of poverty are analyzed. The report also includes recommendations 
to make improvements on this issue (Commission européenne, 2008). According to this 
report, in 27 EU member states in 2005, 19% of children under 17 were at risk of poverty, 
against 16% of the whole population. Between 1996 and 2001, child poverty remained 
unchanged (19 to 20%) in the 15 EU member states whereas poverty was decreasing (from 
17 to 15%) in the whole population. Between 1995 and 2005, child- poverty has only 
declined in Spain, Hungary, Austria and the UK (Whiteford and Adema, 2007- see graph 1).  
But child poverty has been rising in many countries in the period 2000-2005, in particular in 
Italy, Germany, Belgium (poverty threshold at 50% of the median household income). But it 
has also decreased in the UK, Hungary and Spain. Nevertheless, the highest rates are still 
found in Italy (over 25%), Spain, Germany and Greece while the lowest are in Nordic 
countries with a rate below 5%, though slowly increasing. France also displays a fairly low 
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According to European data (with a threshold at 60%), child poverty is lower in Nordic 
countries, especially in Denmark and Finland where the child poverty risk is around 10%. 
However, in more than half of EU member states, the child poverty risk exceeds 20% and 
even more in Romania (25%) Latvia (27%) Poland (29%). Only a few member states display 
a child poverty risk lower than for the whole population: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, 
Cyprus, Slovenia and Finland (Graph 2). The standard of living of poor children varies across 
countries (European Commission, the Social Protection Committee, 2008). 
In a research comparing child poverty in Europe, Aude Lapinte (Lapinte, 2002) focuses on 
children aged 16 and under, considering that over 16 young people encounter more specific 
problems that are differently treated in EU member States. The study was based on the third 
wave of European Household Panel covering all the EU member states except Sweden, and 
providing data on households‘ income for 1995. The study also gives an assessment of the 
impact of social policy on child poverty reduction. One of the findings is that child poverty is 
dependent on the family size and structure (two parent-families or lone-parent families, 
unemployed parents etc.). Whereas a majority of children lived in two-parent families, a high 
proportion of children lived in families with two unemployed parents in Ireland and in the UK. 
By contrast, more than 50% of children in Portugal and Denmark lived in dual-earner families 
(Lapinte, 2002).  The author underlines that social and family benefits have higher impact on 
reducing child-poverty in Nordic countries than in Southern countries. She also shows that 
whereas vertical redistribution is more effective in Ireland, Greece and Spain, horizontal 
redistribution, noticeably towards lone parent families, is more effective in Denmark, the 
Netherlands, the UK and Finland. In France, redistribution is more effective towards large 
families.  
Reasons for child poverty 
Over the last years, the focus in research has increasingly been on the new social risks 
impinging on the well-being of children (Taylor-Gooby, 2004; Lewis, 2006). The new risks 
tend to affect people at younger stages of their lives due to an increase in precarious 
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employment and to changing family forms, thus extending the demand for state support into 
areas of life that were before seen as being private (Flaquer, 2007b). New social risks result 
from difficulties in accessing employment and also from difficulties in managing conflicting 
pressure on family life. Long term unemployment, hard working conditions, precarious 
employment, lone parenthood, limited social rights, tend to be concentrated on the young, 
the low skilled and on women, and to affect children. For Flaquer (2007a) the coordinator of 
the Wellchi network, one of the reasons for the rise in child poverty in developed countries 
may be the inadequacy of social policies to respond to new social risks in terms of social 
transfers and provision of services. This is particularly true for lone parent families who, 
according to a comparative research conducted by the Brodolini Foundation in 2005-2006, 
strongly rely on state support to get out of poverty.  
Lone-parent families and also large families are more at risk of poverty than other families. 
The disposable income for a child depends on the family size, and the composition and 
characteristics of the household in which he/she is living. In the EU on average 22% of poor 
children live in lone parent families and 25% in large families, whereas only 13% of children 
live with only one parent. In 90% of cases, the lone parent is the mother. However, reasons 
for lone parenthood differ deeply from one country to another (Fondazione Brodolini, 2007). 
More than 20% of children living in large families are exposed to poverty risk. Although large 
families are not common in Southern Europe nor in Eastern countries, it is in these countries 
(Greece, Spain, Slovenia) than the poverty risk for children living in large families is the 
highest. The opposite is observed in Nordic countries and the Netherlands where large 
families are more common (26 to 33% of all families) but where the poverty risk is the lowest. 
Children in immigrant families face more difficulties than other children, as also do children 
with parents suffering from a handicap or drug addiction.  
 
Age and level of education of parents also explain the child-poverty risk. Children with 
―young‖ parents (lower than 30) are more exposed to poverty than others living with older 
parents. The risk is on average 27% if the mother is under 30 against 19% if she is 30 to 39, 
and 16% is she is older. Young parents on average have lower wages than older ones and 
are more often exposed to unemployment and precariousness of employment.. The parents‘ 
level of education also impacts on child-poverty: 30% of poor children have parents who 
have stopped school before achieving the secondary level of education. However, for all 
families, the main issue is access to the labour market.   
 
Since earnings from work constitute the major source of income for families, the employment 
situation is determinant with respect to poverty risk: 62% of households with children and 
without a job are exposed to the risk of poverty. In EU 25, almost 10% of children live in 
households where no adult is working. In most countries, the situation has not improved 
since 2000 despite an improvement of the UE labour markets.  Finally, child poverty rates 
are more than three times as high for jobless lone parent families as for employed lone 
parent families. And children living in one earner families are almost three times more likely 
to be poor than children living in dual earner families (Förster and D‘Ercole, 2005). So 
parental employment is a key issue for reducing the child poverty risk which has a significant 
negative effect on child development (Kammerman and al., 2003).  
 
Measures and determinants of child well-being 
Measuring child well-being and development 
Child well-being refers to the quality of children‘s lives. However, there is so far no single 
definition and no one method of measurement of child well-being. Two approaches can be 
identified from the literature on this topic. In a first set of researches child well-being is 
approached with a multidimensional concept incorporating mental/psychological, physical 
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and social dimensions. The definition behind this approach however leaves limited room for 
the material dimension of child well-being, e.g referring to child poverty or to child material 
deprivation. By contrast to this definition provided by researchers, a second approach 
considers the perception that children have well-being. This subjective approach uses a self 
reported measure. Some research based on multidimensional indicators has included 
subjective life satisfaction measures in the set of indicators. But a major limitation of this 
subjective approach lies in the difficulty of collecting perceptions from young and very young 
children. Such indicators are only reliable for specific age groups.  
Two theoretical approaches also frame the research on child well-being, opposing a 
―developmentalist‖ perspective and a ―children rights‖ perspective. Moreover, the 
―developmentalist‖ perspective is more likely to be associated with a focus on poverty and 
deprivation than the ―children‘s rights ―perspective which is more often associated with a 
―positive‖ approach to child well-being.  
In fact, most studies refer to specific dimensions of child well-being, often emphasizing social 
and cultural variation. However, so far child well-being has rarely been approached from an 
overall perspective. The UE, the OECD and the UNICEF are now actively involved in 
exploring indicators of child well-being.    
The Laeken primary and secondary indicators of social inclusion contain two indicators that 
relate to children. Children in poverty have been named by the European Union as targeted 
groups in the common outlines and the common objectives of the National Action Plans for 
social inclusion, and also in the March 2005 EU Presidency Conclusions. Following the 
proposal made by a group of experts (Bradshaw, Hoelscher and Richardson, 2007) of an 
index of child well-being for the EU 25, and the recommendations of the task force on child 
well-being and child poverty (Social Protection Group Indicators Sub-committee) the EU has 
contributed to producing new indicators of child well-being. The idea was to extend the 
definition of child well-being beyond child poverty (Bradshaw, 2007). The indexes produced 
by this group of experts are now used by the OECD and by UNICEF. These indexes are 
based on a multidimensional understanding of well-being, informed by a view of children‘s 
rights, and drawing on national and international experiences of indicator development.  The 
child is at the center of the analysis and the data are about children. No less than 51 
variables have been used to define 23 domains that have been structured into 8 clusters: 
material situation, housing, health, subjective well-being, education, children‘s relationships, 
civic participation, risk and safety (UNICEF, 2007). These indexes are however constrained 
by the availability of data.  
Cross – country comparisons on the six OECD dimensions  
The index does not limit the approach of child well-being to an economic perspective but 
rather opens it up to wider social considerations on living conditions24. According to the 
index, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark are at the top of the scale concerning child well-
being while the Slovak republic, Estonia and Lithuania are at the bottom. However, data are 
missing on several clusters for several countries, therefore limiting the validity of the scaling. 
It is however worth noting that the UK is among countries with the lower rate (i.e., mostly 
central and east European countries) showing a low performance on each domain.  
The UNICEF report on Child Well-being in rich countries also collects and compares 
indicators for child-being in 21 countries25 (including Canada and United States) broken down 
by the six core dimensions mentioned above (UNICEF, 2007).  The report establishes 
country performances for each dimension. The performance is calculated by averaging the 
scores for the components/indicators chosen to represent this dimension. An aggregate 
score is calculated for each country. The breakdown into six dimensions provides a diverse 
                                                 
24
 On new methods for researching child poverty, also see Bastos, 2004 
25
 Luxembourg and the Slovak Republic are not included in the overview because of insufficient data. 
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and nuanced picture of child-well-being. It also provides a comprehensive overview of 
dimensions on which progress can be expected26.  
The main findings of the report show that the Netherlands stands in the top 10 for the six 
dimensions of child well-being. European countries dominate the top half of the overall table 
with Northern European countries ranking in  the four top ranks. But all countries display 
weaknesses: for instance, the UK (and the US) stand in the bottom third of the rankings for 
five of the six dimensions considered. No single dimension of well-being stands as a reliable 
proxy for child well-being as a whole, and several countries find themselves with differing 
rankings for different dimensions on child well-being. Finally the report concludes that there 
is no obvious relationship between levels of child well-being and GDP per capita. The Czech 
Republic, for example achieves a higher overall rank for child well-being than several 
wealthier countries including France, Austria and the UK (UNICEF, 2007).  
With regard to the first dimension, i.e. material situation, indicators currently in use (the 
proportion of children in households with equivalent income less than 60% of the median and 
the proportion of children living in workless households) reveal huge disparities among EU 
member states.  Whereas Denmark, Slovenia and Finland display the lowest child poverty 
rate (Eurostat, 2008) with less than 10% of children living under the poverty threshold, the 
UK, Portugal, Poland, Spain, Italy and Slovak Republic display a child poverty rate above 
20%. In 2006, the proportion of children under 17 living in workless households ranged from 
less than 3% in Luxembourg to slightly more than 16% in the UK. The lowest proportions are 
found in South European countries (Greece, Slovenia, Cyprus, Portugal, Spain, Italy) while 
the highest proportions are found in Central European countries and the UK. However, as 
noted by Bradshaw (2007), the relative child poverty rate has only a fairly weak correlation 
with overall child well-being as measured by the Bradshaw and al. (2007) index, and the 
percentage of children living in workless families has an even weaker correlation. Finally, 
child well being may be referring to three clusters of indicators that are: the relative child 
income poverty domain (combining child poverty rates and child poverty gaps) the child 
deprivation domain (combining lacking own bed room, holidays last year, a computer, a car, 
a desk, quiet place to study, less than ten books in the home) and the parental worklessness 
domain.  Nevertheless, the selected indicators in the index give a parsimonious picture of 
how countries perform on the different clusters. And according to Bradshaw (2007), it is the 
cluster performance rather than the overall index that is useful for national governments to 
focus on in order to draw policy lessons from comparisons.      
Parental employment as a determinant of child development 
Within the last decade, the literature, dominated by Anglo-Saxon studies, has paid a growing 
attention to the determinants of childrens‘ development in the first years of their experience. 
Two main issues have been considered: the impact of parental employment, and the 
experience of poverty. The results however differ according to whether short or long term 
consequences are considered, and according to social and family background, and work 
intensity of parents. 
The short-term consequences of parental employment on child development has been an 
issue of very lively debate in the US and subject to a growing body of research on both sides 
of the Atlantic. A substantial achievement of recent developments has been to provide better 
controls of the different factors which are likely to influence the relation between parental 
employment and children‘s performance, and to account for cross-individual heterogeneity.  
Overall, there is a limited consensus in the literature about the effects of maternal 
employment and childcare. Most of the research carried out in the US context focusing on 
the first years of infancy suggests that maternal care during childhood is essential for child 
                                                 
26
 The assessment provided by this report relies on a concept of child well-being that is guided by the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, also corresponding to the views of a wide public. 
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development and emphasizes the risk of detrimental effects of parental employment on 
children‘s cognitive development (Han et al., 2001; Brooks-Gunn et al., 2002; Baum, 2003; 
Belsky, 2004; Ruhm, 2003; Ruhm, 2004b; Baker et al., 2005).  
Among these studies, Baum (2003) investigated the effect of maternal employment within the 
first year of life of children. He suggests that mother‘s work in the first year of a child‘s life 
has detrimental effects on child‘s cognitive development. Where significant, the results also 
indicate negative effects of maternal employment in the child‘s first quarter of life. However, 
the negative effects of maternal marketplace work are partially offset by positive effects of 
increased family income. Brooks-Gunn et al. (2003) also report negative associations 
between maternal employment during the first year of life and children‘s cognitive outcomes 
at age 3. The effects are found to be more pronounced when mothers were working 30 hours 
or more per week and for certain groups (i.e. boys, children with married parents, etc.). 
Although quality of childcare, home environment, and maternal sensitivity also mattered, the 
negative effects of working 30 hours or more per week were still found, even when 
controlling for child-care quality, the quality of the home environment, and maternal 
sensitivity.  
Ruhm (2004b) also finds similar negative associations and concludes that maternal labour 
supply during the first three years of the child's life has a small negative effect on the verbal 
ability of 3 and 4 year olds and a substantial detrimental impact on the reading and maths 
achievement of 5 and 6 year olds. Working during the second and third years appears to 
have less favorable or more deleterious consequences when the mother is also employed in 
the first year. The results are robust with the inclusion of controls for day care arrangements 
or paternal job-holding and there is some indication that early employment may be 
particularly ―costly‖ for children in ―traditional‖ two-parent families. Finally, the data suggest 
that paternal and maternal employment have qualitatively similar effects, hinting at the 
importance of time investments by fathers. Some relatively similar conclusions are drawn for 
the UK by Gregg and Washbrook (2003) who found that maternal employment can have a 
deleterious impact on a child below age 2 or 3, but the impact depends on the quality of the 
associated childcare solution. 
In contrast to these results, other studies find negative or mixed effects of maternal care 
(Bernal and Keane (2006), Gregg et al. (2005), Stafford (1987), Waldfogel et al. (2002)). One 
first reason explaining differences in results is that the negative association between 
mothers‘ employment and childrens‘ outcomes does not hold for all types of families, and 
especially in ―deprived‖ families. In that case, mother‘s employment provides income which is 
of benefit to children. Children living in sole-parent families are particularly sensitive to this 
opportunity, as illustrated by Esping-Andersen (2008) who compared the cognitive scores of 
children living with a sole mother, either working or not. He found that children get better 
scores in cognitive development, such as measured by the PISA evaluation, if the sole 
mother works in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United-Kingdom. He also emphasizes 
the role of the quality of childcare in order to explain why such a result may not be replicated 
in the United States. A similar conclusion is stated by Dex and Ward (2007) who found no 
evidence of maternal employment influencing child development for three year old children, 
except for those where non participation in the labour market creates economic difficulties.  
Moreover, such a positive relation is also found for the US when longer-term consequences 
for the cognitive achievement of ―disadvantaged‖ adolescents are considered. Ruhm (2005) 
found such positive relations when investigating how maternal employment is related to the 
outcomes of 10 and 11 year olds in terms of both cognitive test scores and childrens‘ 
overweight. Controlling for a wide variety of child, mother and family characteristics, his 
results suggest that limited amounts of work by mothers benefit youths who are relatively 
―disadvantaged‖. Working long hours, which occurs relatively rarely, is unlikely to leave 
children much worse off. Nevertheless, such results are not replicated for adolescents living 
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in a more favourable context, since maternal labour supply is estimated to have much more 
harmful effects on ―advantaged‖ adolescents. The negative cognitive effects occur partly 
because maternal labour supply reduces the time these mothers spend in enriching home 
environments.  
In addition, the quality of the substitute to parental time for child care, and the working 
conditions of parents, are found to be important determinants of the relation between 
parental employment and child development. One basic concern is indeed that labour force 
participation of parents (and especially of mothers) can reduce the amount of time parents 
are able to allocate to childcare, and thus can impact negatively on both well-being and 
development of children. The evidence allowing some general statement on such a concern 
is however lacking. By contrast, the available evidence underlines the problems of home 
environment, of the quality of the relation between the child and his/her parents, and of the 
quality of the substitute to parental time when relying on external or informal childcare as 
especially important to assess the impact on children (Ruhm, 2004a; Belsky, 2004). A 
NICHD early childcare research network (2005) suggests that in both the cognitive and 
socio-emotional domains, quality and type of childcare have a clear impact on child 
outcomes, even after controlling for family factors. 
One must also emphasize that most of these studies pay little attention to the role of fathers 
in child cognitive development despite the growing attention paid to parental interactions in 
the care of children in line with the rise in mothers‘ employment rates. Dex and Ward (2007) 
suggest that children are more likely to have developmental problems if their fathers have no 
flexible working arrangements, do not share parental responsibilities and do not take 
paternity leave after birth. These factors are likely to be associated with education and 
earnings level, making a causal link difficult to prove. Nevertheless time spent by fathers with 
their children may have a positive impact on children well being. 
Finally, the positive association between parental employment and child develoment for 
―disadvantaged‖ families suggests that poverty is a key factor in this development. The 
impact of poverty on the future of children at school has also been investigated. Some 
studies carried out in the United States conclude that children living in poor households 
attend the educational system on average for two years less than the other children. The 
proportion at risk of having problems of health, of committing crime, or of being unemployed 
when they are adult is significantly higher (Brooks-Gunn et al., 1997; Brooks-Gunn, 2003). 
The impact of poverty on children is perhaps less marked in Europe, but remains a marker of 
differentiation in children‘s educational experience. As underlined by Esping-Andersen 
(2008), data reported by Gregg et al. (1999) show that the probability of attaining a higher 
degree of vocational training is reduced by almost a half by the lack of income affluence 
during childhood. Their probability of graduating from a University is also three times less, 
whatever their abilities are.  
The role of attitudes towards maternal employment 
Attitudes towards maternal employment and its impact on children are also important 
dimensions explaining cross-country variations in the framing of policies. Pfau-Effinger 
(2007) observes wide variations across countries in attitudes towards the well being of pre-
school children and paid work of mothers. Her findings are based on the responses in the 
ISSP 2002 ―Family and Gender roles III‘ survey to the statement ―A pre-school child is likely 
to suffer if his or her mother works‖. Whereas almost 65% of the respondents ―agree‖ to the 
statement in Austria for instance, only 24% do so in Sweden and around 32% in Demark and 
East Germany. More than one in two respondents agree to this statement in Poland, West 
Germany and Spain, underlining the cultural values behind mother‘s roles and the 
conceptualization of children‘s well-being. However, whereas more than 80% of respondents 
agree with the statement ―Work is best for women‘s independence‖ in Austria, Spain, France, 
East Germany and Denmark, only 57% in the Netherlands and 55% in the UK agree with 
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this, indicating that there is a tension between values related to women‘s identity and the 
conceptualization of children‘s well-being. To overcome this tension, she suggests that 
policies support an ―active motherhood‖ by implementing both social rights to receive care 
and social rights to provide care (Pfau-Effinger and Geissler, 2005). The combination of 
these two types of social rights and their broadening should enhance the well being of 
children while providing incentives to mothers‘ participation in the labour force.   
These difference in attitudes illuminate the differences in policy frameworks  supporting child 
development. In Scandinavian countries, comprehensive parental leave and childcare 
support are based on the idea that good quality services are good for children whatever their 
age roughly from 12 or 15 months onwards. However, as mentioned in OECD (2007) 
Scandinavian countries in some ways have different perspectives on the age at which 
children may be cared for by somebody other than the parents, and therefore the age at 
which mothers are encouraged to go to work. In Finland and Norway, the paid parental leave 
pattern and home care allowances encourage one of the parents to provide care until the 
child turns three, while in Sweden children often start to be in collective childcare at the age 
of one and a half, and in Denmark at the age of one year.   
 
The effectiveness of policies to foster child well-being and development 
Not only has the amount of policy expenditure dedicated to children to be considered but 
also the policy instruments, since they may have different outcomes for child well-being. We 
examine in this section what the literature has to say on the effectiveness of policies 
supporting parenthood for child poverty and deprivation, and for child cognitive and social 
development. We then examine the arguments supporting the policy objective of investing in 
children that has been developed recently by different authors.   
Policies to eliminate child poverty  
The risk of poverty is far higher for lone parent families than for other families with dependent 
children. However, in some countries: Portugal, Italy, Bulgaria, and to a lesser extent 
Denmark, large families (3 or more children) are highly exposed to poverty risk. In both 
cases, the chances of  escaping from poverty rely on social transfers and on provisions 
aimed at reducing the costs of children. Generally speaking, there is a causal relationship 
between the level of social expenditure and child poverty in most countries. Child benefits 
are one of the major measures reducing child poverty, but there are large disparities among 
EU countries regarding the percentage of social expenditure dedicated to support families, 
from 2,2% in Spain to 16% in Luxembourg (see above, chapter 2). Also, mothers‘ 
contribution to the household income through paid work contributes to reduce the poverty 
risk of children, while at the same time it increases the income gap between high and low 
educated families, dual earner families and lone parent families (Esping-Andersen, 2005).  
Strategies to combat child poverty are relatively well known. Comparative research has 
highlighted the role of social transfers  in reducing the poverty of children living in lone parent 
families in some countries like France for instance, while confirming at the same time the 
importance for the parent of being employed. This presupposes the existence of good quality 
childcare services at a reasonable price. The cost of eliminating child poverty was calculated 
by Esping-Andersen (2002, 2005) who estimated that it was not expensive for a national 
budget. This author suggests the development of a ―preventive‖ strategy based on 
―investment in children‖ as a way of reducing the risk of poverty and of promoting equal 
opportunities for children. Investing in children means placing a peculiar emphasis on 
education to develop human capital and reduce the transmission of inequalities across 
generations. Esping-Andersen‘s proposal relies on the observation of the clear relationship 
existing between structural poverty and low school achievement. There is also a positive 
correlation between the persistent risk of child poverty and early school leaving. Southern 
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European countries (except Greece) are both concerned by early school leaving and high 
child poverty while Finland not only displays leadership in school performance but also in 
eradicating persistent child poverty.   
A policy aimed at reducing child poverty was implemented in the UK by the Blair government 
in the 1990s onwards. Beyond general objectives such as giving every individual the 
opportunity to achieve his capabilities in a market economy, this policy is part of a global 
strategy aimed at reducing poverty by encouraging people to shift from welfare to work, by 
making work pay, by struggling against certain specific disadvantages (health, school, …), 
and by paying attention to ethnic and geographic disparities. The most effective outcomes of 
this strategy have been in reducing child poverty (Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2005). 
Recognizing the multidimensional nature of child poverty, the strategy targeted the main 
dimensions of the poverty risk, among which the first were school difficulties with the Sure 
Start Programme targeted at very young children in order to improve their cognitive 
development before attending primary school; and secondly early pregnancies that are fairly 
frequent in the UK, hindering the future of young mothers and their children.  In addition, two 
mean tested benefits were created: the family tax credit (for children) and the tax credit for 
employment (Join-Lambert, 2005). According to the UNICEF Innocenti research center, only 
four countries have registered a significant reduction of child poverty among which was the 
UK, which had reached its objective of reducing child poverty by 25% by 2004-2005 (Unicef, 
2005). The success of the British strategy may also be explained by the formulation of 
explicit quantitative objectives in each domain of risk, the regular publication of indicators for 
assessing the strategy and the implementation of an evaluation process (Join-Lambert, op. 
cit.). Such a programme has not been adopted in France where child poverty was lower than 
in the UK. In fact, as also in Nordic countries, family policy impacts significantly on income 
redistribution, thereby preventing the risk of poverty for most families (Blanpain, 2004). 
The impact of parental leave policies on child well-being  
The impact of parental leave on child well-being has been reviewed by both Ruhm (2XXX) 
and Kamerman (2006) within the International Network on Leave Policy and Research. Both 
overviews suggest that generous periods of leave following childbirth improve child health, 
provided leave is paid, sufficiently long and that the job is protected during this period. The 
authors also emphasize the role of other family-friendly policies allowing time to both mothers 
and fathers for caring.  The incidence of parental leave should be considered as a part of a 
more complete framework of support. Accordingly, the role of parental leave cannot be 
assessed separately from the role of childcare services. 
The role of kindergartens and preschool services in fostering child development:  
Growing attention has been paid within the literature to the impact of early enrolment in 
preschool and kindergartens on children‘s later cognitive and social development. A small 
number of results can be summarised. Evidence on the positive incidence of early enrolment 
in kindergarten and preschool on cognitive development and social behaviour is generally 
forthcoming. However, there is no clear evidence from research on the ―optimal‖ age at 
which this enrolment should start, and on the volume of preschool hours that is best for 
children. 
Many studies reach positive conclusions on  the benefit of attending preschool for 
achievement at school.  The effects are not huge, but certainly significant on test scores 
(Magnuson et al., 2007a; Ermish and Francesconi, 2001; Lefèvre and Mérrigan, 2002). On 
the basis of a longitudinal survey in the United Kingdom, Sylva et al. (2004) concluded that 
pre-school experience for children under three (compared to none) had a significant positive 
effect on child development and that an earlier start (before three) is better than at six for 
intellectual development.  For children over three, early education in pre-schools is generally 
viewed as positive for child-development (OECD, 2007). However, part of this benefit can be 
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short-lasting: when looking at what happens after kindergartens; Magnuson et al., 2007b 
found that a portion of the initial advantage fades by first grade in the US. 
A second consideration is how disadvantaged the child can be in terms of family background, 
income, education or life-style of their parents when they start school. Here again, a couple 
of studies provide some evidence that preschool gives a bigger boost to poorer or otherwise 
less advantaged children. They emphasise especially the positive effects of early access to 
kindergarten and preschool on children‘s ability to read, to develop vocabulary, or to 
concentrate at school (Sylva et al., 2004; Evangelou et al, 2005).  
Goux and Maurin (2008) contribute an interesting study to evaluate if children benefit from an 
early enrolment in preschool (i.e. at age 2 rather tha age 3) compared to children cared for 
by their mother. They found no significant result that children‘s performances at primary 
school are worse when they have attended preschool at age 2. In contrast, they emphasize 
that an early enrolment in preschool can be very fruitful for children living with a single 
mother, since it is proved to have a positive impact on her labour market participation. Such 
positive impact on the achievements of low income families is also found by Morris and 
Michalopoulos (2000) assessing the Canadian self-sufficiency programme. 
Moreover, the effects of early support are perceptible beyond the period of early childhood. 
Cameron and Heckman (2001) show that the gap in college-going rates of different racial 
and ethnic groups is partially due to differences in income and social backgrounds of 
parents, but especially to differences in children‘s ability which is strongly influenced by the 
experience in early childhood. This evidence explains why many poor or disadvantaged 
families fail to utilize programmes that subsidise college tuition for the disadvantaged. 
Heckman and Masterov (2007) then emphasize the importance of both cognitive and non-
cognitive abilities in shaping child educational and economic outcomes. They stress that 
gaps in college attendance across socio-economic groups are largely shaped by abilities 
formed in the early years, and claim consequently that early intervention is surely the most 
efficient way to remedy these deficits. Since human and social development is a cumulative 
process, later interventions are certainly less effective. 
Migrant families can also be the main beneficiaries of such an early support, as found in a 
study focusing on West Germany. Spiess et al. (2003) thus established that while there is no 
significant correlation between Kindergarten attendance of children of German citizens and 
children‘s later school placement, a positive association is found in immigrant households: 
later school placement is significantly associated with kindergarten attendance prior to school 
enrolment. 
The quality of care and child development 
It is often said that early collective socialization in quality childcare structures is beneficial for 
the cognitive development and social behavior of children. There is, however, no clear 
evidence showing this impact, controlling for other factors such as the paternal presence or 
the quality of home learning environment. Furthermore, while the actual impact of childcare 
enrolment on child development may crucially depend on the quality of care, only very limited 
studies consider the impact of the different components of care and preschool quality: child 
to staff ratio, implication of parents in the definition of the pedagogical approach, 
individualization of care, etc..  
 
Investing in young children: the productivity argument 
To the question of how social policy can compensate for adverse family environments in the 
early years, policies have given various answers over time. One policy response is to reduce 
the material deprivation of poor children with transfers from the state towards families. 
Another response is to develop programmes for children outside the home, even sometimes 
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by removing children from their family. Exploring the US case, James H. Heckman and 
Dimitri V. Masterov (2007) suggests a third approach to the question, supporting an  
investment in early education for disadvantaged children. The argument that is that on 
productivity grounds it makes sense to invest in young children living in disadvantaged social 
and family environments. For this investment, there is no equity-efficiency trade off. The 
argumentation is based on the assumption that early interventions may partially mediate the 
effects of adverse environments and thus reverse some of the harm of disadvantage and 
may have a high economic return (Heckman and Masterov, 2007: 2). Investment in early 
education may be of benefit not only to the children themselves but also to their children, as 
well as to society at large. Investing in disadvantaged young children reduces inequalities 
associated with the accidents of birth while raising the productivity of society at large. The 
analysis provides an understanding of the effects of early intervention programmes, their 
channels of influence and their costs and benefits. It draws on an accumulated body of 
knowledge showing that early interventions for disadvantaged young children are more 
effective than interventions that come later in life. They also underline the self-productivity of 
early investment. Thus, they consider that this investment may be the most effective policy 
for improving the human and social capital of a society: ―at lower cost to society, bolstered 
families will produce better educated students, more trained workers and better citizens‖.  
Such an early investment should be considered as a preventive strategy, since a large body 
of research, mostly in the United States, shows that post-school remedial programmes 
cannot compensate for a childhood of deprivation. Analyzing a broad variety of early 
intervention programmes targeted on disadvantaged children in the US, the two auhors show 
that the economic return to these programmes is high, since promoting early education is a 
factor of performance for schools, for reducing the effects of child poverty, and for social 
performance in general, notably by reducing participation in crime and other damaging 
behaviour. They show that early education programmes reduce crime, promote high school 
graduation and college attendance, and reduce special education costs and help in 
preventing teenage births. Theses programmes concomitantly raise achievements: rates of 
return are estimated at 16% (4% for participants and 12% for society at large). Finally, the 
two authors found that both cognitive and non cognitive abilities of children are the major 
determinants of the economic return to education, both types of abilities being shaped early 
in life. They conclude that early interventions can partially remedy deficits in parental 
environment and parental practices and suggest developing policies aimed at improving the 
early years of disadvantaged children by developing enriched pre-school centres coupled 
with home visiting programmes (Heckman and Masterov, op. cit.).   
Conclusion and recommendations  
This chapter has been dedicated to the literature on the effectiveness of policies supporting 
parenthood for child well-being and work-family balance. First, the definition and 
measurement of child well-being have been examined, raising the issue of the policy 
implications of various definitions. A specific focus has been on the material dimension of 
child well-being and on the effectiveness of policies aimed at reducing child poverty and 
deprivation. The broad disparities across European countries raise the issue firstly of the 
importance of the child social inclusion objective in policies supporting parenthood and 
secondly of the effectiveness of the various policy instruments that are being implemented in 
the EU member states. A specific focus has been on early education policies, highlighting 
their impact not only on children‘s cognitive development but also on social inclusion of 
disadvantaged children and on productivity for the society at large.  
A right balance between paid parental leave and the provision of high quality kindergartens 
and preschool services are suggested to be important supports for child development, 
especially for those living in ―disadvantaged‖ families. This overview however does not give 
strong arguments to identifiy what the ―ideal‖ age could be for children to enter preschool, but 
there is evidence that this age would depend on family and economic context. Some 
136 
 
evidence is here reported that an early enrolment (between age 2 or 3) of ―disadvantaged‖ 
children has at least no negative impact on their school achievement, and has positive 
incidence on single-mothers‘ employment, which helps to prevent poverty. In addition, 
although the quality of care is of prime importance, the evidence identifying which of the 
quality components are determinant is lacking.  
The literature on the effectiveness of policies (most of it based on the North American 
experience) tends also to suggest that a fairly high social and economic return may be 
expected from an investment in children. The next chapter turns to the more long-term 
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Indirect costs of children in a macroeconomic perspective: 






We have seen so far that parenthood penalizes mothers more than fathers in terms of 
employment discontinuity as well as career and income losses. Yet these indirect costs of 
children for mothers have further negative consequences. In the first section of this chapter, 
we will see that inequality between men and women in terms of human capital accumulation, 
employment and income is economically costly not just for women but also for society as a 
whole, because it limits a country‘s economic growth and welfare. In addition, women‘s 
career and income losses due to the presence of children contribute to explaining the fertility 
decline which can be observed in many European countries over the last decades, as 
discussed in chapter 3. The second section of this chapter shows that a change in the fertility 
behaviour of women affects not only individuals, but all of society due to its macroeconomic 
consequences.  
 
The impact of women’s education and employment on growth  
Economists today agree that the active participation of women in education and in the work 
force significantly contributes to a country‘s economic growth.  Despite legal equality 
between men and women, gender-specific disparities persist in all European countries. In 
most countries, employment and income disparities between men and women are larger 
than educational disparities. Within the last decade, girls have caught up with boys in the 
likelihood of graduating from secondary schooling in most, but not all European countries. 
Nevertheless, in all European countries there persist significant gender-specific differences in 
terms of technical knowledge, professional skills and work experience, which count as 
―human capital‖ differences. We know from chapter 4 that the presence of children is a main 
determinant to explain the gender-specific employment gap. This is also valid for the gender-
specific human capital gap: the gap goes back to the gender-specific traditional division in 
the family, which implies that women, and especially mothers with young children, 
accumulate less labour market experience than men. Furthermore, because women 
anticipate shorter and more discontinuous careers, they invest less in professional education. 
In addition, the longer hours that women spend on housework may also decrease the effort 
women put into their professional careers, which also has a detrimental effect on their human 
capital stock. 
There exists a series of theoretical arguments that investigate the growth reducing effect of 
the gender-specific disparities in education, employment and income which exist due to the 
presence of children. When talking about education, human capital is meant in a wider 
context. Barro and Sala-i-Matin (1995) or Knowles, Lorgelly and Owen (2002), for example, 
show how gender-specific differences in education reduce a country‘s growth in theory. A 
theoretical study by Galor and Weil (1996), for example, investigates the question how 
employment and earned income of women promotes growth over generations. There also 
exists a series of empirical investigations of the impact of women‘s education, employment 
and income on macroeconomic growth, for example by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), 
Klasen (1999), Klasen (2002) and Pissarides (2006). Recent theoretical and empirical 
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studies agree that gender-related differences in education, employment and income hinder 
economic growth. Therefore, indirect costs of children are not only to the disadvantage of 
mothers and of children‘s welfare, as we have seen in the previous chapter, but beyond this 
the indirect costs are to the disadvantage of the society as a whole.   
 
The impact of women’s education on growth - in theory 
Economists today agree that gender-specific determinants have an important impact on 
growth, but this finding was made quite recently. Until the 1980s, economists did not take 
gender aspects into account in growth models, until they found out that adding gender-
specific determinants significantly helped to explain differences in income levels and growth 
between countries. The rising recognition of gender-specific determinants came with the 
evolution from exogenous to endogenous growth models.  
Growth is usually measured as a long-term development of national income on the basis of 
change in per capita income. As one of the first economists to do so, Solow (1956) 
formulated a exogenous growth model. This model only takes into account the level of labour 
and capital, which is in turn determined by savings, population growth and depreciations 
(steady state convergence theory). Yet, later empirical studies found out that the 
determinants of Solow‘s exogenous growth model can only explain up to 40% of what 
influences a country‘s specific income level (c.f. Blanchard, 1999, for example).  
Economists, therefore, investigated alternative determinates of growth not represented in 
Solow‘s growth theory. In a first step, an exogenous advance in technology was added to the 
model by Solow himself. Yet, this model is also unable to explain the real reasons for an 
increase in income, because technological advancement is considered exogenous. It was 
not until the 1980s that endogenous growth models were developed to explain long-term 
growth of productivity. Robert Lucas and Paul Romer primarily developed endogenous 
growth models during the mid 1980s. They endogenize technological advancement by 
integrating human capital as a third input factor in the production function. This significantly 
improved the empirical evidence of the growth model.  Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) further 
developed this approach. They endogenized technological advancement by splitting capital 
between physical capital and human capital. The important difference between exogenous 
and endogenous growth models is that in the endogenous growth models, human capital is 
no longer exogenous. A simultaneous doubling of physical and human capital doubles output 
and makes continuous growth without convergence possible. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) 
use their endogenous growth model to prove theoretically the positive impact of investments 
in human capital on economic growth.   
In a next step, Knowles, Lorgelly and Owen (2002) show how gender-specific disparities in 
human capital impact a country‘s growth. They use a neoclassical growth model that sets 
female and male education as separate explanatory variables to clarify the impact of gender 
discriminating distribution of education on a nation‘s growth. Their model supposes that 
investments in women‘s human capital positively impact a country‘s productivity and growth.   
The model takes into account long-term effects of education by including the output elasticity 
of female and male human capital as well as of physical capital. Knowles et al. (2002) also 
model coefficients that represent differences in education between men and women. They 
demonstrate theoretically that human capital influences growth by means of its effects on the 
level of output per worker, which, in turn, influences output growth.  The model shows that 
given a fixed level of male qualification, a rise in female qualification raises output. In an 
additional model by Knowles et al. (2002), education acts as male education as well as the 
gender difference in education. The model suggests that given a fixed level of education of 
men and women, gender-specific differences in education have a negative effect on a 
country‘s output. Hence, Knowles at al. (2002) theoretically prove that lower education for 
women lowers a country‘s growth performance. When gender-specific differences in 
education are large, rates of return from education of women are higher than those from men 
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due to falling marginal returns of human capital. Consequently, investments in women‘s 
human capital raise a country‘s capital stock, underlining the importance of education for 
women and girls for a country‘s labour force productivity.  
 
Klasen (2002) adds that, assuming that boys and girls possess evenly distributed capabilities 
and that children with high capabilities become better educated, it can be said that gender-
specific discrimination in education reduces the ―potential talent pool‖ of educated children. If 
a person‘s human capital stock consists of capability and education, discrimination in 
education reduces the average human capital stock, thereby also reducing the nation‘s 
potential for growth.  Furthermore, it is common knowledge that children‘s‘ education has 
positive aspects not just for themselves, but for all of society, and this applies no less to girls 
than to boys. Hence, investment in girls‘ education positively affects their skills and 
knowledge, their intellectual capacity, their social competence as well as their health and life 
expectancy. This benefits not only on their own quality of life but the whole nation. As girls 
will pass down their knowledge and skills to their own children later in their life, education of 
girls also promotes a nation‘s welfare in an inter-generational context.  
Finally, the World Bank (2001) states that the level of women‘s education also raises the 
educational level of men by means of a constant dialogue (―life long learning‖) as well as the 
educational level of children.  The president of the World Bank acknowledged this 
scientifically proven fact at the fourth Women‘s World Conference in Beijing in 1995 with the 
following saying: ―When we educate a boy, we educate a person.  When we educate a girl, 
we educate an entire family and an entire nation.‖  
However, even though the model by Knowles et al. (2002) suggests that women‘s human 
capital promotes growth, it is important to note that the term ―human capital‖ is not ideal to 
describe a person‘s productivity. Gardiner (2000) emphasises that even though there is 
some awareness that human capital is much more than formal education, difficulties in 
measuring other aspects such as experience, skills and social capital reduces the informative 
value of the term ―human capital‖. This goes especially for women with children, as the term 
―human capital‖ is uniquely related to market work, and experiences from house-related 
capabilities and child rearing (social competence, organisational skills...) are not considered 
as integral parts of the definition of human capital.  
 
The impact of women’s employment on growth - in theory 
In the models discussed so far, education directly affects output. However, female education 
also affects a nation‘s income in more complex ways: for example, it raises women‘s 
participation in employment and earnings and reduces women‘s fertility.  Galor and Weil 
(1996) discuss this chain of impacts in a growth model with a generational time span. They 
combine a growth model with endogenous labour supply of women and men with a 
household model that models a couple‘s choice between unpaid household activities and 
paid labour. Thereafter, economic growth (accumulation of capital caused by investments in 
women‘s education) raises the relative wages of women. Higher women‘s wages, in turn, 
raise women‘s opportunity costs of staying at home and thus increase female labour market 
participation. Women‘s employment provides the household with an additional income, which 
makes greater savings possible. The increase in savings raises the capital stock per worker 
and therewith increases output (feedback effect). Consequently, the more women actively 
participate in the labour market, the faster a national economy will grow. 
Klasen and Lamanna (2003) add that high levels of gender-specific discrimination in 
employment artificially restrict the ―talent pool‖ of a nation‘s labour force, because less 
qualified men push potentially highly qualified women out of the job market.  As a result, the 
average available labour force within a national economy is kept artificially low (measured in 
units of productivity). This hinders a country‘s ability to be internationally competitive. In this 
context, it also becomes clear that child care infrastructure and other policy instruments that  
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encourage a reconciliation of work and family life play an important role in growth, as they 
enable mothers to participate in the work force.  
The World Bank (2001) adds that higher wages for women affect the decision-making power 
on saving and consumption within households. More bargaining power within the household, 
as a result of personal income, allows mothers to invest in the education and health of their 
children according to their own preferences. This positively affects children‘s health, reduces 
mortality rates, increases life expectancy and, last but not least, raises intellectual capacity, 
which later benefits the national economy in the form of raised human capital. Hence, 
women‘s employment and income also promote growth in an inter-generational context.  
Finally, Abu-Ghaida and Klasen (2002) further argue that women‘s disadvantages in 
employment also lower a whole nation‘s welfare through a population‘s presumed aversion to 
inequality (intrinsic effect). Gender-specific differences in employment and income lead to 
social-political instability for a country and make necessary a redistribution of wealth through 
tax and transfer systems.    
 
Empirical evidence of the impact of women’s education on growth 
The relationship between women‘s education, employment and income on the one side and 
macroeconomic growth on the other is not easy to investigate empirically because of the 
problem of reverse causality. The double-sided and indirect effects of women‘s 
empowerment in terms of education, employment and income on growth present several 
challenges to empirical estimation methods. 
The first empirical studies produced unexpected results that made waves within the research 
world: Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) estimate in their growth regression that education of 
women has a negative effect on growth. Their puzzling findings motivated many other 
economists to investigate the effect of women‘s education on growth. The general consensus 
was that more complex data ascertainment and estimation methods were necessary. Forbes 
(2000) and Klasen (2002) criticize Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) for their inadequate 
consideration of colinearity and endogeneity problems.  Further development of estimation 
methods improved the significance of estimation results and hence Klasen (2002) finds a 
significantly positive impact of women‘s education on growth.  
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) empirically investigate a series of potential determining 
factors of growth differences between countries. In contrast to theoretical predictions based 
on models, they estimate a negative impact of women‘s education on growth. For the growth 
regression, the countries‘ data is divided into 2 decades in order to limit time series 
variations. The first decade from 1965-1974 contains 87 countries and the second decade 
from 1975-1985 contains 97 countries. 
The endogenous variable, the growth rate of real per capita income (GDP) is measured as 
the average rate for both decades (two endogenous variables: average growth rate 1965-
1974, average growth rate 1975-1985). The first two exogenous variables that are taken into 
consideration as growth determinants are GDP per capita of the base year (to control for the 
growth convergence mechanism) and human capital, measured on the basis of the proxy 
variables education and health (where life expectancy proxies health). Education is divided 
into male education and female education. The educational variables contain the number of 
years in primary school (years of schooling up tol 10 years of age), the number of years in 
secondary school and the number of years in higher education. According to the theory of 
Knowles et al. (2002), one may expect that female education positively influences growth. A 
further exogenous variable is the ratio of education expenditures, which indicates education 
quality, since years of schooling only reflect the quantity of education received. This ratio is 
expected to impact growth positively. The ratio of government expenditures to GDP is also a 
further exogenous variable. This ratio is expected to impact growth negatively as it is 
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assumed that income taxation in order to finance government consumption distorts 
household decisions. Further exogenous variables are the relationship between investments 
and BIP, the spread of the black market for foreign currencies as a proxy variable for market 
distortions, changes in terms of trade, countries‘ political instability and fertility rates.   
OLS-estimations and SUR-estimations (Seemingly Unrelated Regression), which do not take 
into account potential correlation problems, yield significantly positive coefficients of male 
secondary schooling and male higher education, but the coefficients of female secondary 
schooling and female higher education are negative. The coefficient of female secondary 
schooling is insignificant and the coefficient of female higher education is only marginally 
significant27. The growth reducing effects of female education contradict the theoretical 
prospects. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) reason that this result emerges due to the high 
income level in wealthy countries. High gender differences in education can be seen as signs 
of economic underdevelopment and, therewith, as signs of high potential for income growth 
(convergence mechanism). Most wealthy countries with high income levels and low growth 
potential have smaller gender-specific differences in education. This is why a growth 
regression including observations of wealthy countries results in a negative impact of female 
human capital on growth.  
The estimated negative impact of female education on growth raises questions about how 
data was gathered and measured. Several succeeding studies criticize Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995)‘s study. Klasen (2002), for instance, states that Barro and Sala-i-Martin‘s 
estimation does not sufficiently account for the high co-linearity between female and male 
education. The correlation between both variables is over 90%, according to Klasen. This 
problem of multicolinearity makes it almost impossible to separate the effects of female and 
male education on growth. Furthermore, Klasen (2002) refers to an insufficiently solved 
endogeneity problem between growth and education. A higher human capital stock may 
generate growth, but inversely a country‘s growth may promote investments in education. 
This inverse causality makes estimations with appropriate instrumental variables necessary. 
Forbes (2000) names another central problem of measuring growth: the lack of access to 
data over long time periods. Plus, countries often have very different measurement 
conceptions and methods for the variables economists are interested in. Data is often 
incomplete and inconsistent in terms of time.  Measurement errors and omitted variables due 
to missing data reduce the measurement‘s significance (omitted variable bias). Systematic 
measurement errors lead to either positively or negatively biased estimators, which depends 
on the correlation between measurement errors and other variables in the regression. If 
countries tend to tone down the gender-specific difference in education that they report (that 
is, they report a smaller gap than actually exists) and if these countries have an under-
average growth at the same time, the negative impact of gender-specific educational 
differences on growth will be underestimated. If variables that increase inequality between 
men and women and reduce growth, such as the degree of corruption for example, are 
omitted in the regression, the negative impact of gender-specific educational differences on 
growth will be overestimated. Unobserved country-specific effects, such as production 
technology standards that are not represented by proxy variables, go into the residuals of the 
estimation equation and bias the estimators. Therefore, Klasen (2002) recommends applying 
a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation method for dynamic panel data, which 
eliminates growth determinants that are unobservable and/or difficult to measure and remain 
constant over time (country-specific effects such as climate and geography or a country‘s 
political and legal system). Finally, Klasen (2002) points out that insufficient data availability 
makes measures of the impact of female education on growth somewhat problematic. 
Women‘s household and child rearing activities are measured only in a few countries and 
overall changes in quantity and quality of this sector are generally not measured. It can 
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therefore be assumed that growth effects from women‘s education are underestimated, 
because advances in productivity within private realms remain unaccounted for. 
Since 1995, data collection and estimation methods have been further developed and a 
number of economists have concentrated their research on the growth effects of female 
education.  The advancement of empirical methods allowed for more trustworthy results, the 
majority of which demonstrate that gender-specific differences in education of income hinder 
a country‘s economic growth. 
Klasen (2002), for instance, proves a positive impact of women‘s education on a country‘s 
growth based on new estimation methods. The regressions are based on cross-country data 
as well as on panel data (combination of cross-country and time series data) and the 
estimations are based on instrumental variables (lagged variables) and System GMM. Both 
methods adequately take into account endogeneity and multicolinearity problems. Klasen 
uses data from 109 countries that spans three decades, 1960 to 1992, and, therewith, 
measures long-term growth more effectively than did Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), whose 
estimations were based on a time period that covers only 20 years. Growth is measured as 
change over time in a country‘s ―Purchasing Power Parity‖ (PPP) per capita. The PPP per 
capita allows for a better comparison of living standards than GDP per capita, because it 
accounts for different price levels between countries and, therewith, makes it possible to 
compare standards of living. The growth rate of PPP per capita is determined by a series of 
exogenous variables, which are population growth, labour force growth, the degree of a 
country‘s openness (free trade), the investment rate in relation to GDP and gender specific 
education levels. A path analysis captures the overall growth effect of education, which 
indirectly impacts growth via investments, population growth and labour force growth. Klasen 
(2002) proves empirically that gender-specific discrimination in terms of education is a direct 
hindrance to growth.  
Empirical evidence of the impact of women’s employment on growth 
The impact of women‘s employment on growth has been studied empirically much less than 
the impact of women‘s education on growth, and the relevant studies have all been 
conducted in the past 10 years. Klasen (1999) uses data that include observations for 109 
countries and the years 1960 to 1992. The exogenous variable, which again is the change in 
the purchasing power parity (PPP) per capita, is explained by the initial income level of the 
year 1960, the degree of openness, gender disparities in education and growth in female 
labour force. The female labour force is measured by the share of women working in the 
formal labour sector relative to the number of all women of working age as well as the share 
of women working in the formal labour sector relative to the country‘s entire labour force. The 
estimation results suggest that gender disparities in employment significantly contribute to 
the difference in growth performance between countries.  
Pissarides (2006) confirms these findings for Europe. He emphasizes that Europe is able to 
promote its growth by enhancing employment possibilities for women, as foreseen by the 
Lisbon agenda of 2000. In Europe,  women work on average 8 hours less than do American 
women in the markets, but they work 10 hours more in the home and therefore are more 
engaged in ―home production‖ (housing, child rearing). A marketisation of women‘s home 
production would get Europe closer to the objective of more growth and employment. 
So far, the analysis has showed a positive impact of women‘s education and employment on 
a country‘s macroeconomic growth. In most empirical studies that investigate this impact, 
measures of women‘s employment are limited to the female share of the labour force. Surely 
it would be interesting to measure the impact of the economic empowerment of women, and 
not only their labour market participation, on growth. Examining the real economic role of 
women would not only entail measuring female labour market participation, but also taking 
into account women‘s working hours (full time, part time), women‘s qualifications and 
income, their detailed working conditions (ProClarity, degree of social security) and the part 
they play in decision making in the economy, in politics and society, for example. However, 
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the restrictions of the empirical studies are due to limited data availability. Female labour 
market participation is the best available indicator for the economic role of women when the 
purpose is to take into consideration several decades and over 150 countries. It is not 
possible to create an index which represents the economic empowerment of women, for all 
countries and all time periods. Missing observations, especially for developing countries and 
early time periods, would bias the estimation results to a great extent. Nevertheless, there 
exist several wider measures of female empowerment today. The United Nations 
Development Programme, for example, offers a Gender Related Development Index (GDI), 
which represents a gender specific Human Development Index (HDI)28 that tries to capture 
women‘s well being. The GDI takes into account women‘s life expectancy, education and 
income and penalises gender equality in these fields. The GDI index is available for a large 
set of countries, but contains yearly observations only from 2006 on, and therefore can only 
be used for cross country analysis. The same problem applies also to another existing index 
which is the GEM (gender empowerment measure), a composite indicator that captures 
gender inequality in political participation and decision-making (women‘s and men‘s 
percentage shares of parliamentary seats), economic participation and decision-making 
power (women‘s and men‘s percentage shares of positions as legislators, senior officials and 
managers and women‘s and men‘s percentage shares of professional and technical 
positions) and power over economic resources (women‘s and men‘s estimated earned 
income in PPP US$).  
 
However, even empirical research results that deal only with female employment have to be 
interpreted with care because the quality of the results can only be as good as the quality of 
the available data. Measures of female labour market participation are confronted with 
serious measurement problems. Firstly, measurement methods and definitions of female 
employment can differ between countries and data sources in quality and coverage. 
Differences in statistical and conceptual practices can lead to a gender bias in official 
statistics and concepts of labour market participation. Secondly, it may be that the finding 
that under-proportional employment of women reduces growth is also due to a measurement 
effect: household and child rearing activities are usually not captured by economic measures. 
Hence, changes in the quantity and productivity of women‘s household activities can be 
measured only insufficiently or not at all. Substituting these activities with employment, which 
is recorded as data, raises a country‘s measured economic output (―accounting effect‖, c.f. 
Waring, 1988; Klasen, 2002). Secondly, data weakness arises because female work is often 
informal and therefore unrecorded. Non-paid work and own-accounted work are rarely 
included in the statistics. This goes especially for women‘s subsistence activities in the 
agricultural (or black market) sector, which concerns not only developing countries, but also 
countries in the European Union. In some of the former Communist countries in Central and 
Eastern Europe, as for example in Romania, the introduction of the market economy in the 
1990s has sharply decreased the options for women in formal employment and pushed 
women into informal subsistence farming (cf. Esim,  2001). Due to these unrecorded 
activities, changes in the quantity and productivity of female work can be measured only 
insufficiently and the impact of female employment on growth risks being underestimated.  
 
The impact of fertility on growth 
Whereas recent studies unambiguously give evidence for a positive impact of women‘s 
education and income on growth, the impact of fertility on growth is scientifically not as clear. 
In theory, the exogenous growth model based on Solow (1956) provides a negative impact of 
population growth on fertility, whereas endogenous growth models, for example by Romer 
(1986) and Lucas (1988), suggest a positive impact. Empirical investigations do not give 
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clear evidence, either. Nevertheless, recent empirical studies agree that a growth in the 
qualified work force positively impacts a nation‘s macroeconomic growth. Therefore, 
decreasing fertility rates due to the rising costs of children are thoroughly linked to the risk of 
lowering income growth in Europe.  
The impact of fertility on growth - in theory 
The exogenous growth model based on Solow (1956) predicts a negative impact of fertility 
on macroeconomic growth. As we have already seen, in this model, GDP per capita is 
determined by the two production factors capital and labour, which depend on the savings 
rate, population growth and depreciations. Falling marginal returns of capital and labour lead 
to a convergence of growth between countries. It is assumed that the saving rate is fixed. 
Consequently, population growth lowers GDP per capita. Preliminary population growth 
would lead to a new equilibrium at a lower level of GDP per capita. To avoid this ―dilution‖ of 
capital induced by population growth, the saving rate would have to rise, which is not 
possible according to the assumptions of the exogenous growth model. As with population 
growth the ratio of capital to labour falls, productivity of labour and consequently wages also 
decrease. As labour is abundant and capital is relatively rare, the interest rate of capital 
increases. This phenomenon is called ―capitalistic intensification‖. Solow‘s addition of 
exogenous advance in technology to the model does not change the result.  
Solow‘s negative effect of population growth on income per capita is in line with the 
arguments of Malthus (1798). Malthus sketched the picture of a ―population trap‖ by 
emphasising that income growth leads to population growth, which in turn leads to an income 
decline. Ricardo (1815) agrees with Malthus in stressing the fact that population growth 
precedes an expansion of population‘s resources, especially food resources. Thereafter, 
population growth leads to poverty and immiserization due to a fixed amount of land for 
cultivation and the finiteness of natural resources. 
 
The predictions of the exogenous growth model pose, however, a logical problem: according 
to Solow, a continuous population decline would be extremely growth stimulating, even if the 
population size goes towards zero. Moreover, the model‘s predictions do not correspond to 
the observations that can be made for the 18th and 19th century in Europe, where rapid 
population growth went hand in hand with GDP per capita growth, especially in times of 
industrialisation (c.f. Blanchet, 2002; Galor and Weil, 2000).  Boserup (1965, 1981) explains 
this phenomenon by recognising the human capacity to increase food supply. Thereafter, 
food scarcity in times of population growth, as predicted by Malthus, was the motor for new 
innovations in agriculture. New techniques, division of labour and specialisation lead to 
agricultural extension and intensification (―Green Revolution‖, see also Nerlove and Raut, 
1994). Hence, population growth stimulates innovations due to resource limitations. These 
innovations increase productivity and enable further income growth. Boserup‘s arguments 
contributed to the scientific recognition that new theoretical frameworks had to be developed, 
which investigate the impact of fertility on growth.  
 
Endogenous growth models that integrated technical advancement by considering human 
capital as a third production factor threw light on further growth determinants. Arrow (1962), 
for example, identifies technical advancement as a key element of economic growth and 
emphasizes that innovations are driven by ―learning by doing‖, which means that increased 
productivity is achieved through repeated practice and self-perfection. Phelps (1966) 
completes this idea by highlighting that the learning processes of each worker have positive 
externalities and spillover effects on the other workers, which leads to economies of scale. 
Consequently, returns of human capital cannot be considered as decreasing, but must be 
considered as constant individually and as increasing in aggregate (see also Romer, 1986). 
Lucas (1988) adopts Arrow‘s and Phelps‘ concept to explain even increasing individual 
returns of human capital. Constant or increasing returns of human capital imply that GDP 
levels do not converge, but increase at the technology growth rate. Technical progress, in 
turn, is generated by the accumulation of human capital. In this context, not only education 
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but also fertility constitutes an economic advantage: population growth increases the number 
of workers available to the economy and the size of manpower stimulates research efforts 
(c.f. Phelps, 1966). The bigger the labour force, the bigger is a nation‘s ―talent pool‖ and the 
bigger are the spill over effects within the workforce. In addition, the higher the density of a 
population, the faster is the technology transfer and the knowledge exchange within a 
country (c.f. Lee, 1986). 
 
However, the predictions of the endogenous growth models also pose a logical problem: a 
continuous population increase would always be growth stimulating, even if the population 
size goes towards infinite. Moreover, Klasen (1999) emphasises that the quality aspects of 
the labour force should not be underestimated.  Whereas Phelps (1966) points out that the 
quantity of the labour force induces quality by spill over effects, Klasen (1999) accentuates a 
possible trade-off between the quantity and the quality of the labour force. Lower fertility sets 
free money to invest more in the human capital of each individual, which raises individual 
intellectual capacity. Especially in the case of increasing individual returns of human capital, 
a nation‘s talent pool would profit rather from a rise in individual quality than from a rise in the 
quantity of its human capital stock. Thereafter, high welfare equilibrium would result from low 
fertility rates combined with high levels of human capital, whereas low welfare equilibrium 
would result from high fertility rates combined with low levels of human capital.  
 
The theoretical arguments discussed so far suppose an ambiguous impact of population 
growth on income. There is a series of further arguments that take into account other 
aspects, as for example labour market or age structure dynamics, pension schemes or even 
ecology. To start with labour market aspects, the impact of fertility on growth with respect to 
labour market dynamics is twofold. On the one hand, population growth can lower a country‘s 
income due to decreasing wage income and increasing unemployment, which both imply 
decreasing consumption and savings. On the other hand, a population decline can lower 
income due to labour force shortages (c.f. Hantrais, 2004). Taking into account age structure 
dynamics of the population does not clarify the impact, either. On the one hand, an ageing 
population may lead to higher savings, which implies a rising GDP per capita (c.f. Artus and 
Legros, 1999). On the other hand, an ageing population disposes of fewer younger 
generations. As it is the younger generation that adapts new technologies more easily, an 
ageing population runs the risk of slowing down the motor for technical innovations (cf.  
Beaudry and Green, 2000). In addition, an ageing population implies higher dependency 
rates, which financially strain a country‘s social protection system due to an increase in 
health and pension expenditure (c.f. Blanchet, 1991; Mason, 2005). These additional costs 
risk slowing down economic growth. Moreover, countries with pay-as-you-go pension 
systems face serious financing problems in the case of a fertility decline (c.f. Sinn, 2004). 
More precisely, the pension system of pay-as-you-go financing adheres to an inter-
generational component to reassure responsibility between generations. As the working 
population finances retirement insurance fees for its parents, fertility decline presents a grave 
problem: fewer and fewer young people must finance the retirement of more and more 
elderly people.  The young are overburdened financially, payments for the elderly shrink, and 
lower savings and consumption hinder growth. Finally, even neo-Malthusian ideas give no 
clear indication of the impact of fertility on growth. On the one hand, due to the finiteness of 
certain natural resources, population growth can lead to environmental exploitation and 
degradation, which clearly reduce living standards. On the other hand, it is possible that 
these negative aspects of population growth can stimulate ecological innovations, which 
enable sustainability and economic growth to be attained in the middle and long run (c.f. 
Robinson and Srinivasan, 1997). Hence, considering a series of addidtional arguments 
certainly provides a deeper insight into the possible effects of fertility on growth, but does not 
lead to an unambiguous finding. 
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Empirical evidence of the impact of fertility on growth 
Here again, empirical analysis is confronted with an endogeneity problem. The estimations of 
the impact of fertility on growth may be biased due to reverse causality. On the one hand, an 
increase in GDP per capita may increase population growth, because an income increase 
may raise the demand for children just as it raises the demand for goods (classic population 
theory according to Malthus). This phenomenon can be observed mainly for less developed 
countries. On the other hand, an increase in GDP per capita may lead to lower fertility rates, 
because parents may start preferring to invest in each child‘s qualitative education and 
because higher wages raise the opportunity costs of staying at home (modern population 
theory, c.f. Galor and Weil, 2000, for example). This phenomenon can be observed mainly in 
highly developed countries over the last quarter of the 20th century, where in some countries 
fertility levels fell below replacement levels, as we have seen in chapter 3. 
 
Early empirical studies from the 1960s to the 1980s use OLS estimations, which is not 
appropriate to deal with the problem of reverse causality. The bigger part of these studies, 
which mainly focus on developing countries, find a positive, but very moderate impact of 
population growth on GDP per capita (see Blanchet, 1991 for an overview). In contrast, by 
differentiating between short term and long term effects, Kelley and Schmidt (1994) find a 
rather negative impact of fertility on growth in the short run for developing countries. Barro 
(1991) introduces several demographic variables into convergence growth models and finds 
that fertility and population growth have a negative impact on growth, whereas population 
size and population density have a positive impact on growth. However, with population 
growth as the only demographic variable, the impact of population growth on GDP per capita 
estimated by Barro (1991) becomes insignificant. 
 
More recent empirical studies take into account the population‘s age structure which reflects 
productivity (c.f. Brander and Dowrick, 1994; Bloom and Canning 2001).  The common result 
is that population growth alone is not significant, but the growth of the working age population 
has a significant positive impact on growth. More precisely, Prskawetz and al. (2006) find 
that in Western Europe, growth of the working age population has a positive impact not only 
on aggregate output and on output per capita (accounting effect, transition component), but 
also on output per worker (behavioural effect, productivity component). In a review paper, 
Kelly and Schmidt (2005) conclude that both the accounting and the behavioural effect 
explain up to 24% of GDP growth observed in Western Europe between 1960 and 1990. 
Prskawetz and al. (2006) suggest that in Western Europe, the peak of the accounting effect 
took place in the 1980s. In those years the baby boom generation caused an increase in the 
working age population. Furthermore, Prskawetz and al. (2006) forecast that Europe‘s 
ageing population, which implies a decline in the working age population, will have a 
negative impact on growth from 2030 on. They conclude that not only the size of the work 
force, but also the age structure within the work force plays an important role in growth. In 
this context, a well-balanced age structure seems to be the most growth promoting: whereas 
a younger work force drives the absorption process, an older work force drives the mature 
productivity process.  
 
To sum up, empirical studies so far show no robust correlation between population growth 
and GDP per capita. Yet recent studies that take into account the structure of the working 
age population unambiguously come to the conclusion that a growth in the work force 
positively impacts a nation‘s economic growth. Concerning the impact of the age structure 
within the workforce on growth, more research is needed. Prskawetz and al. (2006) foresee 
an ageing of the work force within the next decades in Europe, but stay vague about its 
economic consequences.   
 
In addition, some words have to be said about the fact that in all the cited empirical analyses 
in this chapter, GDP per capita represents a nation‘s welfare. Just as female labour market 
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participation insufficiently represents women‘s empowerment, GDP per capita insufficiently 
represents a nation‘s welfare, not to mention well-being or standard of living. First of all, 
measures of GDP discount the non-monetary economy and hence do not consider unpaid 
productive activities like voluntary work, domestic work and subsistence production. The 
evaluation and measurement of women‘s housework is a difficult task, because housework, 
raising children and caring for family members is viewed as the opposite of market work and 
hence is not assigned an economic value. Were all men and women to dedicate equal 
numbers of hours to housework and caring, it would suffice to measure GDP to capture 
differences in economic development across countries. As this is not the case, GDP is not an 
ideal measure of economic activity. Furthermore, GDP measures leave aside black market 
activities. These unaccounted activities bias income measures downward. Another 
consequence arising from these unrecorded activities is that GDP increases when non 
market production becomes marketable. This market shift biases measures of GDP upwards, 
for example when meals or other products that used to be made at home are now sold at the 
market as semi-finished or finished products. Moreover, GDP as an indicator or a nation‘s 
welfare is often criticised because it only reflects average national income, but does not 
indicate income distribution or the pattern of expenditure. It also ignores the quality of goods 
(durability) and negative externalities of growth such as the damage to the environment. 
GDP assumes that if there were more goods in circulation, general welfare would 
automatically increase and hence, GDP growth does not account for sustainability. Nobel 
Prize winner Joseph E. Stiglitz, for example, sees GDP as an imperfect indicator because 
improvements in the quality of life, which do not show up in material consumption, do not 
increase GDP. In order to take into account other determinants of well being, various kinds of 
―quality of life‖ indices were developed recently. The most influential indicator is the Human 
Development Index (HDI), which was introduced by the United Nations Development 
Programme in its annual Human Development Report in 1995. The ideas of Nobel Prize 
winner Amartya Sen were influential in the development of this indicator. The HDI combines 
normalized measures of life expectancy, knowledge (literacy and educational attainment) 
and living standard (GDP per capita in PPP US$). The use of Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) 
takes into account countries‘ different price levels and converts the data into a common 
currency. The PPP can be a better indicator of living standards, especially of less-developed 
countries, because it compensates for the weakness of local currencies in world markets. 
Yet, as even the HDI‘s information value is limited, further research is being done in the field 
of measuring ―quality of life‖,  or even ―happiness‖, which is assumed to correspond to the 
freedom to make personal choices. Today, the new indices are becoming a tool for judging 
the true wealth of nations, but due to limited data availability, especially concerning the time 
period, they enhance rather than replace GDP as a measure of a country‘s well-being. The 
major advantages to using GDP per capita as an indicator of standard of living are that it is 
measured frequently and widely. Furthermore, the technical definitions used within GDP are 
relatively consistent between countries.  
 
Hence, empirical studies dealing with the link between women‘s economic empowerment 
and fertility on the one side and a nation‘s welfare on the other side are of restricted 
explanatory power due to limited data availability. Furthermore, the empirical results tend to 
suffer from endogeneity problems, which are often not sufficiently taken into account due to 
the data‘s limited time periods. Consequently, in order to enable empirically compelling 
investigations in this field, further data collection is of prime importance. It is advisable to 
concentrate on developed nations if one wants to achieve in the near future more specific 
observations of women‘s empowerment, the structure of a country‘s working age population 
and of a country‘s welfare for several time periods. These data would allow an intensified 
analysis of the link between macro-based evidence and individual behaviour. The OECD 
currently compiles a family database, which may be useful in regard to future macro-micro 
research. The database categorises information under four broad headings, which are family 
structures, labour market positions of families (i.e. maternal employment by family status; 
employment profiles over the life-course, time for caring…), public policies for families and 
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children and child outcomes. Yet in order to extend the analysis to a large time span and new 
member states of the European Union, it is foreseeable that the OECD data base will need to 
be completed by other data sources.  
 
Conclusion 
We have seen that women play a significant role in a country‘s macroeconomic growth. 
Economic theory and recent empirical analysis unanimously suggests that women‘s 
education, employment and income contribute largely to growth. Therefore, while there is 
undeniable social value in dismantling discrimination of any kind, a reduction in gender 
discrimination is not an ―aim of its own‖ that benefits women only, but is also meaningful in 
economic terms and therefore is profitable for all of society.  
 
Persisting gender-specific disparities in terms of education, employment and income in all 
European countries show that gender equality under the law is on its own insufficient. The 
presence of children is one main reason for gender-specific discrimination. Mother‘s careers 
and wages often do not match their qualifications. Sooner or later, many mothers hit the so-
called ―glass ceiling‖ of career and income opportunities.  The negotiating power over wages 
is weak for mothers, since family related leaves or absence carry costs for the employer. The 
struggle to balance family and career results in the fact that continuous employment and 
secure full-time jobs are uncommon for mothers, which often makes investment in women‘s 
education seem unprofitable.  
Moreover, income losses due to the presence of children have a negative impact on 
women‘s fertility decisions. However, as there is no clear empirical evidence of the effect of a 
nation‘s population growth on economic development, policy implications have to be 
formulated with care.  It seems that policy makers cannot expect multiplicative effects of 
population growth on macroeconomic growth.   Nevertheless, a stabilisation of population 
growth in order to replace generations seems to be advisable for European countries. To 
achieve this aim, countries should enable parents to have the number of children they like.   
Therefore, taking into account the macroeconomic aspects of the cost of children leads to the 
following conclusions: Firstly, it is important to provide equal opportunity for mothers in terms 
of access to human capital, employment and paid income. Secondly, it is important to 
provide parents with the possibility of a ―free choice‖ of the number of children they have. In 
order to achieve these aims, a family policy that focuses on the reconciliation of work and 
family life seems most appropriate. In this sense, policies that promote a more equal division 
of professional, household and child care responsibilities between mothers and fathers, like 
for example schemes that encourage parents to share parental leave, are a suggested step 
towards gender equality. Nevertheless, the macroeconomic discussion of this chapter 
suggests that a family policy that confines itself to equalizing parents‘ responsibilities without 
assuming its own responsibility is not forward-looking enough in terms of macroeconomic 
sustainability. A rise in female employment at the expense of male employment and of 
fertility rates would not contribute to promoting economic growth. Consequently, the 
macroeconomic analysis framework provides a strong argument for countries to discharge 
parents from parts of their family responsibilities in order to enable them to pursue 
professional activities and have children at the same time. Investments in ubiquitous and all-
day public childcare infrastructure play an outstanding role in this context. Furthermore, a 
development of child-care facilities for all ages and all-day schools would not only promote 
women‘s participation in the labour force without reducing fertility and male employment, but 
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Policy implications of the literature review  
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The Communication on "The demographic future of Europe – from challenge to opportunity" (COM 
(2006) 571final), adopted by the European Commission in October 2006, the communication 
―Promoting solidarity between the generations‖ (COM(2007)244 final), adopted on 10 May 2007, and 
the conclusions of the European Council, adopted at its meeting on 30-31 May 2007, argue in favour 
of modernising policies supporting parenthood: policies should be made more effective in creating 
conditions conductive to child-raising, in supporting women‘s participation in the labour force and 
gender equality, and in improving the social inclusion of families and the well-being of children.  
The modernisation of policies supporting families is expected to be crucial, not only in enabling 
Europeans to have the number of children they want, thereby contributing to Europe‘s demographic 
renewal, but also in combating child poverty (a priority in the context of the Open Method of 
Coordination applied to social protection and social inclusion). Moreover, the modernisation process is 
crucial for promoting equal opportunities for women and men, for parents and non-parents and for 
children from different backgrounds and, ultimately, for the success of the Lisbon strategy, which 
depends, to a significant extent, on increasing the labour force participation of women.  
The purpose of this report is to provide an overview of the existing knowledge about how and to what 
extent family policies intend and succeed in compensating for the cost of parenthood and in 
supporting the well-being of families. We first introduce the challenges associated with the assessment 
and compensation for the cost of children, and present some evidence about the mix of policy 
measures that EU Member States have implemented to support families with children. Then, we 
discuss the design of the  policy mix which produces the most effective outcomes in terms of 
preventing child poverty, increasing  the living standards of families, enabling the labour force 
participation of parents, fostering equality between women and men, providing sustainable public 
finances and increasing fertility rates. Relevant questions for policy makers are identified, and policy 
responses emerging from the literature review are explored from an internationally comparative 
perspective.  
What are the challenges for policies supporting parenthood? 
The increase in the number of mothers remaining in the labour force when they have young children 
has raised difficult policy dilemmas to governments. Incentives to raising women‘s participation in the 
labour force have sometimes been seen has competing with measures encouraging fertility and 
childbearing. Governments are faced with decisions about whether and how support parents to 
balance employment and other activities, while encouraging gender equality in domestic and care 
work. Although public provision of financial support and services was often treated in the literature as 
an intervening variable facilitating or impeding work and family life balance, much of the research tend 
to indicate that public provision of childcare is a precondition for combining female employment and 
childbearing. Other factors are however to be considered such as the direct economic, social and 
opportunity costs of parenting, especially for women, the access to labour markets, pay and career 
opportunities, and the well-being of children, as well as  the reduction in child poverty.  
How can the cost of children for parents be assessed?  
From the perspective of households, the economic assessment of the ―cost of children‖ refers to the 
reduction in the standard of living due to the presence of children in the household compared to 
childless households. These costs involve direct and indirect components: 
 Direct costs are measured with reference to the changes in spending due to the presence of 
children in the household. These changes include new expenditure items, such as those 
related to childcare and child-rearing, as well as spending on food, clothing and housing. The 
birth of a first or a third child is, for example, often estimated to produce a significant increase. 
This increase can, however, be balanced by economies of scale due to the enlargement of the 
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family. The assessment of the impact of children on the standard of living of households takes 
into account such economies by using an equivalence scale to weight differences in spending 
patterns according to household size. 
 However, these measures underestimate the actual cost of raising children since they do not 
include the indirect costs associated with the time allocated to children, such as career breaks 
and other potential consequences of the presence of children for the career prospects of 
parents.   
The combination of these two components might lead to a situation where the costs induced by the 
presence of children increase with household income, due to either higher direct expenditures or 
higher forgone earnings. Strictly speaking, compensation for these costs would involve providing more 
support for families with higher incomes, thereby contravening the objective of income redistribution 
which drives social policies. Consequently, compensation for the economic cost of children cannot be 
considered independently from a wider concern about the contribution of family policy to redistribution 
policies. Moreover, policy strategies may differ according to whether they prioritise compensation for 
direct cost – through family or child cash benefit – or the minimisation of indirect costs by means of 
policies aimed at reconciling work and family-life – by means of entitlements to periods of paid leave, 
provision of childcare services or childcare subsidies).   
What does the empirical evidence say about variations in the cost of children?  
According to studies carried out in EU Member States, children account for between 20 and 30% of 
the budget of the households, but this proportion depends on several factors such as the number and 
age of children, education, family income and the bargaining process within the household.  For 
example, in France, the marginal ―direct‖ cost of a child is estimated to decrease with birth parity due 
to economies of scale. The cost also increases with the age of children, especially during the transition 
to adulthood. Changes in consumption patterns are mainly responsible for this increase: while 
spending on food and housing is dominant for younger child, the main budget items for young adults 
are transport, holidays and education. Some studies find that the proportion of the household budget 
devoted to children is higher for wealthier households who can afford to spend more on consumer 
goods, such as clothes, leisure activities, housing environment and schools or universities.  
A number of studies have investigated the level of indirect costs, as well as the determinants of the 
―family earnings gap‖ caused by, for example, the foregone earnings that can be attributed to the 
presence of children compared to the income situation of childless women. These studies find that, 
among EU Member States, the UK, (West) Germany or Portugal incur higher costs than, for example, 
France or Sweden. Significant penalties in pay are also found in Denmark, Ireland, Spain (see table 
1).  
Table 1: Unadjusted Estimates of the Family Gap in Pay 
 Number of Children 
 1 child 2 children 
Germany 88% 85% 
Denmark 109% 103% 
Netherlands 100% 96% 
Belgium 93% 98% 
France 100% 105% 
United Kingdom 90% 75% 
Ireland 99% 94% 
Italy 105% 105% 
Greece 102% 100% 
Spain 93% 94% 
Portugal 82% 90% 
The unadjusted family gap in pay is the percentage difference in earnings of women‘s with 1 or 2 children 
compared to childless women. These estimates are based on the ECHP wave 1. The relative ratio of earnings can 
be higher than 100% for women with 1 or 2 children compared to childless women since they are older on 
average. 




Why does the family gap in pay vary so much across countries? Differences in pay structures and in 
job characteristics are of prime importance compared to differences in labour force participation 
patterns. Differences in the impact of motherhood on career development are also relevant. For 
example, the family pay gap is larger in the UK than in most other Member States because of the 
higher propensity of mothers to work in low-paid part-time jobs and also because women working full-
time may be earning less than men. Career breaks also contribute to a smaller increase in women‘s 
earnings. In Germany and the UK for example, the arrival of a child is clearly associated with lower 
earnings of mothers, even though in the UK one can observe a recovery of women‘s earnings once 
the spell of family formation is competed. By contrast, in France the child-specific component of the 
earning gap of women is much lower than in Germany or in the UK. The main reason is that, although 
children affect women‘s labour market participation rates and consequently women‘s labour market 
experience, they have little or no significant impact on women‘s job selection and on the rewards from 
being in employment.  
Whatever the intensity of the gap is, the birth of children induces indirect cost for households which 
can be reduced by shortening the period of labour market interruption.   
 
Why are policy makers interested in reducing the cost of children for parents?   
Children bring benefits to their parents as well as the rest of society. This is a major argument for 
developing policies designed to share the cost of raising and educating children. Examples of positive 
externalities are intergenerational transfers from children to older people through pensions systems. 
The economic gain in productivity and the social rewards resulting from collective behaviour, such as 
investing in children‘s education, also result in benefits due to policy intervention and hence justify the 
fact that society bears a share of the costs of raising children. 
However, policies supporting families have to confront a number of challenges. Not only are they 
expected to enable Europeans to have the number of children they want, thereby contributing to 
Europe‘s demographic renewal, but they are also required to reduce child poverty (a priority in the 
context of the Open Method of Coordination applied to social protection and social inclusion), to 
promote equal opportunities for women and men, parents and non-parents and children of different 
backgrounds, and to contribute to the success of the Lisbon strategy, which depends to a significant 
extent on an increase in women‘s labour force participation.  
These policy objectives are given greater or lesser priority on the policy agendas of the EU Member 
States, since the situation with regard to women‘s participation in the labour force, fertility rates, or the 
incidence of child poverty differs significantly across countries. Moreover, these objectives may be in 
conflict with one another and policy packages vary according to national priorities. The provision of 
wide-ranging support for families is one way of reconciling these objectives.  
In such a context, there is a clear window of opportunity for the development of public policy 
supporting families. On the one hand, the aim of policies may be to reduce the direct cost of children, 
i.e. the differences in standards of living that can follow the birth of children with the provision of in-
cash support. On the other hand, the provision of comprehensive support to reconcile work and family 
life is expected to reduce the indirect costs of children.  
 
What policy instruments are used to support the cost of children for parents in Member 
States?  
The measures that prevent parents from incurring certain costs or that compensate for these cost 
include cash benefits (immediate and deferred, for example in the form of pension credits), services 
(including access at reduced rates) and tax relief. The way such measures are delivered and funded 













































































































































Source: ESSPROS database - Eurostat 
 
 
According to the Eurostat ESSPROS database, in 2006 spending on families and children in the EU27 
Member States amounted to 2.1% of GDP on average, ranging from 3.7% in Denmark to 0.8% in 
Poland. Nordic countries and also Luxembourg, Germany and Austria appear to devote the largest 
share of GDP to families, whereas South European as well as Central and East European countries 
spend relatively little on families and children, with exceptions such as Hungary and Slovenia. 
ESSPROS classifies family/child benefits under nine types of benefits that can be grouped in three 
core family policy measures: cash support, child-rearing allowances during maternity and parental 
leave and services (in kind benefits). However, a wider range of policy instruments can be included 
under the heading of ‗family policies‘, such as social protection provisions other than those focusing 
specifically on families with children but which have a visible effect on family income, for example  
supplements for children in housing benefits, health insurance coverage for children or pension 
supplements. Spending on education may also be taken into account, particularly in countries that 
have developed a pre-school system. Tax breaks in certain countries represent also an important 
component in the support provided to families. Support from companies or NGOs can also be 
considered.  
What are the most cost-effective ways of supporting families with children? 
The literature considers the issue of efficiency in terms of a ―costs‖ and ―benefits‖ balance derived from 
the implementation of policy programs supporting families. The ―benefits‖ refer to the impact of policies 
on household members‘ well-being and on their employment or fertility behaviour. When trying to 
assess such impacts, researchers are confronted with the fact that an impact is recorded 
simultaneously in several areas of behaviour. Results can even be conflicting when, for example, one 
policy measure is found to have a positive impact on parental employment or poverty, but a negative 
one on fertility decisions. This means that, irrespective of their cost, policies cannot be considered to 
be efficient if they fail to achieve a satisfactory balance between the outcomes associated with the 
different goals assigned to policies supporting families. Hence, policy ―costs‖ have to be set against 
their long-run returns.  
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How effective are labour market policies in supporting families? 
It is often argued that employment-related policies are most cost-effective, since they combine 
different objectives. In this case, however, the support needs to be sufficiently wide ranging to meet 
the many needs of families. Thus, policies that encourage parents, living alone or with partners, to be 
in work are found to offer an efficient means of reducing the risk of poverty, while raising the standard 
of living of families with children and promoting greater gender equality in the labour market. Higher 
employment rates can also generate a higher income for the state by means of taxation, which can 
contribute to the funding of social and family policies. This virtuous circle can be achieved, however, 
only if the support provided is sufficient to meet the basic needs of families and to help both parents 
combine work and family life and to share caring tasks. If the policy is too narrowly focused on work, it 
does neither improve the standard of living of families, nor prevent income inequalities, nor promote 
child development or higher fertility rates. The literature suggests that a mix of support is needed, 
including cash benefits to support the welfare of families, entitlements to employment-protected leave 
after the birth of a child, and the provision of high quality affordable childcare services, if these various 
dimensions are to be reconciled. The most positive outcomes are observed in countries where support 
is wide ranging. Such provision is undoubtedly costly, and some EU Member States may not be able 
or willing to devote the necessary amount of spending to family support measures. 
 
Are programs targeted at families with the greatest needs more effective than universal 
programs?  
The provision of ―targeted‖ support to low-income families is often regarded as a means to limit the 
fiscal burden. Practices vary across the Member States according to the relative importance of means-
tested and non-means-tested benefits (Chart 2).  
 































































































































Means-tested benefits are more common in Member States with low levels of social expenses devoted 
to families and children, especially in Southern European Member States (with the exception of 
Cyprus) and also in a majority of Central and Eastern European Member States (with the exception of 
Estonia, Latvia and Slovakia). Nordic countries, by contrast, have no or very few means-tested 
benefits and devote a high percentage of GDP to supporting families and children. Germany, France 
and Ireland stand in a particular position due to the combination of means-tested and non-means-
tested benefits and a relatively high percentage of GDP devoted to families and children.  
Universal benefit programmes have been shown to be more powerful in reducing poverty than 
targeted support for low income families for a number of reasons. Universal programmes receive 
support from a wider range of stakeholders, and the amount of support remains consequently greater. 
Universal programmes are also likely to be more effective in withstanding budgetary constraints during 
periods of crisis and austerity. Targeted programmes may fail to reach the families with the greatest 
needs due to high transaction costs and lack of information for some potential recipients. Moreover, 
targeted support is generally considered to be less readily acceptable by tax payers, who do not 
expect to benefit themselves from such support; it appears to be less robust over time and seems to 
be less effective in reducing poverty.   
However, the provision of ―universal‖ access to all benefits and services is usually more costly and 
needs to be sufficiently well funded to have an impact. It is therefore argued that a realistic and cost-
effective support system needs to be based on two pillars:  
- The first pillar provides ―universal‖ in-cash and in-kind support to cover basic needs. On the 
one hand, universal cash benefit aims to limit the risk of poverty; on the other, the provision of 
a universally-based minimum of childcare services goes some way towards guaranteeing 
more egalitarian conditions of care and a more egalitarian preparation for schooling among 
young children. 
- The second pillar provides ―targeted‖ benefits and/or services to meet specific needs and to 
supplement support for the population with the greatest needs.  
Several advantages of a two pillar policy support are proposed in the literature: 
 By maintaining a range of universal support measures and covering all categories of 
families, such a combination is likely to receive more widespread support, even during 
periods of economic austerity.  
 Maintaining a set of universal support measures limits the stigmatisation of families 
receiving support.  
 The combination of the two pillars is likely to create confidence about the sustainability 
and durability of the system. This confidence is certainly needed to ensure that people 
use the existing support, and that policy delivery is effective. Confidence also partially 
explains the success of policies supporting families in countries like the Nordic states or 
France with a long tradition of government intervention.  
 
Is support in cash or kind more effective in tackling the cost of children?  
Childcare support can be provided either in cash or in kind. To promote access to high quality 
services, many countries have implemented programmes to support both the development of services 
and the solvability of households. Several EU Member States increased cash payments to parents to 
enable greater access to childcare facilities. However, the ratio between support in cash and in kind 
still varies across countries. In the Nordic states, priority is given to support in kind, whereas in Central 
and East European countries, childcare support is mostly offered in cash. On average, the 27 EU 
Member States devoted 0.6% of GDP to benefits in kind or services to families and children in 2006, 
ranging from 1.4% or more in Nordic countries to 0.2% or less in the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Latvia, 
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Whether it is preferable to provide childcare support in cash or in kind remains a controversial issue. It 
is often argued that support in cash gives parents the opportunity to choose between different forms of 
childcare, which encourages childcare providers to respond better to the needs of parents (see below). 
However, in-kind support is defended by three main arguments: 
 Firstly, programmes providing benefits in kind (services) guarantee that the support is actually 
used by parents to access childcare services with a minimum standard of quality. Benefits in 
kind can also guarantee that children in families with different socio-economic statuses or 
living conditions and backgrounds have access to a relatively homogenous quality standard of 
services. This argument is based on the traditional paternalistic view of social welfare.  
 Secondly, programmes offering services in-kind are useful in overcoming the risk of 
inefficiency associated with the provision of cash benefits, especially when benefits are 
targeted. Such benefits can indeed fail to cover families with the highest or with specific 
needs, unless comprehensive programs are developed to identify their targets accurately. The 
administrative costs of such programs can potentially be high. In-kind benefits provided on a 
universal basis can consequently help to overcome such inefficiencies. 
 Thirdly, the development of cash payments often includes subsidies for parents who 
themselves care for their own children during their early years. However, the incidence of such 
a diversified set of subsidies creates inequalities: women who are disadvantaged because of 
their labour market position or the lack of affordable high quality childcare services are often 
forced to accept cash benefits and stay at home, while those in higher socio-economic 
positions can make use of childcare services. Thus, although cash payments make it easier 
for governments to respond to social demands for more choices regarding childcare, they 
have an ambiguous impact on women‘s labour market performance and thereby create (or 




What are the most effective policies to enhance the well-being of families? 
In addition to employment and demographic objectives, policies supporting parenthood are also aimed 
at improving family life, the reconciliation between work and family obligations and the well-being of 
children. Work–life balance has progressively gain ground on the policy agenda in most EU member 
states, emphasizing the importance of time devoted to children as well as the importance of reducing 
their monetary costs. According to the EurLife data base of the European Foundation for the 
improvement of life and working conditions, Europeans generally consider family life as being very 
important. However, almost 30% of men in the EU25 find that their job prevents them from devoting 
time to their family, compared to 28% of women. Several surveys suggest that people who succeed in 
reconciling their work with family life are more satisfied with their family life in general. But 
reconciliation appears to be more difficult for some vulnerable groups such as lone parent families, 
notably when they receive limited policy support. The issue is therefore to identify what kind of support 
can be developed to improving the work and family life reconciliation. It is also to identify what is 
considered as being the best support for the child well-being.       
 
Can the various objectives of family support be achieved simultaneously or do they compete 
with each other?  
The reconciliation of paid work and family life has long been on the Community and national agendas 
throughout the European Union in order to promote gender equality and the labour force participation 
of women. These goals are sometimes seen as competing with the goals of children‘s well-being and 
fertility. However, in a number of the countries where governments have long supported childcare 
provision and parenting, women‘s employment rates are today higher than in countries with poor 
policy support to parenthood.   
The effectiveness of such policies is found in some of the literature to stem from a holistic approach to 
policy support for parenthood, suggesting that countries with longstanding and diversified support for 
families may score better on the three criteria of achieving relatively high female employment, low 
poverty and high fertility rates. Reconciling work and family life therefore tends to be promoted as a 
more effective policy strategy than supporting the choice between work and care. The existence of a 
continuum of support throughout early childhood would seem to be a key characteristic of countries 
where the aim is to achieve higher fertility, greater female labour market participation and higher 
employment rates for lone parents, while reducing the risk of poverty. 
Affordable all-day care facilities for children of all ages are being actively promoted in a number of 
countries and at EU level to support to mothers‘ employment and encourage families to have more 
children on the grounds that good provision of childcare facilities and short periods of parental leave 
can prevent mothers from long career interruptions after childbirth, thus limiting the negative impact on 
wage progression and career prospects. At the same time, a leave system that motivates fathers to 
take up leave should contribute to a more equal sharing of work and care between parents, although 
the evidence shows that the number of days of leave taken by either men or women remain quite 
unbalanced. A minimum entitlement to paid parental leave and early enrolment in childcare and 
education services has also been shown in some studies to be beneficial for children's well-being, 
especially for those from a disadvantaged family background. With regard to fertility, most research 
findings agree that such policies have an impact on the timing of births and possibly also on fertility 
levels. The impact of reconciliation policies is clearer than those exclusively based on cash support. A 
longstanding and stable institutional and family environment may also be a critical factor in producing 
positive outcomes. 
Furthermore, the literature suggests that family support measures concentrating essentially on 
women‘s childbearing and childrearing years are not sufficient to enhance the work–family balance. 
Support beyond early childhood is necessary to help the conciliation between work and family life, 
foster gender equality and reduce the impact of children on career prospects.  
Whereas a large range of practices are identified across Europe with respect to childcare in the very 
early months of life, there is no evidence from the literature that it is better for infants to be cared for by 
their parents at home or by professional in childcare services. Research findings differ from one 




Does provision in kind provide better access to high quality childcare than market-based 
provision with cash support?  
In general, provision in kind is thought to provide greater access to childcare services with a minimum 
level of standardised quality, especially with respect to the qualification of care workers and the child–
staff ratio. By contrast, the provision of childcare subsidies in cash is believed to provide more freedom 
of choice and diversity of supply, better matching of parents‘ needs and ―consumers‘‖ preferences. A 
rapid increase in market-based childcare capacity can also be achieved, as has been the case in the 
Netherlands or in the United Kingdom in the recent years. There are, however, concern about the 
beneficiaries of market forces who are more potentially urban areas and higher income households.  
Provision in kind usually takes the form of public services whereas provision in cash allows parents to 
buy services provided by the private sector. But there is a considerable evidence of mixed provision 
everywhere, even in countries with an available and affordable public childcare service. Some EU 
Member States like the Nordic countries have supported the development of services in kind placing 
particular emphasis on the quality of childcare associated with a high level of qualifications of care 
workers, an affordable cost for parents and the use of pedagogical methods ensuring the cognitive 
development of children. Some other countries have developed benefits in cash, ensuring that parents 
will be able to buy services on the market, according to their preferences. Although the former solution 
ensures more equality for families and children, the latter provides parents with more freedom of 
choice and more flexibility.  
The choice between public and private childcare services with regard to quality is somewhat complex, 
because it depends on what outcomes and policy objectives are being sought. Whereas the quality of 
childcare in public services is regulated, controlled and hence similar all over the country, except in 
federal states and where local authorities are in charge of provision,   the quality of childcare in private 
collective services may vary widely according to the price that parents are able or prepared to pay for 
care. The more they pay the greater the quality they expect. The risk is to create a dual childcare 
market with ―high quality‖ childcare for well-off parents on the one hand and low quality childcare 
services for those parent who cannot afford better quality services. Hence, several conditions have to 
be met in regulating private as well as public childcare and prevent polarisation: the definition and 
control of quality standards that service providers have to comply with, the recruitment of trained and 
qualified staff, the related wages of childcare workers, the standardisation of child–staff ratios and the 
allocation of childcare subsidies conditional on the use of certified services.  
The French case provides an interesting perspective on the debate since support is provided both in 
cash and in kind, depending on the parents' preferences. In opinion survey, a majority of parents with 
young children state their preference for childcare in a ―crèche‖ because of the focus on the child's 
development and the early socialisation of children in a collective environment. Parents who have their 
child cared for by a registered childminder tend to emphasise their needs as working parents: 
childminders are more flexible with respect to working time than collective services. Some parents 
may also prefer a childminder because they find the environment more family-like than in a crèche. 
Nevertheless, the quality of childcare by childminders remains a controversial issue. Not only their 
qualifications, but also the possibility of controlling the quality of the care offered in particular are 
criticised. Furthermore, even if highly subsidised by social and fiscal benefits, childcare provided by 
childminders remains unaffordable for the poorest parents in most countries and does not seem to be 
a viable substitute for collective public childcare arrangements. 
 
What is the impact of mothers’ paid employment on children living in lone-parent families?  
EU employment policy encourages parents to join the labour force, whatever their family situation. 
Lone parents, especially lone mothers face particular challenges in this regard. In some countries 
whether the well-being of young children with lone parents are better catered for when the parent is in 
paid employment or stays at home remains a controversial issue. Some of the literature suggests that 
children of lone parents are effectively better off when the parent is in paid work since employment 
appears to be the best protection against poverty and precariousness. However, lone parents need be 
supported by affordable childcare facilities and by other facilities aimed at balancing work and family 





Is it preferable to make provision for a short period of well-paid parental leave or a long 
period of leave with a low level of compensation?  
Even though all EU Member States guarantee a minimum provision of maternity and parental leave, 
the length, remuneration and flexibility of the existing periods of leave differ markedly across countries. 
Research findings tend to highlight the positive impact of paid parental leave on children's health and 
cognitive development. However, these findings depend on the quality of the time devoted by parents 
to care for their children, and also on the quality of services that can be substituted for parental care. 
Research also shows that the employment of parents, notably of mothers, can have a positive effect 
on the well-being of children living in an underprivileged environment. This finding does not only apply 
to lone-parent households, but also may be explained by the parents‘ socio-economic background, 
household composition, the home environment and ethnic origin. Whereas many of the studies 
showing the negative impact of the mother‘s participation in the labour force on child well-being have 
been conducted in the US and the UK, where parental leave is generally unpaid and the range and 
quality of childcare services have long been relatively underdeveloped, a positive impact of the 
mother‘s labour force participation on child well-being is found in EU Member States where parental 
leave is paid and childcare services are of good quality. 
Another controversial issue about parental leave is its impact on mothers‘ employment progression 
and social rights. Comparative research has highlighted the negative impact of long parental leave on 
women‘s patterns of employment and the probability of resuming work after the interruption. It is 
generally assumed that a three-year period of parental leave discourages less qualified women from 
returning to work after the leave, reduces employability and thereby increases the risk of poverty for 
families and the vulnerability of the mother. Several Member States have opted for a shorter parental 
leave of about one year allowing a higher rate of wage replacement (Nordic countries and Germany), 
while other Member States have opted for a long period of less well-paid parental leave (in France for 
example where recent reforms have attempted to encourage part-time leave combined with part-time 
work during the three first years of the child in order to maintain links with the enterprise while 
childrearing). The former pattern is expected to maintain the link between the parents, the employer 
and the work place, thereby limiting the negative outcomes of parental leave on careers and pensions 
rights.  
Part-time leave can also be an option to maintain the link with employers and, at the same time, to 
provide time for parents to care for their children. This option also provides more flexibility for parents 
to make time use arrangements. In this perspective, many EU countries have introduced the possibility 
for parents to take leave on a part-time basis. Too long a period of part-time work taken by one parent 
can, however, have long term consequences on his/her earnings and career progression since part-
time work, usually when taken by women, is found to be an important determinant of the gender and 
family wage gap. 
 
How can a more equitable sharing of parental leave be ensured between mothers and 
fathers?  
In addition to the negative impact of long breaks in employment on wage progression and promotional 
prospects, a negative impact on gender equality has also been reported. Indeed, whether long or 
short, full-time or part-time, paid or unpaid, the take-up of parental leave is highly gendered, since in 
all countries, few fathers take parental leave or even part of it. However, more fathers tend to take 
leave in countries where parental leave is relatively short and well paid and, above all, where there are 
specific incentives for fathers to take up parental leave as in Iceland, Sweden and more recently in 
Germany. Hence, three parameters have to be considered to ensure a more equitable sharing of 
parental leave between women and men: a replacement income proportional to individual wages, the 
existence of a non-transferable period of leave and the flexibility of leave take up, such as the 




What are the effects of early childcare outside the family on the later development of young 
children?  
Another controversial issue concerns the impact of children‘s early enrolement in collective care on 
their later development.  However, a large number of studies suggest that high quality formal day care 
in the year prior to kindergarten increases readiness for school, and also non-cognitive development.  
Furthermore, although the early enrolment of children, i.e. within their first two years of life in childcare 
centres or preschool is not proven to be better for the child in all cases, several studies suggest that 
child development (measured by delayed performance at school or slow cognitive development) is, at 
least, not worse than when they are looked after for three years by their parents, provided they have 
access to high-quality childcare. This statement is especially true for disadvantaged families, such as 
those headed by a lone parent, for whom an early enrolment of children in childcare services is also 
found to reduce the risk of poverty (which is detrimental for the well-being of all the family members 
including children). Surely, it is not only the enrolment of the child that matters in the case of poverty 
but the fact that the mother is bringing in an income, as stated above. However, in any case, the 
quality of childcare services is a critical factor in determining its impact on child development. 
 
What are the long-term benefits of investing in family policy for society and for 
families?  
Many governments may be reluctant to increase their expenditure on families, especially in periods of 
retrenchment of public spending. The benefits expected for children and, later, for society as a whole, 
imply that such policies must be considered as an ―investment‖ rather than a ―burden‖ for society.  
Can policies focused on children be viewed as an investment? 
Some authors emphasise the benefits of investment in early childhood, especially for disadvantaged 
children, on ―productivity grounds‖. Investment in high-quality childcare for example significanlty 
increases the exposure of children to education. Such investment may result in better educated pupils 
capable of developing their human capital later in life, thus making them less likely to experience 
unemployment later on during their working life and offering them better employment prospects. Social 
capital may also be positively affected if the provision of high quality care services in early childhood 
reduces initial social inequalities associated with family background. 
The evidence of returns on investment in early childhood remains relatively scarce given the difficulty 
of properly evaluating them in the long run. Findings are also influenced by the assumptions 
underlying calculations. Nevertheless, examples of rough estimations can be given. One estimation 
found a 9% increase in female employment in the United Kingdom and the corresponding GDP growth 
for an initial cost of £3 billion. An evaluation for Zurich in Switzerland concluded that each franc 
invested in childcare services generates a return of 3 francs in the form of increased tax revenues 
resulting from the increase in the parents‘ labour supply. Similarly, returns on investment are roughly 
estimated at 143% of initial spending on childcare in Denmark. 
What macroeconomic rewards can be expected from reconciliation and gender equality 
policies? 
Investment in reconciliation measures and in early childhood can benefit not only mothers and children 
in terms of income and human capital. The return on investment from family policies in terms of tax 
revenues and productivity gains are also recorded at the collective level. Although empirical evidence 
on the exact incidence of policies is lacking, analysis of the relationship between female labour market 
participation, human capital, fertility and economic growth suggests that the investment in work and 
family reconciliation policies generates a dynamic that benefits all of society. A series of theoretical 
arguments have been formulated suggesting that gender-specific differences in education reduce a 
country‘s growth. Other theoretical studies suggest that women‘s employment and income promotes 
economic growth. A series of empirical investigations have been conducted into the impact of 
women‘s education, employment and income on macroeconomic growth. Recent empirical studies 
agree that gender-related differences in education, employment and income hinder economic growth. 
Therefore, the indirect cost of children in terms of the loss of qualifications for mothers, employment 
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opportunities and income are not only to the disadvantage of mothers and their children‘s well-being, 
but also to the disadvantage of the society as a whole. Consequently, policies fostering reconciliation 
between qualifications, labour market participation and family life can thus be expected to impact 
positively on the growth dynamics in the long run. Moreover, policies that promote a more equal 
division of professional, household and childcare responsibilities between mothers and fathers can be 
expected to stimulate a country‘s growth performance and raise aggregate welfare. These arguments 
may provide a motivation for sharing the costs of children and developing public policies supporting 
families.  
